State v. Townley
| Decision Date | 29 April 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 22,086.,22,086. |
| Citation | 149 Minn. 5 |
| Parties | STATE v. A. C. TOWNLEY AND ANOTHER.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
After the former appeal reported in 142 Minn. 326, 171 N. W. 930, the case was tried before Dean, J., and a jury, and defendants were found guilty as charged in the indictment. From an order denying their motion for a new trial, defendants appealed. Affirmed.
George Hoke, George Nordlin and Vince A. Day, for appellants.
Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, James E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, and E. H. Nicholas, County Attorney, for respondent.
Defendants were indicted in Jackson county in May, 1918, on a charge of criminal conspiracy. The substance of the indictment and the questions raised by their demurrer to it are reported in State v. Townley, 142 Minn. 326, 171 N. W. 930. Defendants were brought to trial in June, 1919. The trial lasted three weeks and resulted in a verdict of guilty. They moved for a new trial. On July, 1920, their motion was denied and they appealed, specifying 102 alleged errors. Some of the assignments are not of sufficient importance to justify discussion, but none-have escaped our careful consideration. Some have been combined for examination and others will be considered separately.
1. The objections to the constitutionality of Chapter 463, p. 764, Laws 1917, which are first in order, were disposed of in State v. Gilbert, 141 Minn. 263, 169 N. W. 790, affirmed in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125, 65 L. ed 2. To establish the guilt of the defendants, the state was required to prove that they had conspired to teach or advocate that men should not enlist in the military or naval forces of the United States, or that citizens of Minnesota should not aid the United States in carrying on the war with Germany, and that some act had been done by one or both to effect the object of the conspiracy. Sections 8595, 8596, G. S. 1913.
The combination of two or more minds in an unlawful purpose is the foundation of the offense, but an overt act in furtherance of the common purpose is necessary to complete it. The statement to the contrary in State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 99 (164), is no longer the law in view of the provisions of the statute. All who are parties to the combination incur guilt when any one of them does an act to further the purpose of the unlawful confederation. State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 447; State v. Palmer, 79 Minn. 428, 82 N. W. 685; State v. Dunn, 140 Minn. 308, 168 N. W. 2; State v. Lyons, 144 Minn. 348, 175 N. W. 689; Hyde v. U. S. 225 U. S. 347, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, 56 L. ed. 1114, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 614.
The combination need not be established by direct evidence. It may be inferred from circumstances. No formal agreement to do the acts charged need be shown. Concurrence of sentiment and co-operative conduct and not formality of speech are the essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy. Redding v. Wright, 49 Minn. 322, 51 N. W. 1056; Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. W. 1039; State v. Caine, 134 Iowa, 147, 111 N. W. 443; Marrash v. U. S. 168 Fed. 225, 93 C. C. A. 511; Underhill, Crim. Ev. § 491.
To sustain the charge, the state introduced both direct and circumstantial evidence of the alleged conspiracy and made proof of defendants' acts alleged to have been done in furtherance of it. Those done in Jackson county were the acts of Gilbert alone, for it does not appear that Townley was ever in that county prior to the return of the indictment, but nevertheless the venue might properly be laid in Jackson county. Hyde v. U. S. supra.
The direct evidence of conspiracy consisted of the testimony of one F. A. Teigen, which in substance was as follows: He made Townley's acquaintance at Fargo in the winter of 1916, and Gilbert's at St. Paul somewhat later. They employed him as an organizer, under a contract running for one year, to procure members of the Nonpartisan League and to collect membership fees. Before he was employed, Townley told him he had conceived of and built the league himself and had the final decision as to its policy. Defendants were together at league headquarters in St. Paul, where both had offices. Townley was president and Gilbert had charge of the organization work of the league. Teigen took orders from both. He discussed with Townley a speech which one Van Lear made at a meeting in his territory, and asked whether he should participate in another meeting at which Van Lear was to speak. Townley replied that the Van Lear speech was a "cracker-jack," and in the same connection said: "We are against this God-damned war, but we can't afford to advertise it." He advised him not to take part in the proposed meeting. Teigen had prepared a speech which he intended to deliver, and discussed it with defendants. Gilbert thought it was all right, but Townley said it was too direct, that it should be camouflaged a little, and added:
Late in the summer of 1917, letters of instruction were mailed to league organizers, expressing loyal sentiments. Townley told Teigen they were sent out to show that the league was patriotic, but that the real instructions would come by word of mouth from traveling agents. Gilbert expressed opposition to all wars, on principle. Townley's opposition was based on policy rather than principle. Both told Teigen that the cost of the war should not be met by the sale of bonds — that it was absolutely wrong, a mistaken policy on the part of the government. In the fall of 1917 Gilbert informed Teigen that the Public Safety Commission had asked that his further services be dispensed with. Townley said to him:
Gilbert admitted that he had talked with Teigen about the war, expressing his personal opinion, but denied that he told him what to teach. He admitted that Teigen had shown him his proposed speech, but denied that he had approved of or discussed it with Townley. He also admitted that he had signed Teigen's contract in behalf of the league.
Townley did not testify.
The sum and substance of Teigen's testimony was that the defendants were in accord in their purpose to discourage the prosecution of the war; that they planned to oppose it and to use their organization to accomplish that end. Defendants characterize his testimony as a tissue of falsehoods. Granting that he is a man of doubtful veracity and the defendants' enemy, it nevertheless appears that defendants did and said in public substantially what he asserts they told him in private they were going to do and say. Their conduct and utterances square with his testimony and lend it credit, which otherwise it might not be entitled to receive. The jury who heard him testify, and saw him undergo a searching cross-examination, were evidently convinced that he was not unworthy of belief.
The relations of the defendants to each other and to the organization they were promoting, the printed matter they distributed, and their public speeches, comprise the circumstantial evidence of the existence of the alleged conspiracy. This was the situation: When the United States declared war, defendants were, and for some time had been, engaged in enlarging the membership and field of activity of the Nonpartisan League. It was a political organization, seeking to gain control of the government of a number of states, in order to put through an economic program advocated by its leaders. Defendants were conspicuous and influential members of a small group of men who controlled the organization. The entry of the United States in the war interfered with their program and naturally diverted public attention to greater and more momentous issues than the alleged economic grievances of the class of citizens which the organizers of the league proposed to redress. It was inevitable that during the continuance of the war a consideration of these grievances would be postponed. The war was unpopular in many localities. It would be easier to sell memberships in such localities, if the impression prevailed that the officers of the league proposed to use the influence of a powerful organization to keep young men from being sent overseas.
Soon after war was declared a pamphlet was printed and placed in the hands of the league's field workers. It was composed of three distinct parts. The first sets forth the league's origin and method of operation; the second contains resolutions on the war adopted by the league, and the third states the principles of the league. It was prepared at Gilbert's suggestion, to be used in getting members, and he admitted that he was absolutely in accord with the ideas expressed in it. There can be no reasonable doubt that Townley, as president of the league, was cognizant of the pamphlet and its circulation, and the inference is that he approved of it. The war resolutions contained in it are set out in State v. Townley, 140 Minn. 413, 168 N. W. 591, where it was held that they did not violate chapter 463, p. 764, Laws 1917. They were, however, a criticism of the policy of conscripting men and not wealth, and of the alleged unwarranted interference of military authority with the rights of individuals. We are of the opinion that the pamphlet was properly received in evidence. Pierce v. U. S. 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205, 64 L. ed. 542.
Defendants made numerous speeches in different parts of the state during the summer and fall of 1917 and the winter of 1918. Occasionally...
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