State v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 05 April 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-0775,16-0775
• Citation: 813 S.E.2d 59
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Frank Gene THOMPSON, Defendant Below, Petitioner
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

813 S.E.2d 59

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

v.Frank Gene THOMPSON, Defendant Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0775

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: February 7, 2018

Filed: April 5, 2018

Dana F. Eddy, Esq., Public Defender Services, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Gordon L. Mowen, II, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent

WORKMAN, Chief Justice:

A jury found Petitioner Frank Thompson guilty of four felony counts of driving under the influence ("DUI") causing death, two felony counts of child neglect resulting in death, and three misdemeanors. On appeal, Petitioner asserts the trial court’s comments deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the felony convictions.

After review, we find that the trial court’s comments at the beginning of the jury selection process tainted Petitioner’s presumption of innocence and deprived him of a fair trial. We therefore reverse Petitioner’s convictions. Because the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was otherwise sufficient, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of September 19, 2014, Petitioner was driving a vehicle on US 119 in Boone County, West Virginia. Four passengers were with Petitioner: his girlfriend, Betty Holstein, their one-year-old-son, Nathaniel Thompson, Ms. Holstein’s five-year-old-daughter, Alyssa Bowman, and Ms. Holstein’s friend, Rebecca Bias. Petitioner drove the vehicle off the side of the road and it crashed against an embankment about 600 feet away, landed on the passenger side, and caught fire. All of the passengers were killed.

Following an investigation, Petitioner—who tested positive for methamphetamine following the accident—was arrested and indicted on multiple charges. The case proceeded to trial in March 2016. The jury found Petitioner guilty of six felonies (four counts of DUI causing death and two counts of child neglect resulting in death) and three misdemeanors (reckless driving, driving on a suspended license, second offense, and failure to maintain lane of travel).

The State instituted recidivist proceedings.¹ Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Petitioner in July 2016.²

We detail the relevant facts more specifically below as they relate to Petitioner’s two assignments of error.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The alleged errors raised by Petitioner are subject to particular standards of review, which we set forth in connection with our discussion of them. Generally, however,

[i]n reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance , 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Trial Court’s Comments Irreparably Tainted the Jury Pool

On the morning trial was scheduled to begin Petitioner indicated that he wished to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement offered by the State. As a result, the trial court released the jury pool for the day, telling them, in relevant part:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you all were called here today on the case of State of West Virginia vs. Frank Thompson. Case number 15-F-95. It was a case involving four counts of DUI causing death, two counts of child abuse causing death.

About five minutes ago the defendant reached an agreement with the State and is going to enter a plea here later this morning.

I want to say that even though you all didn’t really do anything, you really did a lot. The fact that he knew there was 56 people out here waiting to make a decision on his guilt or innocence I’m sure weighed heavily on his mind and ultimately caused him to decide to accept the plea agreement that the State had offered.

I can’t really tell you much more about the case but he probably did everyone a favor by doing the plea. It was a pretty tragic case.

....

I thank you for your service. Don’t think you didn’t do anything. There was not a plea agreement this morning at 9:00 a.m. The fact that he knew that there was 56 people out here waiting to decide his fate I think is what caused him to change his mind and decide to accept the agreement.

Like I said, I think he did—I think he did the jury pool a favor, because like I said it was a pretty tragic case with some children involved.

Good luck. Thank you all very much.

Thereafter, the parties informed the trial court that Petitioner had decided to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial. The trial court then placed the following on the record: "I did release the jury, I gave them the name of the defendant and told them what the charges were. I did not say anything else. I don’t know if I did anything to prejudice the jury, but I would have said that anyway at the start of trial."

The following day, the trial court convened the same jury pool. Petitioner moved for a mistrial and stated the trial court’s comments irreparably tainted that panel. The trial court denied the motion. Instead, in hopes of minimizing the obvious problem, the trial court informed the jury pool what occurred and gave a curative instruction:

The matter was set for trial yesterday, and the jury panel was summonsed to be here. At the start of the trial the parties announced to the Court they had reached a plea agreement. Pursuant to this announcement, the Court released the jury panel. The plea agreement ultimately did not take place, which brings us back here today.

The fact that there were plea negotiations, a tentative plea agreement that did not take place, and anything this Court might have stated upon releasing the jury shall not be considered at any time by this jury panel, nor jury as evidence, and shall not be viewed in reaching any decisions on this matter.

The parties agree that none of the jurors eventually seated gave any indication that he or she was biased or prejudiced against Petitioner.

Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts the trial court’s comments to the jury pool irrevocably tainted the group and constituted a denial of his constitutional rights to fair trial by an impartial jury when the petit jury was selected from the biased jury pool. We agree.

A criminal defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial judge and jury is sacrosanct, regardless of the evidence against him or her. See Tumey v. Ohio , 273 U.S. 510, 535, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). So basic to our jurisprudence is the right to a fair trial that it has been called "the most fundamental of all freedoms." Estes v. Texas , 381 U.S. 532, 540, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965).³ "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. ... This is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he occupies." Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

As this Court held in syllabus point two of State v. Varner , 212 W.Va. 532, 575 S.E.2d 142 (2002),

" ‘ "[t]he right to a trial by an impartial, objective jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution." Syllabus point 4, [in part,] State v. Peacher , 167 W.Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981).’ Syllabus point 4, in part, State v. Derr , 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994)."

"And the question of whether a jury is impartial is dependent upon whether the jurors are free from bias or prejudice either for or against the accused." State v. McClure , 184 W.Va. 418, 421, 400 S.E.2d 853, 856 (1990) (citing State v. Pratt , 161 W.Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978), and State v. Hatfield , 48 W.Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900) ).

Consistent with this bedrock rule of law, trial courts must jealously guard the fairness and integrity of the entire criminal trial process. This Court has cautioned that

[t]he trial judge in a criminal trial must consistently be aware that he occupies a unique position in the minds of the jurors and is capable, because of his position, of unduly influencing jurors in the discharge of their duty as triers of the facts. This Court has consistently required trial judges not to intimate an opinion on any fact in issue in any manner. In criminal cases, we have frequently held that conduct of the trial judge which indicates his opinion on any material matter will result in a guilty verdict being set aside and a new trial awarded.

Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Wotring , 167 W.Va. 104, 279 S.E.2d 182 (1981).⁴

In this case, the trial court informed the jury pool that Petitioner decided to plead guilty and that he "probably did everyone a favor by doing the plea. It was a pretty tragic case." It repeated this sentiment moments later when it stated: "I think he did the jury pool a favor, because like I said it was a pretty tragic case with some children involved." Consequently, it is beyond serious debate that the trial court expressed its opinion on a material matter at trial. Essentially, the trial court made clear its opinion on the material fact at trial—Petitioner’s guilt. The statements suggested that in view of the guilty plea, the trial court believed that Petitioner committed the crimes charged and the plea agreement avoided an unnecessary trial. Obviously, when the trial court made these remarks it had no idea that Petitioner would ultimately reject the plea offer and its remarks to the jury in this circumstance were not improper.

Petitioner relies on Blue v. State , 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000), a case with...