State v. Torrence

• Decision Date: 15 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 2699,2699
• Citation: 1 Conn.App. 697,476 A.2d 598
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Booker T. TORRENCE.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 598

476 A.2d 598

1 Conn.App. 697

STATE of Connecticut v. Booker T. TORRENCE.

No. 2699.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 10, 1984.

Decided May 15, 1984.

Jon C. Blue, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Katherine J. Lambert, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John T. Redway, State's Atty., and John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before DANNEHY, C.P.J., and TESTO and BORDEN, JJ.

BORDEN, Judge.

The defendant appealed ¹ from his conviction, in a single trial, of the following crimes: two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(2); one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of General Statutes § 53a-211; one count of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61; one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(3); and one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94. ² The first two robbery convictions and the conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun arise from an armed robbery at a package store in Middletown at 1:20 p.m. on March 1, 1978. The third robbery conviction, the conviction of assault and the conviction of kidnapping arise from an assault on and the robbery and kidnapping of a victim at his home in Middletown at about 8:15 p.m. of that same day.

The first set of convictions involves evidence from which the jury could have found the following facts. At about 1:20 p.m. on March 1, 1978, the defendant, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, with two accomplices robbed two victims at a package store in Middletown. This robbery was immediately followed by an automobile chase of the defendant and his accomplices by the police. This chase was interrupted by the following confrontation. The defendant had stopped his car due to a collision. A police officer had left his cruiser and was walking toward the defendant's car with his gun drawn. The defendant then drove his car past the officer, who jumped from its path, fired at the defendant's fleeing car and resumed the chase in his cruiser. ³ A few minutes later the police found the car abandoned nearby, with the shotgun and some of the money from the robbery. The accomplices were discovered almost immediately, both within one quarter of a mile from the abandoned car. ⁴

The second set of convictions involves evidence from which the jury could have found the following facts. The victim, 93 years old, lived in Middletown within three quarters of a mile from where the defendant and his accomplices abandoned their car. At about 8:15 p.m. on that same day, the victim went to the cellar of his home, where the defendant, who had broken in, was hiding. The defendant hit the victim on the head with a hammer; took his wallet; tied his legs with ropes; hit him again repeatedly on the head with the hammer; placed a chopping block on his chest, cracking three of his ribs; threw kerosene and oil into his eyes; pulled the victim, still tied at his legs, into a cold storage room and shut the door; and went upstairs, where he took more cash and some rings of the victim. The victim managed to untie himself and leave the cellar. When he went outside to summon help, the defendant was there and hit the victim again on his head with the hammer. The defendant left the victim in the snow and went back into the house. The victim crawled back into the cellar and eventually the defendant left the house. At about 10 p.m. the defendant was hitchhiking out of town about one quarter of a mile from the victim's house when he was picked up by a police officer. The defendant was in possession of the victim's social security card.

The defendant's principal defense at the trial was lack of mental capacity, or insanity, under General Statutes § 53a-13. ⁵ Two experts testified on his behalf. Lee David Brauer, a psychiatrist, testified to the effect that the defendant was borderline psychotic, paranoid and delusional, and that his mental illness rendered him unable to conform his conduct to the law. David Fitzgibbons, a psychologist, testified to the effect that the defendant was chronic paranoid schizophrenic, and that the confrontation with the police officer caused him to lose control of himself. In rebuttal the state offered Mehadin Arefeh, a psychiatrist, who testified to the effect that the defendant was not mentally ill and could conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

The defendant's appeal raises three grounds. We find no error.

I

The defendant's principal claim is that the court erred in its charge to the jury on the issue of mental capacity under General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-13. The charge is quoted in full in the footnote, with the challenged portion in italics. ⁶

Because the defendant neither filed a request to charge nor took an exception to the charge as given, in order to review this claim under the Evans bypass doctrine we must first determine whether the charge raises a question of constitutional dimension and, if so, whether the claim has merit. State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 557, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982); State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). "The state was obligated to prove every essential element of the crime[s] including, upon challenge, the defendant's sanity." State v. Ontra, 178 Conn. 480, 486, 423 A.2d 134 (1979). The charge improperly injected into this issue the element of the defendant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong. See footnote 2, supra; see also State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 424 A.2d 293 (1979). The state's evidence of the defendant's commission of the crimes was not contradicted, and the defendant introduced without limitation, through his psychiatric witnesses, evidence of his presence at the package store and in the elderly victim's cellar. Thus, as both the state and the defendant agree, the only real issue in the case was the defendant's mental capacity. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the injection of the right-wrong test into the essential element of the defendant's mental capacity was of constitutional dimension. We therefore consider the merits of the defendant's constitutional claim.

It is clear that the inclusion in the charge of the challenged language, which involved the abandoned M'Naghten test, was error. State v. Jones, 193 Conn. 70, 85, 475 A.2d 1087 (1984); State v. McCall, 187 Conn. 73, 86-87, 444 A.2d 896 (1982); State v. Toste, supra, 178 Conn., 632-33, 424 A.2d 293. This is particularly true in view of No. 336 of the 1967 Public Acts, which, as General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) § 54-82a, was the statutory predecessor of General Statutes § 53a-13. Section 2 of that public act provided that "[t]ests of insanity previously used in criminal cases are hereby abolished."

This does not end our inquiry. We must still determine whether the error was reversible. "An error of constitutional dimension in the instructions in a criminal case is reversible error when it is reasonably possible that the jury were misled by the instructions." State v. Kurvin, supra, 186 Conn., 572, 442 A.2d 1327 (Speziale, C.J., dissenting); see also the majority opinion in State v. Kurvin, supra, 558-66, 442 A.2d 1327. "The scope of appellate review of [a claim under the Evans exception] is, however, limited by virtue of its constitutional origin." State v. McCalpine, 190 Conn. 822, 828, 463 A.2d 545 (1983). That scope is confined to ascertaining not "whether the ruling or instruction was undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned but rather whether when reviewed in the context of the entire trial it violated" the defendant's fundamental rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution or article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution. State v. Kurvin, supra, 186 Conn., 565, 442 A.2d 1327. "Due process seeks to assure a defendant a fair trial, not a perfect one." Id. Thus, the Evans bypass is not aimed at errors of law which, by traditional analysis, would merely be deemed harmful; rather it "is designed to protect fundamental constitutional rights ...." Id., 566, 442 A.2d 1327.

State v. Kurvin, supra, makes clear that, in reviewing such a claim, we must balance "two concepts which if not mutually exclusive at least appear to lead us in opposite directions." Id., 561, 442 A.2d 1327. The first is that a claimed error involving an essential element of the crime "must be examined ... in a constitutional penumbra." Id. This involves an inquiry into whether the error had substantial influence on the result. Id., 562, 442 A.2d 1327. The second is that, "absent real rather than abstract constitutional violations criminal prosecutions should, at some point, be laid to rest." Id., 563, 442 A.2d 1327. This involves several related notions: that rarely will an improper instruction, which was not so obviously prejudicial that the defendant himself disregarded it, justify reversal of a criminal conviction; that requiring such claims of error to be made at trial has the salutary purposes of permitting their correction before it is too late, and of avoiding subjecting an accused to needless multiple prosecutions, which is not in the public interest and which contributes to the economic waste and court congestion caused by unnecessary trials; and that such a requirement discourages trial by ambuscade and avoids transforming criminal trials into games of chance. Id., 563-66, 442 A.2d 1327.

Furthermore, and most significant for this case, Kurvin makes clear that, in deciding whether an error of constitutional dimension in a charge is reversible, the charge "is not to be examined in a vacuum. Rather, it is to be viewed in the context of the factual issues raised at the trial." Id., 558, 442 A.2d 1327. We must " 'view the charge itself as part of the whole trial.' United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1912, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975)....