State v. Tinsley
Citation | 264 A.3d 560,340 Conn. 425 |
Decision Date | 27 August 2021 |
Docket Number | SC 20479 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Darrell TINSLEY |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Hodge, state's attorney, Gail P. Hardy, former state's attorney, and John Fahey, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Naomi T. Fetterman, for the appellee (defendant).
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
The sole issue in this certified appeal is the extent to which a court should consider the facts alleged by the state in the charging documents when determining whether a crime is a lesser included offense of another, rather than confining its analysis to the elements of the statutes at issue, under Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court, which denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence filed by the defendant, Darrell Tinsley, on the basis of its conclusion that the defendant's convictions of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1)2 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-21, Public Acts 1995, No. 95-142, § 1,3 violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See State v. Tinsley , 197 Conn. App. 302, 304, 326, 232 A.3d 86 (2020). On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly considered the factual allegations in the information in concluding that risk of injury to a child, as charged therein, was a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree, rendering the defendant's conviction of both offenses a violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy. We conclude that the Appellate Court improperly considered the facts alleged in the state's information, rather than confining its analysis to the statutory elements under the Blockburger test, insofar as risk of injury to a child is not a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree because each offense requires the state to prove an element the other does not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history, aptly set forth by the Appellate Court in its opinion. "[Despite having] an unstable relationship, [the defendant and the victim's mother] cohabited in a one bedroom apartment along with the [fifteen month old] victim .... During the course of the adults’ relationship, individuals who knew the victim noticed a marked change in his behavior when he was in the presence of the defendant. At such times, the victim was timid, withdrawn and afraid of the defendant. The defendant's attitude toward the victim ranged from indifference to dislike. When [the victim's mother] was no longer able to avail herself of professional child care, the defendant sometimes took care of the victim while [the victim's mother] worked.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 304–306, 232 A.3d 86.
(Footnotes omitted.) Id., at 306–307, 232 A.3d 86.
Specifically, the court stated: " " Id., at 309, 232 A.3d 86.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that "his conviction and punishment for manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury arose from the same transaction and that risk of injury is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree, as charged in this matter, in violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy." Id. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant. Specifically, the court concluded that, despite risk of injury not being a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree under the Blockburger test, it was nevertheless a lesser included offense as charged in the information in this case. Id., at 325, 232 A.3d 86. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id., at 326, 232 A.3d 86. This certified appeal followed.
Before turning to the parties’ claims, we set forth the applicable standard of review and background principles governing the analysis of double jeopardy claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Porter , 328 Conn. 648, 654–55, 182 A.3d 625 (2018).
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 655, 182 A.3d 625 ; see also State v. Goldson , 178 Conn. 422, 424, 423 A.2d 114 (1979). At the outset, we note that the Appellate Court's conclusion that the defendant's convictions of manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury arose from the same act or transaction perpetuated on the same victim is undisputed. See State v. Tinsley , supra, 197 Conn. App. at 319, 232 A.3d 86. Accordingly, pursuant to the second step of Blockburger , we now turn to whether risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree, rendering them...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Jose A. B.
...provisions). Relying on the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Tinsley , 197 Conn. App. 302, 232 A.3d 86 (2020), rev'd, 340 Conn. 425, 264 A.3d 560 (2021), the defendant asserts that, as charged in the information, it is not possible to commit the offenses of sexual assault in the first......
-
State v. Abraham
...is whether each provision requires proof of a fact [that] the other does not." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tinsley , 340 Conn. 425, 432, 264 A.3d 560 (2021). As we explained in part II of this opinion, the defendant's criminal conduct can be separated into two different act......
-
State v. Ares
...likely to impair the morals or health (3) of a child under the age of sixteen." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tinsley , 340 Conn. 425, 444, 264 A.3d 560 (2021) ; see also State v. McClary , supra, 207 Conn. at 240, 541 A.2d 96 (intent required is only general intent to do act......
-
State v. Jose A. B.
...provisions). Relying on the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn.App. 302, 232 A.3d 86 (2020), rev'd, 340 Conn. 425, 264 A.3d 560 (2021), the asserts that, as charged in the information, it is not possible to commit the offenses of sexual assault in the first and fourth ......