State v. Town of Guttenberg

• Decision Date: 06 June 1899
• Citation: 43 A. 703,62 N.J.L. 605
• Parties: STATE (HERRMAN et al., Prosecutors) v. TOWN OF GUTTENBERG et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

43 A. 703

62 N.J.L. 605

STATE (HERRMAN et al., Prosecutors)

v. TOWN OF GUTTENBERG et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 6, 1899.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari by the state, on the prosecution of Frederick W. Herrman and others, against the town of Guttenberg and others, to review the validity of a proposed issue of bonds by the town. Affirmed.

Argued June term, 1898, before LIPPINCOTT and GUMMERE, JJ.

Chas. C. Black, for prosecutors.

W. H. Corbin, for defendants.

LIPPINCOTT, J. The matter to be reviewed by the writ of certiorari in this case is the validity of a proposed issue of bonds by the town of Guttenberg, in the county of Hudson, under an act of the legislature entitled "An act authorizing towns to issue bonds for the purpose of raising money to pay certain bonds and improvement certificates and interest thereon, and judgments recovered thereon heretofore legally issued and now due," approved March 9, 1898 (P. L. 1898, p. 63). On March 21, 1898, the board of councilmen of the town of Guttenberg by resolution ascertained that there existed outstanding bonds of the town, issued for the costs and expense of street improvements, to the amount of $26,000, legally issued by the town on January 1, 1876, which became due on January 1, 1886, with the accrued interest thereon; that, also, there existed improvement certificates, legally issued, for the sum of $12,025.36, with accrued interest from the date of issuing the same; also, that there existed judgments recovered in the different courts of this state and the courts of the United States against the town, upon other bonds and certificates, and interest thereon, due and unpaid, to the amount of $29,679.99, with interest thereon from the date of the recovery of the judgments, respectively. The further resolution was that there be issued by the said town bonds to the amount of $90,000, to provide for the payment of these outstanding bonds, certificates, and judgments, and interest thereon, designating the date which the bonds should bear, the rate of interest, when payable, and the character of the bonds, and providing for their execution, and that they be sold to the highest bidder, at not less than par value, and for the application of the proceeds to the payment of the bonds, improvement certificates, and judgments mentioned, with the interest thereon, and providing for the creation and management of a sinking fund, to be constituted of the moneys to be received from the assessments, redemption from sale for unpaid assessments, for and on account of any of the improvements for which said bonds and improvement certificates were originally issued, and also that, every year while the bonds issued under this resolution should remain unpaid, there should be raised by taxation 2 per cent. of the total amount of the issue of said bonds, which 2 per cent. should also he paid into the sinking fund, which sinking fund should not be used for any other purpose than the redemption of the bonds so issued under this resolution, and providing, further, for levy and collection annually of the interest on the bonds so issued. These bonds were by such resolutions to become due and payable as follows: $10,000 on April 16, 1903, at 5 per cent. interest; $10,000 on April 16, 1908, at 5 per cent. interest; $10,000 on April 16. 1913, at 5 per cent. interest; $6,000 on April 16, 1913, at 5 per cent. interest. These resolutions were issued by virtue of the act to which reference has been made (P. L. 1898, p. 63), the first section of which provides that: "It shall be lawful for the town council or other governing body of any town in this state to provide for the payment of all bonds and improvement certificates, heretofore legally issued by said town, for and on account of any street improvement or improvements, and now remaining unpaid, and for the payment of interest due thereon and of any judgments recovered on any such bond or bonds, improvement certificate, or certificates, by the issue and sale of the corporate bonds of such town, in an amount not exceeding the total amount due by the town, on and for the bonds, improvement certificates, interest and judgments aforesaid." The act also further provides for the denomination and times of payment of the bonds, the rate of interest, and execution and character of bonds (whether coupon or registered), the creation of the sinking fund, the levy of the amount of 2 per cent. of such bonds, to be raised annually to be placed in sinking fund, and for the levy and collection of the interest on such bonds annually.

It will be observed, by reference to the proceedings of the board of councilmen of this town, and the proof in this case, that these resolutions were in entire accordance with the act cited. The amount for which the bonds should be issued is clearly shown by these proceedings and by the proof to have been correctly ascertained, and it exceeds the amount of $90,000. There is no want of conformity with the law, in the ascertainment of the amount for which the bonds should be issued for, and it fully appears that the proceedings of the councilmen were in no wise informal or irregular. Some informalities and irregularities were hinted in the argument made by counsel, but an examination of the proceedings of the councilmen, and proof made under the writ, reveal none whatever. It is conceded that the bonds and improvement certificates for street improvements in the town of Guttenberg were legally issued, and were binding obligations against the town. The bonds to be issued by the resolution are those of the class authorized by the statute, and the resolutions are specific and definite as to their object and purpose.

The sole objection, under the reasons, relied on by the prosecutors, is that the statute is unconstitutional. It will be observed that the act is general in its title and text. It applies to all towns in this state. So much has been conceded by the prosecutors. But it is contended that it should apply to cities and townships as well, and that its failure to do so renders it a special act. Admitting for a moment that this contention has some force, it can be answered by the adjudications in this state that the term "town" includes in its significance cities, boroughs, townships, and villages, which have conferred upon them by statute similar municipal powers and duties, or, in other words, a similar form of government. It is the substance of the thing, and not the mere title, which determines the character of the municipality. Under the term "town," a village, borough, and cities are included,—for instance, every borough or city is a town. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law, 1. It may be said that the term "town" now includes almost every character of municipal government, from a city to a village, including places which are governed by a commission with some municipal governmental powers, and designated by such a title; and, if the functions of these different municipalities are similar, this term "town" would seem to include them all. Improvement Commission v. Dobbins (N. J. Err. & App.) 40 Atl. 599. But in order to sustain this act it is not necessary to go so far; nor does it need much discussion to determine that, if it applies only to such places as have become incorporated under our statutes by the title of towns, this is a classification so general and so natural, as relating to the municipal powers usually conferred, that legislation which refers only to such municipalities is not for that reason alone to be adjudged unconstitutional. This classification alone will not render available the interdict of the constitution against special legislation. This, as now understood, is the clear meaning of all the adjudications on this subject. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law, 1; Lowthorp v. Inhabitants of City of Trenton, 61 N. J. Law, 484-487, 40 Atl. 442; Improvement Commission v. Dobbins (N. J. Err. & App.) 40 Atl. 599.

The objections to the act, as made by the reasons filed and in the argument, are general in their character, including the one above considered; and again it is contended that this act does not include provision for the payment by the issue of bonds of all classes of indebtedness (all bonds and improvement certificates), and that it is limited to past-due bonds, and improvement certificates based upon street improvements, and judgments, when recovered, on bonds based upon street improvements, when it should include all classes of bonds, improvement certificates, and judgments (those not due and unpaid as well as those past due), and that this is a classification entirely artificial. Also, it is objected that the statute is unconstitutional because it is in conflict, in its application in this case, to paragraph 12, § 7, art. 4, of the constitution, which provides that "property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by uniform rules according to its true value."

Now, in the consideration of these objections, we have seen that the act, both in title and in text, is general; and we have seen that while this act may, in its application to the facts, relate to one town alone, yet that by itself does not render the act invalid. It need only embrace one subject, and yet be a good enactment The classification which renders it repugnant to the constitutional prohibition against special legislation must arise from the act. The act here applies to a past indebtedness arising out of street improvements. The act thus classifies the subject which is to be dealt with. It is not shown in this case that this classification of the subject is one which has attributes and qualities which render it one which cannot be appropriately dealt with by legislation and when this does not so appear, or where it is doubtful in the mind of the court, the statute should be upheld. The towns, by the statute, are not...