State v. Timbs

• Decision Date: 10 June 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20S-MI-289
• Citation: 169 N.E.3d 361
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff) v. Tyson TIMBS, Appellee (Defendant)
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

169 N.E.3d 361

STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff)

v.Tyson TIMBS, Appellee (Defendant)

Supreme Court Case No. 20S-MI-289

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: February 4, 2021

Filed June 10, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General, Kian J. Hudson, Deputy Solicitor General, Julia C. Payne, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: J. Lee McNeely, Cynthia A. Bedrick, Scott A. Milkey, McNeelyLaw LLP, Shelbyville, Indiana, Samuel B. Gedge, Institute for Justice, Arlington, Virginia, Wesley Hottot, Institute for Justice, Seattle, Washington

ATTORNEY FOR AMICI CURIAE STATES OF TEXAS, ARKANSAS, LOUISIANA, AND OKLAHOMA: Kevin S. Smith, Special Assistant Texas Attorney General, Church Church Hittle + Antrim, Noblesville, Indiana

Rush, Chief Justice.

We chronicle and confront, for the third time, the State's quest to forfeit Tyson Timbs's now-famous white Land Rover. And, again, the same overarching question looms: would the forfeiture be constitutional?

Reminiscent of Captain Ahab's chase of the white whale Moby Dick,¹ this case has wound its way from the trial court all the way to the United States Supreme Court and back again. During the voyage, several points have come to light. First, the vehicle's forfeiture, due to its punitive nature, is subject to the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines. Next, to stay within the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause, the forfeiture of Timbs's vehicle must meet two requirements: instrumentality and proportionality. And, finally, the forfeiture falls within the instrumentality limit because the vehicle was the actual means by which Timbs committed the underlying drug offense.

But, until now, the proportionality inquiry remained unresolved—that is, was the harshness of the Land Rover's forfeiture grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs's dealing crime and his culpability for the vehicle's misuse? The State not only urges us to answer that question in the negative, but it also requests that we wholly abandon the proportionality framework from State v. Timbs , 134 N.E.3d 12, 35–39 (Ind. 2019). Today, we reject the State's request to overturn precedent, as there is no compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and the law of the case; and we conclude that Timbs met his burden to show gross disproportionality, rendering the Land Rover's forfeiture unconstitutional.

Facts and Procedural History

In August 2013, the State filed a civil forfeiture complaint, alleging that Tyson Timbs had used his Land Rover to illegally purchase, possess, and deal narcotics. So began a legal saga—seven years and counting—to determine the constitutionality of forfeiting this vehicle.

After a hearing on the State's complaint, the trial court entered judgment for Timbs, concluding forfeiture of the Land Rover would be grossly disproportionate to his illegal conduct and so would violate the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Timbs , 62 N.E.3d 472, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

This Court granted the State's transfer petition and reversed, holding the Excessive Fines Clause had yet to be incorporated against the states. State v. Timbs (Timbs I ), 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181–82 (Ind. 2017). We further held that the State had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under Indiana law. Id. at 1184–85.

Timbs then successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection that applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Timbs v. Indiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687–91, 203 L.Ed.2d 11 (2019). So the Court vacated Timbs I and remanded the case. Id. at 691. In its opinion, however, the Supreme Court did not spell out how courts should determine whether an in rem fine is excessive. It left that task to us.

On remand, this Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause includes both instrumentality and proportionality limitations for use-based in rem fines like the forfeiture of Timbs's vehicle. State v. Timbs (Timbs II ), 134 N.E.3d 12, 27 (Ind. 2019). And such fines are constitutional if two requirements are met: "(1) the property must be the actual means by which an underlying offense was committed; and (2) the harshness of the forfeiture penalty must not be grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense and the claimant's culpability for the property's misuse." Id. at 27.

We decided that the Land Rover's forfeiture fell within the Excessive Fines Clause's instrumentality limit but remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether Timbs had overcome his burden to establish gross disproportionality. Id. at 39–40. This Court described the proportionality analysis as both factually intensive and dependent on the totality of the circumstances—and distinct from the standard developed for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id. at 39. The State neither sought rehearing from this Court nor petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari.

On remand, the trial court held another evidentiary hearing, issued fourteen pages of findings and conclusions, and determined that Timbs had shown gross disproportionality. The trial court's judgment meant that the relevant forfeiture statute, Indiana Code section 34-24-1-1(a)(1)(A), was unconstitutional as applied. The facts on which the trial court relied to render its decision are discussed in detail below.

The State subsequently filed this direct appeal, invoking this Court's mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction, as a statute was declared unconstitutional. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b).

Standard of Review

Timbs argues that the forfeiture statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case. The trial court agreed, determining that the forfeiture of his Land Rover—a use-based in rem fine—violated the Excessive Fines Clause.

An appellate court reviews the court's factual findings for clear error, Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), and its excessiveness decision de novo, Timbs II , 134 N.E.3d at 23. The statute is also presumed constitutional, with all doubts resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Id.

Discussion and Decision

The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payment as punishment for an offense. U.S. Const. amend. VIII ; Austin v. United States , 509 U.S. 602, 609–10, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). The Clause is a vital backstop for those instances where "the punishment is more criminal than the crime." Timbs II , 134 N.E.3d at 28 (quoting United States v. 829 Calle de Madero , 100 F.3d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1996) ).

In Timbs II , this Court held that analyzing challenges to in rem actions, or actions against property, can involve a dual inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 27. We first look to whether the property was the "instrument" by which the crimes underlying the State's forfeiture case were committed. Id. at 28–31. If so, we next consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the punitive value of the in rem fine was "grossly disproportional" to the gravity of the underlying offenses and the owner's culpability for the property's criminal use. Id. at 35.

Here, there is no dispute that Timbs's Land Rover was an instrumentality of the crime, as it was the actual means by which his dealing offense was committed. See id. at 31. The parties disagree, however, on proportionality—specifically, whether Timbs overcame the high burden to show that forfeiture of the vehicle was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the underlying offense and his culpability for the Land Rover's misuse. Timbs says he did; the State argues he did not.

And the State presents an additional, broader argument. Devoting nearly half its brief to challenging Timbs II , the State urges us to overturn our excessiveness framework in favor of an instrumentality-only test or, at a minimum, use the same gross-disproportionality standard courts have developed in Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause cases.

As explained below, because the State presents no compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and the law of the case, this Court rejects the invitation to overturn its recent precedent. And an independent, de novo review of the undisputed factual findings leads us to conclude that Timbs met his high burden to show gross disproportionality.

But to provide context for this decision, we begin with an overview of Timbs II and the reasons underlying its holdings.

I. Timbs II established the proportionality framework for use-based in rem fines.

Just over two years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines applies to the states. Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 691. That decision, however, left open a critical question: how should a court determine whether a use-based in rem forfeiture is excessive? See id. On remand, this Court provided the answer. Timbs II , 134 N.E.3d at 21.

Then, as now, the parties disagreed on how to measure excessiveness. See id. at 24. The State urged the Court to adopt an instrumentality-only test for in rem fines—one that would simply look at whether the property was an instrument of the crime. Id. And if it was, then the forfeiture wouldn't run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. Timbs, on the other hand, argued that the Clause includes not only an instrumentality limitation but also a proportionality one. Id. Ultimately, this Court agreed with Timbs. Id. at 27.

This Court explained that, to satisfy the Excessive Fines Clause's instrumentality test, the property must be the "actual means" by which the relevant crimes were committed. Id. at 30–31. And we concluded Timbs's Land Rover was the instrument of his predicate dealing offense. Id. at 31.

We then explained, in...