State v. Tillman

• Decision Date: 07 July 1964
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph TILLMAN. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 494

202 A.2d 494

152 Conn. 15

STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph TILLMAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 7, 1964.

Emanuel Margolis and Saul Kwartin, Special Public Defenders, for appellant (defendant).

Otto J. Saur, State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John F. McGowan and Joseph T. Gormley, Jr., Asst. State's Attys., for appellee (state).

Before KING, C. J., MURPHY, ALCORN and COMLEY, JJ., and HOUSE, Acting justice.

KING, Chief Justice.

The defendant was convicted, after a trial to the jury, of the crime of manslaughter in causing the death of his wife, Christine. It was the claim of the state that her death, which occurred between 9 and 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 21, 1962, was caused by a fall to the ground from the rear porch of the third-floor tenement in which she and the defendant lived, and that the fall was the result of her having been thrown, pushed, or otherwise caused to fall, by the criminal act of the defendant.

A principal ground of the defendant's appeal involves claimed errors in the admission in evidence of certain statements made by the defendant in the nature of informal oral confessions. ¹ Some were made, apparently within a few moments after the fall, to friends who were at the home at the time of the occurrence. Others were apparently made later to police officers. Error is also assigned in the admission of a written statement which was made to Dennis J. O'Connor, a detective in the Stamford police department.

Some of the confessions amounted to statements by the defendant that he had thrown his wife over the porch railing to the ground below; others, to statements that she had fallen in the course of a struggle with him on the porch.

The defendant objected to the admission into evidence of each of these confessions on the ground that the state had failed to offer sufficient preliminary proof of the corpus delicti to render any of the confessions admissible under the proper practice as outlined in cases such as State v. Doucette, 147 Conn. 95, 100, 157 A.2d 487, and in 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 2073, p. 404. See also State v. Washelesky, 81 Conn. 22, 30, 70 A. 62; notes, 127 A.L.R. 1130, 1141; 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1339.

We have carefully considered these evidential claims and the further claim that the totality of the evidence of the corpus delicti, independent of, and extrinsic to, the confessions, was insufficient to warrant the use of the confessions by the jury in reaching a verdict of guilty, under the rule laid down in cases such as State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 693, 166 A. 252; State v. Skinner, 132 Conn. 163, 166, 43 A.2d 76; State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 182, 75 A.2d 429; and State v. Doucette, supra, 147 Conn. 99, 157 A.2d 487; and in 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2073, p. 405.

This consideration in turn has led us to a reexamination of our particular corroboration rule. The rule in some form obtains in almost every state. Perkins, 'The Corpus Delicti of Murder,' 48 Va.L.Rev. 173, 178; 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2071. Probably most states define the term corpus delicti, as we have defined it in our cases such as State v. Doucette, supra, as meaning that the crime charged was committed by someone. 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2072, p. 402. This definition has led to complications and difficulties in the application of the corroboration rule and, in Wigmore's words, 'makes the rule * * * difficult for the jury to apply amid a complex mass of evidence, and tends to reduce the [corroboration] rule to a juggling-formula'. Ibid.; see also § 2073, p. 405. These complications and difficulties are reflected in a lack of harmony in the decisions as to the extent and nature of the corroborative or extrinsic evidence required, both as a prerequisite to the admission of a confession into evidence and as a prerequisite to a conviction where confessions have been introduced. See the collection of cases in 127 A.L.R. 1130 and 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1325-1330; 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2071; see also note, 'Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession,' 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638, 656, 659; 'The Corpus Delicti--Confession Problem,' 43 J.Crim.L., C. and P.S., p. 214. For example, the cases dealing with murder seem to apply a definition of corpus delicti at odds with the one stated above. Although the crime charged is not manslaughter but murder in some given degree, extrinsic evidence tending to prove an unlawful homicide is generally considered adequate under the corroboration rule. Perkins, op. cit., 191, 195. The lack of harmony is also illustrated by the fact that, while in many jurisdictions the evidence corroborative of a confession must relate to, touch upon and tend to establish the corpus delicti, in other jurisdictions it need merely tend to produce a confidence in the trustworthiness of the confession. 7 Wigmore, op, cit. § 2071, pp. 396, 397; note, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1327 § 7. These complications and difficulties have also contributed to some extent in causing differences of opinion as to the respective functions of court and jury in passing upon the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence. 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2072 p. 402, § 2073 p. 405; note, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638, 664; note, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1335, 1338. The complications and difficulties in the application of the corroboration rule arising from distinctions between confessions and admissions have already been mentioned in footnote one.

Some of the uncertainties in the application of the corroboration rule in the federal courts were recently resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101, and Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Scarbeck v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 317 F.2d 546, 566 cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856, 83 S.Ct. 1897, 10 L.Ed.2d 1077; note, 99 L.Ed. 110. Somewhat similar to the federal rule is the holding of a recent New Jersey case. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 56, 152 A2d 50.

We are convinced that the application of our definition of corpus delicti creates complications and difficulties in the trial of cases involving our corroboration rule. Complications and difficulties themselves tend to produce unjust results because of the greater hazard that mistakes will be made by the court or jury. 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2070 p. 395, § 2072 p. 402. After careful consideration, we have come to the conclusion that these complications and difficulties in the application of our corroboration rule largely stem from our present definition of corpus delicti and dictate its abandonment.

Under the Wigmore definition, the corpus delicti consists of the occurrence of the specific kind of loss or injury embraced in the crime charged. We adopt this definition. ² Under it, in a homicide case, the corpus delicti is the fact of the death, whether or not feloniously caused, of the person whom the accused is charged with having killed or murdered. 7 Wigmore, op. cit. § 2072, pp. 401, 403. This change in definition requires us to overrule our cases of State v. LaLouche, supra; State v. Skinner, supra; State v. Guastamachio, supra; and State v. Doucette, supra, to the extent that they define the term corpus delicti as meaning the fact that the crime charged was committed by someone. Incidentally, we also point out that while the requisite corroborative evidence must be material and substantial, it may be circumstantial in nature. Note, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1333.

Of course, it must not be overlooked that there can be no conviction in any criminal case unless there has been proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the crime charged and also of the accused's agency in its commission. Furthermore, General Statutes § 54-83 precludes the conviction of a person for any capital crime without the testimony of two witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereto; see State v. Malm, 142 Conn. 113, 118, ...