State v. Thompson, 96-183

• Decision Date: 16 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-183,96-183
• Citation: 708 A.2d 192,167 Vt. 383
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Richard THOMPSON.

Page 192

708 A.2d 192

167 Vt. 383

STATE of Vermont v. Richard THOMPSON.

No. 96-183.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Jan. 16, 1998.

John T. Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney, Middlebury, for plaintiff-appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, Montpelier, and Larry S. Novins, Public Defender, Middlebury, for defendant-appellant.

Before AMESTOY, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

JOHNSON, Justice.

Defendant, who received a one-year suspended sentence after entering a conditional no-contest plea to a charge of simple domestic assault, 13 V.S.A. § 1042, argues on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) finding him competent to stand trial and enter a plea, and (2) failing to engage in the colloquy required by V.R.Cr.P. 11(c). Because we agree with defendant's second argument, we vacate the plea and conviction without addressing his first argument.

At arraignment, after defense counsel stated that he had substantial questions about defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings, the district court ordered an out-patient evaluation of defendant's competency. The examining psychiatrist's report to the court, which was based on a one-hour interview, indicated that defendant is a person with mild mental retardation, having an intelligence quotient below 70. The report also noted that defendant is illiterate and has a history of alcohol abuse. According to the report, defendant has a severely limited fund of information and a severely compromised ability to engage in abstract reasoning.

The examining psychiatrist also addressed in his report, albeit briefly, defendant's understanding of the legal process and the specific charge against him. The psychiatrist concluded that defendant was "marginally competent" to stand trial, but acknowledged that defendant's "incomplete understanding of the events of the assault as well as his mental limitations will undoubtedly handicap his defense preparation."

Both the psychiatrist and defendant testified at the competency hearing, held a few months later. The psychiatrist restated his conclusion that defendant was marginally competent. He testified that defendant had "sort of an understanding" of the legal issues, and opined that if the situation "were spelled out [defendant] could have a good global understanding of what he apparently or allegedly had done." The psychiatrist also stated that he thought defendant would be able to understand different aspects of the legal system if they were explained to him carefully. Based on the psychiatrist's testimony, and notwithstanding defendant's testimony demonstrating his limited understanding of the proceedings against him, the court found defendant competent to stand trial.

Seven months later, defendant appeared for a status conference before a different judge. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant did not want to have a trial, but expressed serious reservations about his client's level of understanding. Counsel requested that the court be especially careful in assuring that defendant understood the rights he was giving up. When the judge asked defendant what a trial was, defendant responded, presumably referring to one of the police officers who had questioned him on the night of the assault, "He'll come back. At the trial he'll come back here.... Same deal over. And I don't want it." The judge then asked defendant if he understood that a trial would be about whether or not he hit the victim. Defendant replied, "I did hit her. I'm guilty." The judge explained that at trial, the victim would testify and the State would have to prove that defendant hit her. Defendant responded, "I did it.... I don't need to prove it."

Following a few more brief exchanges between defendant and the court, the court announced that it would accept the plea. Defense counsel then asked the court if he could question defendant. In response to further questioning from his counsel, defendant explained that the role of the jury is to "talk to me." Asked about the job of the judge, defendant replied, "I might win.... Well, she might win and I might lose." Counsel then asked:

Q: Do you know in a trial who decides if you hit [the victim] or didn't hit [the victim]?

A: Yeah.

Q: Who?

A: I hit her.

Q: But in a trial who would decide that?

A: Her.

COUNSEL: This is my concern, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, it's a valid concern.

Nevertheless, the court declined to revisit the competency issue, reasoning that the first judge had held a full hearing on the issue, with the benefit of the psychiatrist's report and testimony. The court accepted defense counsel's request for a conditional plea, which reserved defendant's right to appeal the competency issue. Defense counsel did not raise any issue regarding V.R.Cr.P. 11. This appeal followed.

Because we conclude that the second judge failed to satisfy Rule 11(c) before accepting defendant's plea, we need not decide either whether the first judge erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial or whether the second judge erred in refusing to reconsider the first judge's competency ruling. Even assuming that the second judge was justified in relying on the initial competency determination, the record does not support his acceptance of defendant's plea.

A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to enter a plea; the trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687 n. 12, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). The focus of a competency inquiry is on whether the defendant has the capacity to understand the proceedings, while the focus of a plea inquiry, aside from assuring that the decision is not coerced, is on whether the defendant does understand the significance and consequences of the decision to enter a plea rather...