State v. Tranmer
| Decision Date | 30 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 42263,2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 687 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MERNA JEAN TRANMER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction; order denying motion to suppress evidence; and order denying motion for judgment of acquittal, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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Merna Jean Tranmer appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence and her motion for judgment of acquittal. We hold the district court did not err in denying either motion.
Officer Cyr stopped Tranmer's vehicle for failing to use a turn signal. Neither party challenges the validity of the traffic stop. Tranmer was able to produce her license and insurance, but not any vehicle registration, and the van she was driving did not belong to her. During the stop, the officer noticed Tranmer had sores on her face and dirty hair, appeared to be much older than her actual age, waved her arms erratically, repeated statements, was nervous, interrupted him, and talked quickly. Tranmer was known to associate with other drug users and had been with one of them earlier in the evening. Cyr returned to his patrol car, immediately called for a drug dog, and began the process of confirming Tranmer's identification and issuing a written citation. This process took approximately ten to twelve minutes, in part, because his computer was slow and the e-ticket printer was out of paper which required Cyr to handwrite the citation. While Cyr was completing the citation, Officer Loosli and his drug dog arrived on the scene, conducted a sniff around the van, and indicated a positive response for drugs.
After the dog alerted on the van, Loosli asked if he could search the van, to which Tranmer replied, "Go ahead." During the search of inside the vehicle, officers located a digital scale with methamphetamine residue. Loosli questioned Tranmer for approximately two minutes. Loosli then asked Tranmer, "Do you mind if I search you?" Tranmer responded, "No." Loosli then asked, "Do you mind if I search your purse?" Tranmer responded, "Yeah, go for it." Inside the purse, the officer found shards of methamphetamine. Tranmer became increasingly agitated, grabbed the purse, and attempted to either turn the lining of the pocket in the purse out to dispose of the methamphetamine shards or attempted to grind the shards into a powder such that it would be untestable. The officer regained control of the purse. Tranmer was arrested and taken to jail.
Tranmer was charged with possession of a controlled substance and attempted destruction of evidence. Tranmer filed a motion to suppress which was denied. The first trial ended in an acquittal of the possession of a controlled substance charge and a mistrial on the attempted destruction of evidence. The second trial resulted in a jury finding Tranmer guilty of attempted destruction of evidence. Tranmer appeals the denial of the motion to suppress and asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
On appeal, Tranmer argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the traffic stop was unlawfully extended, she did not voluntarily consent to the search, and the doctrine of inevitable discovery does not apply. Tranmer also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempted destruction of evidence. The State argues that the denial of the motion to suppress is moot because Tranmer was acquitted of the possession of methamphetamine charge, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress, and there is substantial and competent evidence to support the conviction.
The State argues that Tranmer's appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress is moot because Tranmer was acquitted of the possession of a controlled substance charge and her motion to suppress was only applicable to that charge. In the alternative, the State argues that even if the methamphetamine should have been suppressed, it would not have affected the charge of attempted destruction of evidence because Tranmer's act of grabbing the purse and trying to either empty the lining or crush the shards was an intervening act that dispelled any initial police misconduct. Tranmer argues that the issue is not moot because the shards of methamphetamine were necessary to establish an element of her charge of attempting to destroy evidence, and this evidence was used in support of the State's case-in-chief in the destruction of evidence trial. Further, Tranmer argues that her actions did not dispel the initial police misconduct.
An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citing Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (quoting Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 (2005))). In other words, a case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome. Hansen v. Denney, 158 Idaho 304, 307, 346 P.3d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Goodson v. Nez Perce Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000)); Idaho Cnty. Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Syringa Gen. Hosp. Dist., 119 Idaho 309, 315, 805 P.2d 1233, 1239 (1991).
Here, the issue is not moot. The methamphetamine was the only piece of evidence to establish the element of the crime of attempted destruction of evidence and was the only piece of evidence to elevate the crime to a felony. That offense requires the State to prove that the item destroyed or attempted to be destroyed is "about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation" and that the "trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature and involves a felony offense . . . ." I.C. § 18-2603. See also I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (). While we conclude below that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, there is, however, a justiciable controversy at issue in this appeal. The record shows that the State's evidence at this trial consisted of the officers' testimony and reports from the Idaho State Police lab that verifiedthat the substance in Tranmer's purse was methamphetamine. If we had determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted, the State would not have been able to utilize the methamphetamine found in Tranmer's purse and there would arguably be no evidence to be destroyed by Tranmer during the traffic stop. Thus, Tranmer would have had a valid basis to argue there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction.
We disagree with the State that State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 6 P.3d 403 (Ct. App. 2000) controls the outcome of this issue. In Schrecengost, the defendant had been arrested for possession of a controlled substances and transported to the county jail, and it was at the jail that she attempted to flush the drug evidence down the toilet. Id. at 548, 6 P.3d at 404. Schrecengost was never charged with possession of a controlled substance, she was only charged with the destruction of evidence offense. Id. at 548 n.1, 6 P.3d at 404 n.1. The parties stipulated that the arrest of the defendant had been illegal so the issue before the district court was whether the drug evidence and evidence of the attempted destruction of that evidence was admissible. Id. at 549, 6 P.3d at 405. To determine whether the evidence should be suppressed because it was obtained through unconstitutionally impermissible police action, the court applied the three factor test from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-605 (1975). Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 549, 6 P.3d at 405. This test requires the court to determine if the evidence was obtained by exploiting the initial illegality by balancing the weight of the following factors:
(1) the temporal proximity of the illegal police conduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) whether there are intervening circumstances between the illegal police conduct and the acquisition of the evidence; and (3) whether the purposes and flagrancy of the official misconduct satisfy the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule.
Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)).
This Court reversed the decision to grant the motion to suppress because the defendant's "actions in destroying the suspected contraband were not committed during an active, illegal police search . . . and . . . while the evidence was still in her possession," and because law enforcement "did not exploit the illegality of their actions in order to obtain evidence related to a new and independent crime involving the destruction of evidence." Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 550-551, 6 P.3d at 406-407.
In this case, we do not find that the law enforcement officers acted improperly or that the evidence was obtained through a constitutionally impermissible manner. However, if we had made that determination, and if we were to apply the factors above to the matter, then theevidence from Tranmer's purse would likely be suppressible. This case is factually distinguishable from Schrecengost because there is no time lapse between the search and the acquisition of the scale in the van and the...
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