State v. Timms
| Decision Date | 04 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-374-C,84-374-C |
| Citation | 505 A.2d 1132 |
| Parties | STATE v. Gwen TIMMS. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendant Gwen Timms appeals from convictions on two counts of driving to endanger, death resulting, in violation of G.L. 1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-1. 1 The defendant assigns as errors (1) the trial court's admitting into evidence results of a blood-alcohol test given her at Rhode Island Hospital, (2) the trial court's admission into evidence of a piece of wire cord seized from the defendant's vehicle without a warrant three days after the vehicle had been impounded, and (3) the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss one of the driving-to-endanger, death-resulting, counts on double-jeopardy grounds.
We affirm the convictions, adverting to each issue separately after a narration of the facts.
On September 13, 1980, at approximately 1:20 a.m., defendant's car crossed over the center line of Elmwood Avenue in Cranston and smashed head-on into a car driven by Janet Palanko. Ms. Palanko and one of the two passengers in her car, fourteen-year-old Barbara Gill, were killed. The other passenger, Ann Spaziano, was seriously injured. The defendant and her passenger, John Ward, were both injured, though not as seriously.
Cranston Police Officer James Brooks, one of the two patrolmen at the scene of the collision, testified as follows. He observed defendant get out of her car. Her clothes were messed up; she was confused, was staggering, and smelled of intoxicating beverages. Her eyes were glassy, and she became combative when rescue personnel arrived. Officer Brooks suspected defendant of being under the influence of alcohol. The defendant was transported to Rhode Island Hospital. Officer Brooks followed the rescue wagon to the hospital and stayed with defendant as she was placed on a gurney and wheeled into the treatment room. The defendant was awake and alert. Officer Brooks advised her of her Miranda rights and told her that she was suspected of driving under the influence. Officer Brooks also read defendant the Cranston police department chemical-test-rights sheet, and requested that she submit to a blood test. He told her that she had the right to refuse the blood test but that if she refused it she would be subject to administrative sanctions. The defendant consented to removal of a blood sample. The attending physician refused Officer Brooks' request that a blood sample be drawn from defendant for chemical analysis because defendant had not signed a release. Officer Brooks then reread to defendant her Miranda rights and those on the chemical-test-rights sheet and requested that she sign a standard medical release form. 2 The defendant signed the form and the attending physician then ordered a blood sample drawn and sent to the lab for alcohol-content analysis. The lab test determined defendant's blood-alcohol content to be .15 percent. These results were introduced into evidence over objection by defendant.
Doctor Arthur Burns, the State Medical Examiner, testified that a .15 percent blood-alcohol content would impair most people's motor skills.
John Ward, the passenger in defendant's car, testified that just prior to the collision, the hood on defendant's car began bobbing up and down to such an extent that he could no longer clearly see the road. It appeared that the hood was tied to the front of the car rather than securely fastened. Ward wondered how defendant could see the road, and just after he asked her about it, the crash occurred.
Lieutenant James Gibbs of the Cranston police department testified that after he learned about the hood from Ward he had enlargements of the accident photographs made, which upon examination revealed a piece of material tying the hood to the frame of defendant's automobile. A cord showed up in two photographs. Lieutenant Gibbs then went to the garage where defendant's car had been towed and, without a search warrant, seized an electrical cord which was entangled in and protruding from the smashed radiator of defendant's car. The cord was later introduced into evidence over defendant's objection.
On October 28, 1983, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts of driving to endanger, death resulting. The trial court denied both defendant's motion for a new trial and defendant's double-jeopardy objection to sentencing on each offense. The defendant was sentenced on each count to eight years' imprisonment, three years suspended, and five years' probation. The sentences were to run concurrently.
The defendant contends that the results of her blood test performed at Rhode Island Hospital should not have been allowed to be introduced into evidence because that information is protected by G.L. 1956 (1976 Reenactment) chapter 37.3 of title 5, P.L. 1978, ch. 297, § 1, the Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act (the act). The act provides generally that a patient's confidential health care information cannot be released without the patient's written consent, on a form meeting the requirements specified in the act, unless otherwise authorized by the act or by law. The defendant's contention rests on the fact that the consent form she signed did not meet the exact requirements of the form required for consent under the act. 3 She argues that her consenting to have the information released to the Cranston police department for purposes of investigation and prosecution was therefore invalid.
The confidentiality act § 5-37.3-4(a) provides in part:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) or as otherwise specifically provided by the law, a patient's confidential health care information shall not be released or transferred without the written consent of such patient or his authorized representative, on a consent form meeting the requirements of subsection (d) of this section * * *."
Thus, there are two exceptions under which a patient's confidential information may be released or transferred without the patient's consent: under an exception provided in § 5-37.3-4(b) or where otherwise specifically provided by law. Here, the transfer of defendant's blood-test results to the Cranston police falls under the second exception.
The Legislature had already explicitly provided, in § 31-27-2, for the admissibility of blood-alcohol-content information in driving-under-the-influence cases. 4 It was clearly the Legislature's intent to have the § 31-27-2 consent requirement apply to the introduction of blood-alcohol-content evidence in cases involving driving under the influence, whether that evidence be derived from blood, breath, or urine samples.
It is inconsistent to allow one type of consent to apply to removal of breath or urine samples by police technicians and to require a different, revocable consent to apply to blood samples taken by a health-care technician. All three types of sample removals constitute the same kind of search-and-seizure activity under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. 5 This is true whether the removal is of breath at the police station or of blood at the hospital. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 918 (1966); State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849, 856-57, 391 A.2d 107, 111-12 (1978).
We assume the Legislature intended statutes relating to the same subject be construed together to be consistent and to effectuate the policy of the law. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25 v. State, 485 A.2d 1245, 1247 (R.I.1984). Statutes in pari materia are to be considered harmoniously by this court. Id.
Although § 31-27-1, under which defendant was convicted, does not explicitly require that the defendant consent to the taking of a blood test before that test may be introduced as evidence in a criminal prosecution, the Legislature must have intended it to include the consent safeguards explicitly provided in § 31-27-2. Both statutes concern the same subject matter, namely driving in a manner so as to threaten public safety. Furthermore, in addition to the already-enacted §§ 31-27-1 and 31-27-2, the Legislature subsequently created § 31-27-2.2, "Driving under the influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in death." The consent safeguards in § 31-27-2.2 are also not explicitly in its text, yet the Legislature would not have enacted two separate driving-under-the-influence sections, intending that the consent safeguards apply only to one. "It follows that if a mechanical application of a statutory definition produces an absurd result or defeats legislative intent, this court will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act." State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I.1985). Thus ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, we are duty bound to give effect to that intent. Id. at 693.
As defendant concedes, the trial court found that her consent was voluntary as a matter of fact. The court based this finding, in part, on the testimony of Officer Brooks, who was at the scene of the collision and followed defendant to the hospital. Officer Brooks testified that after having read defendant her Miranda rights twice, after having read her the chemical-test-rights sheet twice, and after having advised defendant of her option to refuse the blood test, defendant signed the consent form voluntarily. She appeared to him to be awake, coherent, and capable of understanding everything he had told her. The trial court also found defendant's signature on the consent form to be steady.
That the trial court chose to base its finding on physical evidence and on the testimony of Officer Brooks rather than on defendant's...
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