State v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 12 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1764.,13–1764. |
| Citation | 856 N.W.2d 915 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Mark Aaron THOMPSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Benjamin D. Bergmann of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble & Gentry, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather R. Quick, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Andrea M. Petrovich, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
The defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State and proceeded to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The court accepted his plea and set sentencing for a later date. At the time of sentencing, the court did not follow the recommendations in the plea agreement.
The defendant waived reporting of the sentencing hearing. The court failed to give its reason for the defendant's sentence in the written sentencing order. The defendant appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals relied on State v. Mudra, 532 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1995), and State v. Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 197–98 (Iowa 2010). It affirmed the sentence, holding the defendant waived his appeal rights as to his sentence. The court of appeals also held language in defendant's petition to plead guilty did not require the court to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea and therefore complied with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10.
On further review, we overrule our decisions in Mudra and Alloway and hold a judge must give his or her reasons for the defendant's sentence either on the record at a hearing or in the written sentencing order. From this time forward, a defendant does not waive his or her right to an appeal when the defendant waives reporting of the sentencing hearing and the judge fails to include his or her reasons for the sentence in the sentencing order. Additionally, we hold because the plea agreement was not conditioned on the concurrence of the district court, the court did not err in deviating from the plea agreement. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the defendant's sentence, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On August 19, 2013, the State charged Mark Thompson with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2013). The State offered Thompson a plea deal and filed it with the district court. In exchange for a guilty plea to the offense originally charged, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of sixty days incarceration, a $625 fine, and no probation. Thompson accepted the plea offer. On October 10, he filed a petition to plead guilty. Thompson's petition stated the plea agreement stipulated the State wanted sixty days in jail with no probation, but Thompson was free to argue for less jail time at sentencing. On the same day, the district court entered an order accepting the plea and set Thompson's sentencing hearing.
On October 31, the district court sentenced Thompson. The only record of the sentencing is a sentencing-order form filled out in pen by the judge. The form indicates Thompson waived reporting of the sentencing hearing. The form also indicates the district court deviated from the recommended sentence in the plea agreement. The district court sentenced Thompson to two years of incarceration with all but fifteen days of the sentence suspended and placed Thompson on probation for two years.1 The court gave Thompson two days' credit for time served.
However, the district court did not fill out the section of the sentencing-order form regarding reasons for the court's sentence, which required the judge to check one or more boxes that the judge found consistent with the reasons for the chosen sentence. This section of the form reads as follows:
On November 7, Thompson filed a notice of appeal, arguing the district court erred by failing to state on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed and that the district court improperly deviated from the sentence agreed upon in the plea agreement. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence because under current caselaw, Thompson “waived his appellate claim that the court violated Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) ” by failing to provide a record the court could rely upon to determine if an abuse of discretion occurred. Thompson then filed this application for further review, which we granted.
The first issue we must decide is whether a defendant who waives reporting of sentencing and fails to provide a recreated record under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.806(1) or Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.25(1) waives error when the sentencing judge fails to indicate on the written record the reasons for the sentence imposed. We must also decide whether the district court erred by failing to impose the sentence agreed upon in the plea agreement.
We will reverse a decision of the district court when an abuse of discretion occurs or there is some defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). When the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable, an abuse of discretion occurs. Id. We review the court's determination to accept or reject a plea agreement for abuse of discretion. State v. Barker, 476 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Iowa Ct.App.1991).
The Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure state a “court shall state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence” it imposes on the defendant. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d ). This requirement ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal actions.See State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Iowa 2001). Most importantly, the sentence statement affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing court. See Alloway, 707 N.W.2d at 584 (). The district court can satisfy this requirement by orally stating the reasons on the record or placing the reasons in the written sentencing order. See Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304–05.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 9.
In State v. Pierce, the defendant argued the district court's failure to state a reason on the record for the sentence imposed was error. 287 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1980). We remanded the case for resentencing based upon the district court's failure to provide reasons for the sentences on the record. Id. at 575. We came to the same result in State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 589 (Iowa 1980).
We have also held when discretion is not at issue, the district court should state the fact that it lacks discretion for the sentence imposed on the record. State v. Matlock, 304 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 1981) ( ). Our rationale for this requirement was that there were practical reasons for the sentencing statement even when the district court lacks discretion. Id. There we said:
Applying these principles, the court of appeals remanded a case for resentencing where there was no transcript of the sentencing hearing and the sentencing order indicated the sentencing court considered “the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's background,” when it pronounced its sentence. State v. Cooper, 403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa Ct.App.1987). In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals said “[t]he present record,...
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