State v. Timpson
| Decision Date | 05 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20200891-CA |
| Citation | 2022 UT App 57 |
| Parties | State of Utah, Appellant, v. Alayne K. Timpson, Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Second District Court, Farmington Department The Honorable David R Hamilton No. 191700910
Troy S. Rawlings and Nathan Lyon, Attorneys for Appellant
Scott L. Wiggins, Attorney for Appellee
OPINION
¶1 Alayne K. Timpson entered into a plea agreement under which the State agreed, among other things, not to oppose that she be allowed to serve part of her jail sentence through a work release program administered at the jail. After Timpson pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) with priors, but before sentencing, the work release program shut down due to the outbreak of COVID-19, thereby preventing Timpson from being able to serve her jail sentence through the program. Some months later, the program reopened, but it was no longer administered at the jail: participants were allowed to serve their sentences through home confinement on an ankle monitor. Timpson was sentenced soon after the implementation of the ankle monitor program, and the district court imposed a sentence that permitted her to serve her "jail sentence" through home confinement rather than at the jail.
¶2 The State now appeals, arguing that the imposed sentence is illegal because it allows Timpson to serve less than the statutorily mandated minimum of 62.5 days in jail. We agree with the State and therefore vacate Timpson's sentence and remand for resentencing.
¶3 On March 10, 2019, a police officer observed Timpson's vehicle "make a wide turn, crossing over a solid white line and a second lane of traffic before entering the turn lane." During the maneuver, Timpson "failed to signal appropriately." Thereafter, the officer initiated a traffic stop.
¶4 During his first encounter with Timpson, the officer "observed she had relaxed facial features, her eyes were watery and bloodshot, and she was slow to respond to his questions." Based on the officer's experience, he understood these characteristics "were consistent with someone under the influence of a depressant."
¶5 The officer approached Timpson a second time and asked her to exit her vehicle. As Timpson did so, the officer "observed she was slow, deliberate, and appeared unsteady on her feet." The officer noted that these movements were "also consistent with someone under the influence of a depressant."
¶6 Based on these observations, the officer put Timpson through field sobriety tests, which indicated that Timpson was impaired. A subsequent Intoxilyzer test revealed she had a blood alcohol content of 0.151. At the time of the incident Timpson "was an alcohol restricted driver" with "two prior D.U.I. convictions within the past ten years." As a result, the State charged Timpson with three counts related to the incident: driving under the influence of alcohol with priors (Count 1), alcohol restricted driver (Count 2), and failure to signal (Count 3).
¶7 Timpson and the State negotiated a resolution to the case by way of a plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Timpson would plead guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3. In addition, the State agreed to not oppose that Timpson be placed into the work release program at the jail. On March 4, 2020, Timpson entered a guilty plea pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, and sentencing was scheduled for May 6, 2020.
¶8 Two days after entry of Timpson's guilty plea, Utah's governor issued an executive order declaring a state of emergency in Utah due to the outbreak of COVID-19. See Utah Exec. Order 2020-1 (March 6, 2020). In response to growing health concerns, the availability of the jail work center "was initially limited" before being completely closed. Consequently, Timpson's sentencing was continued a number of times awaiting a decision on whether the work center would reopen.
¶9 In August 2020, when it became apparent that serving time at the work center pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement "may not be available to her," Timpson filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Among other things, she argued that because "the promises of the State" to allow her to serve her statutory jail time at the work center "cannot be adopted and sentenced," her plea was not entered into "knowingly and voluntarily." The State opposed the motion, contending the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily and that Timpson "ha[d] received all the benefits and bargain described in the plea agreement."
¶10 While Timpson's motion to withdraw her guilty plea was still pending, the jail initiated a new work release program. Under the revised program, participants do not reside at the jail during their sentence but instead are "under home confinement with an ankle monitor."
¶11 On September 30, 2020, the parties appeared before the district court concerning a motion to continue Timpson's sentencing. A transcript of the hearing was not created; however, based on the court's discussion with defense counsel during the hearing, the State prepared a Sentencing Memorandum.
¶12 In its Sentencing Memorandum, the State outlined its objection to the court's "indicat[ion]" during the September 30 hearing that "it would be willing to entertain a request to have [Timpson] serve the mandatory 62.5 days incarceration through the [jail's] new work release program." The State argued that sentencing Timpson under the new work release program would result in an illegal sentence. It explained that although the new work release program was called "work release," it was actually only "home confinement with an ankle monitor," and therefore it did not satisfy the statutory requirement that all three-time DUI offenders serve "a jail sentence" of at least 62.5 days. Accordingly, the State requested that Timpson be sentenced "to 62.5 days of incarceration at the [jail]."
¶13 One month later, the court held a hearing on Timpson's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Prior to the formal hearing, the court "had an informal conversation with counsel on the record" regarding the pending motion. However, this conversation was not actually preserved as part of the record.
¶14 During the formal hearing, Timpson withdrew her motion and asked the court to proceed with sentencing. The court, over the State's objection, sentenced Timpson to serve 62.5 days in jail but allowed that sentence to be "facilitated through the ankle monitor program at the [jail]." The court reasoned that the ankle monitor program "is, in fact, the jail sentence carried out through the use of ankle monitor and other features," that the ankle monitor program "is consistent with the circumstances . . . as a form of work release," and that "the release was contemplated and agreed to by the State and [Timpson] given the circumstances at that time."
¶15 The State now appeals, arguing the district court erred in interpreting Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) to permit home confinement.[1] "We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 8, 478 P.3d 1048 (quotation simplified).
¶16 The State argues the district court erred in concluding that the term "jail sentence," as used in Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b), includes "home confinement." As a result, it contends Timpson's sentence was illegal because it was less than the minimum sentence mandated by statute.
¶17 Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) provides that in cases involving three-time DUI offenders, "if the court suspends the execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation, the court shall impose . . . (b) a jail sentence of not less than 1, 500 hours." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-505(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added).[2] In interpreting this statute, the district court concluded that in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the "jail sentence" requirement could be "facilitated through the ankle monitor program at the [jail]." This conclusion was incorrect.
¶18 When interpreting a statute, "our primary goal is to ascertain the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." O'Hearon v. Hansen, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 23, 409 P.3d 85 (quotation simplified). Because "the best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself," Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (quotation simplified), "we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous," Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 1177 (quotation simplified). "Additionally, we presume that the expression of one term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). "When the meaning of a statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Id. ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).
¶19 The plain language of section 41-6a-505(3)(b) requires that as a condition of probation, a court shall impose "a jail sentence of not less than [62.5 days]." Because the word "jail" is not defined by statute, we simply apply the plain meaning of that word. See Wilson 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14. The plain meaning of "jail" is a place or a building where "persons awaiting trial or those convicted of misdemeanors are confined." See Jail, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Jail, Merriam-Webster,...
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