State v. TK
| Citation | 139 Wash.2d 320,987 P.2d 63 |
| Decision Date | 14 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 67435-3., No. 67819-7, No. 67185-1 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. T.K., Respondent. State of Washington, Petitioner, v. D.V., Respondent. State of Washington, Petitioner, v. C.C., Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
John Ladenburg, Pierce County Prosecutor, John C. Hillman, Deputy, Tacoma, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.
Catherine E. Maxson, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union.
Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Carol Smith-Merkulov, Asst., Olympia, Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, David Thiele, Deputy, Everett, for Appellant Washington State Patrol and Petitioner State.
David S. Vogel, P.L.L.C., for respondent D.V.
Howard Goodfriend, Brendan Finucane, Judith Dubester, Seattle, for respondents.
The question presented by these three consolidated cases is whether the 1997 amendments to RCW 13.50.050, relating to vacation and sealing of juvenile court records, apply to the records of defendants who were eligible for expungement before the amendments were adopted but who moved for relief after the amendments became effective. In State v. D.V., No. 93-8-03502-2 (King County Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1998), and State v. C.C., Nos. 98-8-12050-1, 91-8-01326-0 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 1998), the State Patrol appeals directly from a superior court order granting defendants' motions to seal juvenile files. In State v. T.K., 94 Wash.App. 286, 971 P.2d 121 (1999), the State petitions for review of a published Court of Appeals decision directing the superior court to seal defendant's records. We affirm the trial courts in D.V. and C.C. and the Court of Appeals in T.K.
T.K. pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation in March 1993. The prosecutor recommended, and the court imposed, treatment under a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA). At that time, RCW 13.50.050(10) and (11) permitted juvenile offenders to petition the court to vacate disposition orders and to permanently seal juvenile court files two years after the juvenile was discharged from state agency supervision. If the juvenile had committed no other offenses, that statute required the juvenile court to grant the motion to vacate and seal.
T.K. completed the requirements of his SSODA in April 1995. In 1996, he petitioned the juvenile court to vacate his duty to register his residential address under the sex offender registration statute, RCW 9A.44.140(4). The court found the defendant met the demands of the statute and entered an order ending the registration requirement. T.K. did not, however, move to have his disposition orders vacated or his conviction records sealed under RCW 13.50.050.
In 1997, the Legislature amended RCW 13.50.050(11) to require sealing under subsection (10) only if the moving party has spent 10 consecutive years in the community without committing any additional offenses in the case of a Class B felony and 5 years for a Class C felony conviction. It also eliminated sealing altogether if the original offense was a sex offense or a class A felony. Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 40. The effective date of the amendments was July 1, 1997. Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 75. In October 1997, T.K. moved the court to order the Washington State Patrol to expunge the record of his juvenile court conviction. The court denied the motion based on the 1997 amendments to RCW 13.50.050.
The Court of Appeals, Division I, held that the 1997 amendments could not divest T.K. of the right to have his records sealed because he satisfied all of the requirements for expungement under the pre-1997 version of the statute. The court therefore reversed and remanded with directions that T.K.'s records be expunged.
State v. D.V.
While trick-or-treating on Halloween night in 1992, D.V. forcibly took bags of candy from other teenagers. D.V. pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree robbery. The court entered its disposition order in November 1993.1 On July 14, 1998, D.V. filed a motion to seal the juvenile court records under his juvenile court cause number pursuant to RCW 13.50.050. The trial court found he had met the requirements of RCW 13.50.050 prior to the 1997 amendments. Therefore, the court held that D.V. had a right to have his records sealed under the former statute and issued an order to the Washington State Patrol to seal the records.
The State Patrol notified D.V.'s attorney that it declined to comply with the order as it had not been notified of the motion and was not a party to the proceedings. D.V. then re-noted his motion and sent notice of the hearing to the State Patrol. At the second hearing the judge again ordered the State Patrol to seal D.V.'s records because he had become eligible for expungement prior to the 1997 amendments. The State Patrol appealed directly to this Court.
State v. C.C.
C.C. pleaded guilty to the charge of rape of a child in the first degree in 1991. In September 1998, C.C. filed a motion to seal his juvenile records. The trial court granted the motion and entered an order sealing the juvenile records. The State Patrol appealed directly to this Court.
These three cases have been consolidated for review by this Court.
RCW 13.50.050(10) provides that an individual against whom an information has been filed under RCW 13.40.100 or who has been referred for diversion pursuant to RCW 13.40.070 "may file a motion with the court to have the court vacate its order and findings" and "order the sealing of the official juvenile court file, the social file, and records of the court and of any other agency in the case." Prior to July 1997, RCW 13.50.050(11) mandated:
The court shall grant the motion to seal records made pursuant to subsection (10) of this section if it finds that:
(a) Two years have elapsed from the later of: (i) Final discharge of the person from the supervision of any agency charged with supervising juvenile offenders; or (ii) from the entry of a court order relating to the commission of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;
(b) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense; and
(c) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person.
RCW 13.50.050(11).
In 1997, the Legislature amended RCW 13.50.050(11) as follows:
The court shall grant the motion to seal records made pursuant to subsection (10) of this section if it finds that:
(a) For class B offenses other than sex offenses, since the last date of release from confinement, including full-time residential treatment, if any, or entry of disposition, the person has spent ten consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime that subsequently results in conviction. For class C offenses other than sex offenses, since the last date of release from confinement, including full-time residential treatment, if any, or entry of disposition, the person has spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime that subsequently results in conviction;
(b) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;
(c) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person;
(d) The person has not been convicted of a class A or sex offense; and
(e) Full restitution has been paid.
RCW 13.50.050(11). The effective date of the 1997 amendment was July 1, 1997. Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 75.
Initially, the State contends the trial court exceeded its authority in ordering sealing of the defendants' records because "[t]he statute relied on by the Juvenile Court did not exist when it made its ruling." Br. of Appellant Washington State Patrol, State v. D.V., at 7; see also Br. of Appellant Washington State Patrol, State v. C.C., at 6. Citing State v. Gilkinson, 57 Wash.App. 861, 865, 790 P.2d 1247 (1990), the State argues that the trial court has no inherent power to resuscitate the terms of a previous statute (former RCW 13.50.050(11)) and apply them to the defendants' cases. Br. of Appellant Washington State Patrol, State v. D.V., at 8. Gilkinson does not support the State's position. At issue there was RCW 10.97.060 which provided for deletion of nonconviction data upon the request of the subject of such data. Gilkinson, 57 Wash.App. at 864, 790 P.2d 1247. RCW 10.97.030(2) defined nonconviction data and RCW 10.97.030(4) excluded from the definition of nonconviction data any dismissal entered after probation, suspension, or deferral of sentence. The defendant conceded that deletion of his deferred sentence was not authorized under the relevant statutes. He argued, however, that the trial court had the inherent power to delete records of his conviction. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that a trial court has no inherent authority to expunge a criminal record and that the authority to do so must come from the Legislature. Thus, the question in Gilkinson was not whether a statute which is amended ceases to exist but, whether a trial court has inherent authority to expunge criminal records, in addition to any express statutory authority'. In these cases, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not purport to rely on an inherent court power. They relied on the language of the preamendment statute. Contrary to the State's argument, amending a statute does not necessarily mean that the prior statute ceases to exist. An amendment generally means that the new statute will apply as of the effective date of the amendment. There are many cases, however, in which a preamendment version of a statute will continue to govern in cases arising prior to the amendment, particularly where vested rights or contractual obligations are affected. See,...
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