State v. Thornton

Decision Date27 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. 99-376-C.A. And 98-263-C.A.,99-376-C.A. And 98-263-C.A.
Citation800 A.2d 1016
PartiesSTATE v. Christopher S. THORNTON.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Present: LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Aaron L. Weisman, Lauren Sandler Zurier, for Plaintiff.

Catherine A. Gibran, Paula Rosin for Defendant.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

In these consolidated appeals, the defendant, Christopher S. Thornton, first challenges his convictions by a Superior Court trial jury for kidnapping, domestic felony assaults, intimidation of a witness, and violation of a previous no-contact order. He also appeals from the denial of his post-trial motion to reduce the sentences that were imposed following his convictions.

Facts and Travel

For some six years prior to June 1996, Debra Means (Debra) and Christopher S. Thornton (defendant or Thornton) had been engaged in a relationship from which in 1994, a daughter, Amy,1 was born. Debra had another son, Adam,2 from an earlier relationship who was seven years old. The defendant, Debra, and the two children lived together in an apartment on Rockland Street in the town of Narragansett.

The relationship between the defendant and Debra was described as having been a tumultuous one, during which he had beaten her. Shortly before June 3, 1996, Debra broke off the relationship, and because of her fear of the defendant, she obtained a no-contact order against him. The no-contact order prevented the defendant from contacting Debra, but permitted him to visit his daughter, Amy.

On the afternoon of June 18, 1996, while Debra was preparing to leave for her employment at a health center in East Providence, her daughter, Amy, was in the living room watching television and waiting for Debra to drive her to her baby-sitter's home. The defendant unexpectedly walked into the apartme nt, came up to Debra and said, "I've got something for you in my back pocket." Debra touched his back pocket and felt the handle of a knife with a blade at least ten inches long. The defendant then pulled a telephone from the wall and pulled Debra into Adam's bedroom. When Debra told the defendant that she was on her way to work, he sharply replied, "You are not going to work. You are going to die." The defendant then directed Debra to telephone her employer and tell him that her car would not start and that she would not be coming to work. The defendant held the knife to her throat while she made the telephone call. Debra then called for Amy, but the defendant told her not to call Amy into the room, threatening to "take her out, too" if she came into the room.

A short time later, Diane Sullivan (Diane), Amy's baby-sitter, telephoned Debra to find out why she had not brought Amy over to her home, where she baby-sat the child. Debra told Diane that she was not going to work, and Diane, sensing something was wrong, asked Debra whether the defendant was there, and Debra said yes. Because Diane was aware of the no-contact order and Debra's fear of the defendant, she telephoned the Narragansett police to alert them of what might be happening.3 Apparently sensing what had been said between Debra and Diane, the defendant became enraged and punched Debra in the face, knocking out her front teeth as Amy watched in horror.4 Within minutes, Debra was able to observe that the police were arriving, and she screamed out for help. At this, the defendant grabbed her by the hair, put his knife to her throat, and again threatened to kill her. The arrival of the police then triggered what would turn out to be a fourteen-hour-long confrontation-standoff between the defendant and the police, with the defendant holding Debra hostage and repeatedly threatening to kill her. The standoff lasted from mid-afternoon on June 18, 1996 through the early morning hours of the next day.5 During that time, the defendant repeatedly dragged Debra to the window in full view of the police, where he either would hold her by the hair with his knife to her throat or with his arm around her with his knife to her back. Debra made at least ten unsuccessful attempts to escape from the defendant, and after each attempt the defendant punched her in the face. During the standoff, the defendant also stabbed Debra four times, twice in the side, once in the back, and once in the arm.

Throughout the long standoff, the Narragansett police had extensive interaction with the defendant in an attempt to negotiate Debra's release, but he repeatedly refused to release her.Later, he began demanding complete amnesty from prosecution in return for releasing Debra, which demands were rejected. Finally, in the early hours of June 19, about twelve hours into the standoff, the police concluded that the defendant would not release Debra, or surrender, so they called in the South Kingstown Emergency Services Unit (a police SWAT team) for assistance. Shortly after the SWAT team arrived, at about 4:30 a.m., it stormed the apartment and subdued the defendant. Debra was immediately taken to a local hospital for extensive medical treatment.6

On September 23, 1996, a Washington County grand jury indicted the defendant, charging him with ten offenses stemming from the June 18-19, 1996 incident at Debra's apartment. He was charged with first-degree sexual assault of Debra (count 1); assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling (count 2); felony assault with a dangerous weapon (count 3); assault with intent to murder Debra (count 4); felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury (count 5); breaking and entering a dwelling without consent of Debra (count 6); violation of a no-contact order (count 7); kidnapping Debra (count 8); intimidating a witness (Diane Sullivan) (count 9); and kidnapping Amy (count 10). The defendant was arraigned on September 25, 1996, pled not guilty to all charges, and was referred to the Public Defender's office for determination of his eligibility for the Public Defender's services.7

The defendant's trial before a Washington County Superior Court jury took place on December 2-5, 1997. On December 8, the trial jury returned its verdicts on the nine charges that had been submitted to it.8 The jury found the defendant guilty on count 3 (felony assault with a dangerous weapon); count 5 (felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury); count 7 (violation of a no-contact order); count 8 (kidnapping Debra); and count 9 (intimidating a witness (Diane Sullivan)). He was found not guilty on count 1 (first-degree sexual assault of Debra); count 2 (assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling); count 4 (assault with intent to murder Debra); and count 10 (kidnapping Amy).

After sentences were imposed, the defendant timely appealed.

In his appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial justice erred in permitting him to waive his right to counsel without first determining whether such waiver was knowing and intelligent; (2) that the trial justice unduly impaired his right of self-representation; (3) that the trial justice erred in precluding admission of defense evidence that allegedly would have supported his diminished capacity defense; and (4) that the trial justice erred in permitting introduction of past incidents of misconduct by the defendant during the prosecutor's cross-examination of defense expert Dr. Ronald Stewart (Dr. Stewart). Also before us is the defendant's consolidated appeal from the denial of his post-trial motion to reduce his sentences. These issues will be dealt with in their order of significance to this opinion. Additional facts will be noted as needed.

Analysis
I Waiver of Counsel

After rejecting representation by three court-appointed attorneys before trial, Thornton elected to represent himself pro se at trial with court-appointed standby counsel. On appeal he concedes that he had waived his right to counsel voluntarily but argues that his waiver violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it was not made knowingly and intelligently, and the trial justice failed to make any finding that it was in fact so waived.

The record before us discloses that Thornton was arraigned on September 25, 1996, and he was referred to the Public Defender's office to determine his eligibility for its services. He was found to be eligible, and Assistant Public Defender Richard Brousseau (Brousseau) was assigned to represent Thornton. Less than a month later, during a preliminary hearing on October 18, 1996, Thornton moved to dismiss Brousseau, asserting that he did not feel "comfortable" with Brousseau's representation. He failed to outline his specific concerns regarding Brousseau's representation but requested that he be assigned either another assistant public defender or be provided private counsel. The hearing justice deferred the pretrial proceedings and ordered Thornton to discuss his specific concerns with Brousseau to determine whether his concerns could be remedied.

Some five weeks later, on November 25, 1996, Thornton again appeared before the hearing justice and requested Brousseau's removal, stating that differences of opinion existed between himself and Brousseau that affected the attorney-client relatio nship. Given Thornton's complaints, Brousseau requested to be permitted to withdraw as Thornton's counsel, and the hearing justice permitted his withdrawal. The hearing justice at that time, apparently sensing that Thornton appeared to have initiated a course intended to delay his trial, warned Thornton that she would not allow "differences of opinion" with his next court-appointed counsel, standing alone, to justify removal of that attorney.

Attorney William O'Connell (O'Connell) subsequently was appointed to represent Thornton, and on December 2, 1996, he entered his appearance on Thornton's behalf. O'Connell's tenure was not much longer than Brousseau's. In March 1997, Thornton motioned to have O'Connell removed because O'Connell had declined to handle a then-pending appeal by Thornton from an earlier probation-violation...

To continue reading

Request your trial
45 cases
  • State v. Watson
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 6 Julio 2006
    ...691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 846 (1st Cir.1989); State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1027-28 (R.I. 2002); State v. Deroche, 682 So.2d 1251, 1252 (La.1996); State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah [¶ 26] Therefore, when a de......
  • State v. Lynch
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • 12 Agosto 2004
    ...that "violations of the Sixth Amendment's public-trial provision are not subject to a `harmless error' analysis"); State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1057 (R.I.2002) (observing that "harmless-error analysis does not apply to Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel-clause violations"). In light of C......
  • State v. Pineda
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • 2 Marzo 2011
    ...examination of whether defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was “voluntary,” “knowing and intelligent”) (quoting State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1025 (R.I.2002)).iiDefendant's Argument While acknowledging that the trial justice did engage her in a discussion of the garden variety co......
  • Allen v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)
    • 26 Septiembre 2013
    ...Court also held that a defendant's right to self-representation was not violated by exclusion from sidebar conferences in State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I.2002). We find this case substantially different from Allen's. In Thornton, the defendant was charged with “horrendous and vicious ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT