State v. Tornabene
| Decision Date | 13 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 57717,57717 |
| Citation | 337 So.2d 214 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Judy TORNABENE. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Sheldon G. Fernandez, Gretna, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Director, Research and Appeals Division, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant Judy Tornabene was convicted of possession with intent to distribute codeine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A) and sentenced to serve six years at hard labor. She appealed relying on six assignments of error.
On June 1, 1975, defendant's purse containing $3500 was found near a New Orleans bank which had been robbed two days earlier. The purse was turned over to local police who related the discovery to F.B.I. agents investigating the robbery. On June 2, 1975, two F.B.I. agents went to the house where defendant resided with her mother, Wilda Roberson, informed Mrs. Roberson they suspected defendant had been connected with the bank robbery, and asked for permission to search the premises. After conferring with her daughter, who said she did not object to the agents' request, Mrs. Roberson signed a written consent form allowing the officers to search. In the defendant's bedroom closet one agent found several plastic envelopes of pills concealed in packages of coffee and grits. Defendant was given the Miranda warning and questioned about the money found in her purse. She reportedly stated that the money had been acquired through the sale of drugs. Chemical analysis of some of the pills indicated that they contained codeine and other narcotics.
These assignments relate to the denial of the defendant's motions to suppress the inculpatory statement and evidence seized in the search. While defendant does not contest the validity of the consent to the search, she argues the agents did not have sufficient cause to request a search of her home or to question her. She bases her contentions primarily on our decisions in State v. Truss, 317 So.2d 177 (La.1975) and State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869 (La.1974) wherein we stated that:
'* * * The police cannot approach citizens under circumstances that make it seem that some form of detention is imminent unless they have probable cause to arrest the individual or reasonable grounds to detain the individual under Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).'
Our opinions in those cases pertained to actions by police in approaching or detaining defendants based on little more than the individuals' demeanor or gestures during street encounters.
The factual situation in the instant case is distinguishable both in character and degree from the street encounter cases. First, the F.B.I. agent did not detain the defendant or approach her under circumstances that made it seem some form of detention was imminent. Ms. Tornabene was not accosted in the street, but was questioned at her home. The evidence indicates she and her mother were free to deny the agents access to the house and to decline to talk to them. Second, the officers in this case acted upon evidence of illicit activity which we consider to be more substantial than the furtive movements or startled look relied upon by the police in Saia and Truss. In the present case, defendant's purse containing a large and unexplained quantity of cash, had been found in the vicinity of a recent bank robbery. Their suspicions justifiably aroused by this discovery, the agents acted properly in seeking an interview of the defendant and a voluntary search of her home.
The agents' suspicions fell short of probable cause to arrest or search, but the circumstances surrounding the discovery of defendant's purse furnished grounds for the officers to approach defendant at her home for consensual, non-custodial questioning and to request a search of her residence. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that:
'In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
The high court in Schneckloth also quoted with approval from People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955), which held that it is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for such purposes, if such inquiries are courteously made and not accompanied with any assertion of a right to enter or search or secure answers. We concur in this holding, but we also agree with the precautionary remarks of Justice Traynor in that case:
'We are not unmindful of the fact that the appearance of four officers at the door may be a disturbing experience, and that a request to enter made to a distraught or timid woman might under certain circumstances carry with it an implied assertion of authority that the occupant should not be expected to resist.' Id., 290 P.2d at 854.
Furthermore, we reserve judgment on whether the F.B.I. agents could have approached Ms. Tornabene for any purpose on the basis of less substantial evidence of illicit activity than existed in this case. We conclude only that the agents in the present case acted properly and that the record indicates the evidence was voluntarily produced in response to a reasonable inquiry.
These assignments of error do not warrant reversal of the conviction and sentence.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, over her objection, the other narcotics seized with the codeine. Because these other drugs were controlled dangerous substances, possession of which is illegal, La.R.S 40:961 ff., defendant argues that the introduction of this evidence constituted an improper reference to other crimes. However, the trial judge correctly ruled that the evidence was part of the res gestae, having been seized at the same time and from the same place as the codeine. La.R.S. 15:447--48; State v. Frazier, 283 So.2d 261 (La.1973); State v. Mays, 315 So.2d 766 (La.1975). The court further found that the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's intent to distribute, a constituent element of the crime with which she was charged. State v. Hamilton, 307 So.2d 329 (La.1975).
This assignment is without merit.
Defendant objected to the introduction of testimony on the street value and dosage units of codeine, and further claimed that if this testimony was to be admitted at all the State's expert witness was not...
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State v. Moore
...State v. Clark, supra. Testimony of street value and dosage of the drug is also relevant to the issue of intent. State v. Tornabene, 337 So.2d 214 (La. 1976); State v. Gladney, 29,791 (La.App.2d Cir.9/24/97), 700 So.2d The proper standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidenc......
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Cummings v. Cain
...Testimony of the street value and dosage units of the narcotic is also relevant.See Jordan, 489 So.2d at 997 (citing State v. Tornabene, 337 So.2d 214 (La. 1976)). The presence of large sums of cash has also been considered as circumstantial evidence of intent. See Jordan, 489 So.2d at 997.......
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State v. Mitchell
...case is a much closer question. Testimony of street value and dosage of the drug is relevant to the issue of intent. State v. Tornabene, 337 So.2d 214 (La.1976); State v. Gladney, 29,791 (La. App.2d Cir.9/24/97), 700 So.2d Factors useful in determining whether circumstantial evidence is suf......
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30-727 La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/98, State v. Goodjoint
...writ denied, 617 So.2d 905 (La.1993). Testimony of the street value of the drug is also relevant to the issue of intent. State v. Tornabene, 337 So.2d 214 (La.1976). Officer Mark Nappier was qualified by the trial court as an expert in evaluation of street level sales of cocaine. He testifi......