State v. Thornton

• Decision Date: 10 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59561,59561
• Citation: 351 So.2d 480
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Elree J. THORNTON.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 480

351 So.2d 480

STATE of Louisiana v.Elree J. THORNTON.

No. 59561.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 10, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 1977.

F. Irvin Dymond, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

DIXON, Justice.

Elree J. Thornton was indicted for the second degree murder of Irma L. Jackson, in violation of R.S. 14:30.1.Defendant waived trial by jury, was tried by the court alone, and was found guilty as charged.He was sentenced to life at hard labor.He now appeals the conviction, relying upon three assignments of error.

Facts

The offense occurred in a residential area.Defendant found his wife, Mary Thornton, in an extremely nervous state after an unsuccessful attempt to shoot herself, prompted by alleged harassment and threats she had received from her neighbor, Irma Jackson.Defendant took the gun from his wife and went outside where he found Mrs. Jackson in her driveway.As defendant testified, after a calm talk he saw Mrs. Jackson reach in her purse to get what he thought was a gun at which point he shot her repeatedly.Defendant deposited the gun in his garage, called police, and was subsequently arrested.He was removed a short distance from the scene by the arresting officer to avoid an angry crowd and was soon taken to police headquarters where a written confession was obtained.

Assignment of Error No. 1

In this assignment of error, defendant contends the trial judge failed to exercise his discretion by refusing to require answers to certain questions contained in an application for bill of particulars and in a prayer for oyer.In these questions defendant had requested (1) the names and addresses of all witnesses the State intended to use at trial, (2) a list of all physical evidence the State intended to use and the manner in which it was seized by police, (3) production of all written witness statements made against defendant which the State intended to use, (4) production of all physical evidence gained from any person, and (5) production of any photographs or drawings the State intended to use.The State had refused to answer these particular questions; the trial judge ruled at hearing that the answers provided were sufficient.

Defendant argues that the trial judge was merely ruling on the sufficiency of the answers as a matter of law without exercising the judicial discretion vested in him.Such, defendant contends, constitutes an abuse of discretion.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to more fully inform defendant of the nature and cause of the charge against him with sufficient information to properly prepare his defense.C.Cr.P. 484.The bill of particulars, however, may not be used to discover details of evidence with which the State expects to prove its case.State v. Walker, 344 So.2d 990(La.1977).

This court has repeatedly held that the granting of a motion for bill of particulars is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse resulting in prejudice to the accused.See, e. g., State v. Huizar, 332 So.2d 449(La.1976).

The trial judge's ruling as to the sufficiency of the answers, in which he did not specifically state the grounds on which he relied, does not eliminate the possibility that he exercised his discretion in addition to ruling on their legal sufficiency.

Furthermore, it has been held that the defense is not entitled to pretrial discovery of names of State witnesses, descriptions of physical evidence, witness statements, photographs, or physical objects (except in the case of narcotics evidence, State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682(1972)).State v. Phillips, 343 So.2d 1047(La.1977);State v. Ball, 328 So.2d 81(La.1976).La. Acts 1977, No. 515, providing for more liberal discovery in criminal cases which might have required production of physical evidence and photographs, was not in effect at the time of the filing of the motion for bill of particulars or prayer for oyer or the rulings thereon.

This assignment is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2

Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in overruling a motion to suppress a written confession.He contends that the written confession was tainted, arguing that it was obtained through interrogation based on a previous oral confession given without defendant being advised of his Miranda rights.

No contention was made that defendant's written confession, obtained at police headquarters, was not made voluntarily or that defendant was subjected to coercion or threats.The argument is that the written confession is a "fruit of a poisonous tree" since the interrogating officers based their questions on information given by the arresting officer, Robert Law, that defendant had orally confessed to shooting the victim.

The testimony is somewhat conflicting.Officer Roland Brown, who asked a series of questions of defendant from which he elicited the confession, testified that although he was informed by Officer Law that defendant had stated he shot the woman, he did not base his interrogation on that information.However, Officer Fred Dantagnan, present at the interrogation but not personally questioning the defendant, testified that the information probably formed the basis of questions regarding what happened initially.

Even if the interrogation was based on information provided by Officer Law, we find that the oral confession was not illegally obtained.The record reveals that defendant approached Officer Law upon his arrival at the scene, told him he shot a woman, and led the officer to where the body lay.The statement was unsolicited and spontaneously given.Spontaneous, voluntary statements, not given as a result of custodial questioning or compelling influence, are admissible into evidence in spite of noncompliance with...