State v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 24 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 72997-2.,72997-2.
• Citation: 92 P.3d 228,151 Wash.2d 793
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Ross THOMPSON, Petitioner.

92 P.3d 228

151 Wash.2d 793

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Ross THOMPSON, Petitioner.

No. 72997-2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued June 10, 2003.

Decided June 24, 2004.

Rita Joan Griffith, Seattle, for Petitioner.

Kathleen Proctor, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorneys Office, Tacoma, for Respondent.

BRIDGE, J.

James Ross Thompson seeks review of his conviction for unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. Thompson asks this court to review three issues: (1) whether police could forcibly enter his home to execute a civil arrest warrant; (2) whether the "community caretaking function" allowed police to enter his home when there was no reason to believe someone was in danger or presented danger in the home; and (3) whether police were required to obtain his consent before searching the boathouse on the property. We conclude that when serving a civil arrest warrant, police may not forcibly enter into a home, and that in this case, a police officer's entry into Thompson's home to retrieve a guest's jacket was not justified by the community caretaking function. However, when applying the "common authority" standard, Thompson fails to qualify as a co-occupant and therefore his consent was not necessary to search the boathouse.

I

Thompson lived on his parents' property on Fox Island. He resided in a 22-foot travel trailer, owned by his parents, while his parents lived in a house on the property. Also on the property was a boathouse that had housed a boat owned by the elder Thompsons.

In June of 2000, Thompson's father, John, wanted Thompson removed from his property because John suspected that Thompson was involved in illicit drug activity. John contacted the Pierce County Sheriff's Office and reported that Thompson had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Deputy Larson from the sheriff's office testified that he confirmed such warrant existed and it was for Thompson's failure to pay child support.

On June 5, 2000, Deputies Larson and Myron went to the trailer where Thompson was living to arrest him on the outstanding warrant. Upon arrival at the travel trailer, Deputy Larson announced, "[T]his is the sheriff[']s office, I have a warrant for James['] arrest." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 38; Report of Proceedings (RP) at 58. The deputies then heard movement and scuffling inside the trailer, and after waiting approximately 10 seconds, the deputies opened the door of the trailer. The deputies immediately saw Thompson and ordered him out of the trailer and to put his hands onto the trailer. Thompson was then handcuffed by Deputy Myron.

The deputies also observed that there was another individual inside the trailer and ordered him to come out also. Sund was patted down to make sure he was unarmed and told to leave the area. Before leaving, Sund told the deputies that he needed his jacket from inside the trailer. Deputy Larson entered the trailer to retrieve Sund's jacket and to make sure that no one else was inside. While inside the trailer, Deputy Larson observed that the oven was open and in it "was a container that had white crystalline residue cooked onto it." RP at 41. He also testified that he smelled a strong chemical similar to paint thinner. Id. at 42. Based on his experience and training, Deputy Larson was concerned that the odor he detected was methamphetamine related so he quickly left the trailer.

After leaving the trailer, Deputy Larson placed Thompson in the back of the patrol car and Deputy Myron read Thompson his Miranda¹ rights. Based on the odor observed in the trailer, Deputy Larson went toward the elder Thompsons' home to look for Sund and to inform John Thompson of his son's arrest. Deputy Larson acknowledged that he wanted to arrest Sund because he was in the trailer where the deputy observed the suspicious items.

The elder Thompsons informed Deputy Larson that no one had come to the house. John Thompson then asked Deputy Larson to search the attached garage. Deputy Larson did not find anyone in the garage and asked John about the detached boathouse. The elder Thompson said that the boathouse was his, that James used it, and answered "`Please do,'" when Deputy Larson asked for permission to look inside. RP at 45.

Deputy Larson did not find Sund in the boathouse, but he did find items that were consistent with a methamphetamine lab in a living area on the second floor. After this observation, Deputy Larson asked the elder Thompsons to sign a consent form for a search of the boathouse, which they both did. Deputy Larson did not seek Thompson's consent either before or after the search.

At some point during his time on the property, Deputy Larson called for a team of methamphetamine lab investigators. Deputy Harms, a clandestine lab investigator, responded to the call. After conferring with Deputy Larson, Deputy Harms entered the trailer to make sure that the oven was turned off. Deputy Harms then inspected a burn barrel and a couple of burn piles outside the trailer that contained material consistent with the production of methamphetamine. He also checked the safety of a corroded propane tank that was located in front of the trailer. Finally, Deputy Harms looked inside the boathouse and observed the same items found by Deputy Larson earlier. After determining that the property appeared to be a methamphetamine lab but that it was a "fairly safe environment," Deputy Harms secured the premises. RP at 79-80. Deputy Harms returned the next day with a search warrant to process the evidence.

Thompson was charged with one count of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. See former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) (1998).² He sought to suppress the evidence obtained following his arrest. Pierce County Superior Court denied his motion to suppress evidence found in the trailer but concluded that Thompson's consent was necessary before the search of the boathouse. Despite finding the search of the boathouse invalid, the trial court convicted Thompson as charged following a bench trial on stipulated evidence.

In a published decision, Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed Thompson's conviction. State v. Thompson, 112 Wash.App. 787, 51 P.3d 143 (2002). Regarding the issue of forcible entry on a civil warrant, the Court of Appeals concluded that the knock and wait statute (RCW 10.31.040) could be applied to the service of such warrant because the deputies involved could not determine whether the warrant was for a criminal or civil matter, and thus, the officers had not acted unreasonably under the circumstances. Thompson, 112 Wash.App. at 795, 51 P.3d 143 ("[W]e decline to require officers at the scene of an arrest to anticipate the nature of any resulting court proceeding.").

With regard to the retrieval of Sund's jacket from the trailer, the Court of Appeals held that it was a valid exercise of the officer's community caretaking function. Thompson, 112 Wash.App. at 797,51 P.3d 143. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the officers did not need to obtain the consent of Thompson to search the boathouse because the boathouse was a place "where one cohabitant might receive a visitor without the other cohabitant's consent." Id. at 802, 51 P.3d 143.

II Knock and Wait Statute

Thompson argues that police officers should not be permitted, under the authority of RCW 10.31.040 (the "knock and wait" statute), to forcibly enter a private dwelling to serve a civil arrest warrant in a civil contempt procedure. We agree.

The "knock and wait" statute provides:

To make an arrest in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner door, or windows of a dwelling house or other building, or any other inclosure, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance.

RCW 10.31.040 (emphasis added).

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo by this court. State v. Tarabochia, 150 Wash.2d 59, 63, 74 P.3d 642 (2003). This court's primary duty in interpreting any statute is to discern and implement the intent of the legislature. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, we are to give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Tarabochia, 150 Wash.2d at 63, 74 P.3d 642. When the plain language is unambiguous—that is, when the statutory language has but one meaning—the legislative intent is clear, and the statute will not be interpreted otherwise. J.P., 149 Wash.2d at 450, 69 P.3d 318. Further, we cannot "`add words or clauses to an unambiguous statute when the legislature has chosen not to include that language.'" Id. (quoting State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003)).

The plain language of RCW 10.31.040 is clear. Its unambiguous language does not encompass the enforcement of civil arrest warrants. Because we cannot add words or clauses to an unambiguous statute, we are prohibited from reading into the statute "civil actions." Thus, we presume that the legislature intended to exclude "civil actions" from RCW 10.31.040. Therefore, we hold that RCW 10.31.040 does not allow forcible entry into dwellings to execute civil warrants.

In the present case, there was a bench warrant for Thompson's arrest for failure to appear at a show cause hearing regarding his failure to pay child support. This warrant was issued under RCW 26.18.050, which provides that a civil bench warrant may be issued in such circumstances. RCW 26.18.050(3). In light of our holding today, the deputies erred in forcibly opening the trailer door when executing the civil warrant. The "knock and wait" statute does not encompass the execution of civil arrest warrants.

Community Caretaking Function

It has long been held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d 373, 384, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). However, there are exceptions to this...