State v. Tompkins, No. 92-1090

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: HAYDEN; SACKETT; SCHLEGEL
• Citation: 507 N.W.2d 736
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Mitchell TOMPKINS, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 92-1090
• Decision Date: 02 September 1993

Page 736

507 N.W.2d 736 STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
v.
Mitchell TOMPKINS, Appellant. No. 92-1090. Court of Appeals of Iowa. Sept. 2, 1993.

Page 737

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Kevin Cmelik, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Amy M. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., William F. Creasey, County Atty., and Christine Dalton, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

HAYDEN, Judge.

Michael Lee Tompkins appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1991).

On February 5, 1992, police officer Teresa Miller observed Tompkins' car weave in its own lane of traffic. The officer followed Tompkins' car for approximately one mile. During this distance she observed defendant's car weave from the center line to the right side boundary several times. Tompkins' car never crossed the center line or the boundary line on the right-hand side. Officer Miller activated her lights and stopped Tompkins. The officer noticed an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. After failing field sobriety tests, Tompkins was arrested. Tompkins consented to an intoxilyzer breath test. The result was .185.

Tompkins was charged by information with operating while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1991). He filed a motion to suppress evidence concerning the implied consent to test procedures and reference to and result of the intoxilyzer breath test. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court overruled the motion.

A bench trial was held in which Tompkins stipulated the intoxilyzer machine used to test his breath was in proper working order and had a five percent margin of error. Officer Miller testified the only reason she stopped Tompkins' car was it was weaving within its lane. She testified she observed Tompkins' vehicle weave within its own lane of traffic.

Q. During that one mile, approximately how many times did the vehicle [of Tompkins'] weave? A. I can't advise an exact number. I think I stated earlier that it was less than six, more than three. I'm not sure exactly how many.

Q. Okay. And did they pass over--the tires pass over the center line? A. No, they did not.

On cross-examination Officer Miller testified:

Q. Your estimate here today is, I believe, three to six. I don't know exactly. More than three, but less than six, I believe is what my notes indicate; is that a correct statement? A. To my recollection. I can't advise what I stated the first time. I know it was enough to get my attention. And when I say at least three, but not more than six, that's probably right around the vicinity as to how many times he hit either the center line or the boundary line.

Q. So the minimum would be three times total of touching either the center line or the boundary line on the right-hand side? A. That's correct.

Page 738

Q. And I believe you previously indicated that at no time did he ever cross either of those lines? A. That's correct.

Tompkins testified he was weaving because he was talking to his girlfriend, a passenger in the vehicle. The district court found Tompkins guilty and sentenced him to pay a $500 fine and serve thirty-five days in jail. The sentence was suspended for a period of one year pursuant to a probation agreement. Tompkins appeals.

Our review is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Iowa 1990); Iowa R.App.P. 4.

The Fourth Amendment requires a police officer must have reasonable cause to stop an individual for investigatory purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). The reasonable cause standard for investigatory stops is set forth in State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1982):

It is well settled that the fourth amendment requires reasonable cause to stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d 755, 750 (Iowa 1975). When a stop is challenged on the basis that reasonable cause did not exist, the State must show that the stopping officer had "specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity may have occurred." State v. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa 1980). Circumstances giving rise to suspicion or curiosity will not suffice. State v. Dixon, 241 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1976). The officer is bound by the true reason or reasons for making the stop; that is, the officer may not rely on reasons that he or she could have had but did not actually have. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d at 619. If the State fails to meet its burden, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop must be suppressed. State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Iowa 1977).

Lamp, 322 N.W.2d at 51. The determination of whether reasonable cause exists must be reached on an objective basis. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981) (citations omitted); Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1976).

The issue is whether the police officer's observations of the vehicle weaving within its own lane of traffic gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. The following cases illustrate Iowa courts have established in this state...