State v. Townsend

Citation6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 639,294 A.2d 650
Decision Date19 May 1972
Docket NumberNo. MV,MV
CourtCircuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Lawrence E. TOWNSEND. 2-31528.

Robert H. Boynton, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Frank A. Maco, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

DEARINGTON, Judge.

The information charged the defendant with having violated § 14-215 of the General Statutes. After a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty. Thereupon, he was charged with part two of the information, which alleged a former conviction for the same offense. He was found guilty of being a second offender under part two of the information. He has appealed, assigning error in (1) the denial of his motion to correct the finding, (2) the court's conclusions, (3) a ruling on evidence, and (4) the conclusion on all the evidence that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We turn first to the assignment of error directed to the finding. The defendant in his fourth assignment claims that upon all the evidence the court could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an assignment makes unnecessary a detailed consideration of the claims of error directed against the finding, since we examine the entire evidence in determining whether the court erred in its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salvaggio, 152 Conn. 716, 717, 210 A.2d 175; State v. Pundy, 147 Conn. 7, 8, 156 A.2d 193; State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 286, 113 A.2d 591. We have given consideration to the finding, however, for the purpose of showing specific facts found by the court upon conflicting evidence. State v. Foord, supra, 287, 113 A.2d 591.

The evidence, including that shown by the finding to have been accepted by the court, supplemented by inferences it could reasonably have drawn, may be summarized as follows: It was stipulated that the right of the defendant to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of the state had been suspended and remained in suspension on January 5, 1971. On that day, about noon, the defendant was observed by two officers of the Bridgeport police department sitting in the driver's seat of a black 1959 Cadillac car parked on Broad Street in Bridgeport. The motor of the car was running and smoke emanated from the exhaust system. There was snow and ice on the highway. The officers observed the car rocking. 'The car was going back and forth.' The officers were aware of the defendant's driving record and he was placed under arrest. The car had a faulty transmission, but the oil pressure of the hydraulic system was capable of being increased to rotate the coupling to a point where it would engage the transmission and make the car operable.

The defendant contends that there was no evidence that the car was moving or that it was capable of moving under its own power at the time and place in question. Whether the car was capable of being operated was the ultimate and precise question upon which the trier had to pass. The state apparently considered that the answer to this question was to a large extent so technical that the opinion of an expert was required. See St. George Pulp & Paper Co. v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 91 Conn. 563, 570, 100 A. 358. To qualify as credible testimony, the opinion of an expert must be 'one which the rational mind would reasonably reach upon the established facts.' Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714, 134 A. 259, 261; see Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 384, 71 A.2d 560. Cyril Kollar, who qualified as an expert witness, having been employed by a Cadillac agency for ten years, during which time he had worked on transmission systems, was called as a witness by the state. During his testimony, much of which consisted in answering hypothetical questions, he was asked the following question: 'If I tell you, Mr. Kollar, going back to my original hypothetical that this car was observed parked at the curb here on Broad Street, before the...

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4 cases
  • State v. Peters
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • November 14, 2017
    ...case State v. Morris , 666 A.2d 419 (R.I. 1995) (mem.). The Court in Morris , relying on the Connecticut case, State v. Townsend , 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 639, 294 A.2d 650 (Conn. 1972), held that a "person 'operates' a motor vehicle * * * when in the vehicle he [or she] intentionally does any act o......
  • State v. Butcher, A10-1782
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • August 15, 2011
    ...(Minn. Sept. 30, 1992). In T.J.B., this court cited, in support of its decision, persuasive authority including State v. Townsend, 294 A.2d 650, 652 (Conn. App. 1972). Id. at 3. In Townsend, the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court of Connecticut concluded that a person "operates" a moto......
  • Welfare of T.J.B., Matter of, C0-92-439
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • August 4, 1992
    ...the vehicle is merely standing in a public street if he possesses the physical power to regulate its movement"); State v. Townsend, 6 Conn.Cir. 639, 294 A.2d 650, 652 (1972) (a person "operates" a motor vehicle under the statute prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle after the suspension ......
  • State v. Morris, 94-724-C
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • October 19, 1995
    ...control of a vehicle." This court has not specifically interpreted that language; however, other jurisdictions have. In State v. Townsend, 294 A.2d 650 (Conn.1972), the court found "that a person 'operates' a motor vehicle ... when in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes use o......

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