State v. Tomasi
| Decision Date | 04 February 1895 |
| Citation | 67 Vt. 312,31 A. 780 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. TOMASI. |
Exceptions from Washington county court; Munson, Judge.
D. Tomasi was convicted of keeping a nuisance, and excepts. Exceptions overruled.
Geo. W. Wing and F. L. Laird, for respondent.
Zed S. Stanton, State's Atty.
But one question arises in this case. The jury were instructed that, if the respondent sold what was in fact lager beer, he might be found guilty, even though he did not know or suppose that the article was lager beer. The respondent insists that the charge so given was erroneous, claiming that Ignorance of fact, unaccompanied by any negligence, exempts one from criminal responsibility. If knowledge of certain facts is necessary to constitute an offense, the respondent can always show an ignorance of such facts in defense, or, rather, to insure a conviction, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show the respondent's knowledge; e. g. It is an offense to pass counterfeit money, knowing it to be counterfeit. To convict, the prosecution must always show the respondent's knowledge of its baseness. The case cited by the respondent (Crabtree v. State, 30 Ohio St. 382) is of this class. The statute prohibited the sale of liquor to a person by one knowing him, the vendee, to be a person in the habit of getting intoxicated. It was held necessary to show knowledge of the respondent of the person's habit. The rule in most instances seems to be this: If, to constitute an offense, knowledge of certain facts is essential, it must invariably be shown that the respondent has such knowledge; but if a statute makes an act penal, without reference to knowledge, it is then unnecessary to show it, and ignorance of the fact is no defense. The rule may be stated in other words, thus: If a statute commands that an act be done or omitted, which in the absence of the statute would be blameless, ignorance of the fact or state of things contemplated by the statute will not excuse its violation. The charge of the court was in accord with the rule as stated in State v. Hopkins, 56 Vt. 250. For the many cases in which the same doctrine is held, see People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N. W. 365, and Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St 456, 30 Am. Rep. note, p. 617. A case much in point may be found in the English exchequer. Reg. v. Woodrow, 15 Mees. & W. 404. The respondent was tried, that eminent jurist, Sir Frederick Pollock, C. B., presiding, upon the charge of having in...
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Ollre v. State
...and contrary to his instructions, the employé alone is liable. Intent is not an essential ingredient of the offense charged. State v. Tomasi, 67 Vt. 312, 31 Atl. 780; State v. Perkins, 42 Vt. 399; State v. Ackerly, 79 Vt. 69, 64 Atl. 450, 118 Am. St. Rep. 940. In Com. v. Savery, 145 Mass. 2......
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State v. Burlington Drug Co.
...to his "willfulness" in the natural sense of the word. State v. Gilmore, 80 Vt. 514, 68 Atl. 658, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 786; State v. Tomasi, 67 Vt 312, 31 Atl. 780; State v. Perkins, 42 Vt. 399. Therefore, since the bond provided by statute can be forfeited only in consequence of a willful v......
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State v. Gilmore
...contrary to his instructions, the employé alone is liable. Intent is not an essential ingredient of the offense charged. State v. Tomassi, 67 Vt. 312, 31 Atl. 780; State v. Perkins, 42 Vt. 399; State v. Ackerly, 79 Vt. 69, 64 Atl. 450. In Commonwealth v. Savery, 145 Mass. 212, 13 N. E. 611,......
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State v. Audette
...in the act as it was understood to be, or some negligence in ascertaining the facts. But the view taken by this court in State v. Tomasi, 67 Vt. 312, 31 Atl. 780, and in State v. Ward, 75 Vt. 438, 56 Atl. 85, with reference to offenses purely statutory, accords with the main current of auth......