State v. Traub

• Decision Date: 17 December 1963
• Citation: 196 A.2d 755,151 Conn. 246
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Robert B. TRAUB. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 755

196 A.2d 755

151 Conn. 246

STATE of Connecticut v. Robert B. TRAUB.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 17, 1963.

James D. Cosgrove, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

George D. Stoughton, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John D. LaBelle, State's Atty., and Harry W. Hultgren, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, SHEA, ALCORN and COMLEY, JJ.

KING, Chief Justice.

On June 17, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in the case of Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493, 83 S.Ct. 1899, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048, and ordered and decreed that the judgment rendered by us in State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 187 A.2d 230 (decided December 18, 1962), be vacated and the cause be remanded for further consideration in the light of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, each decided after our decision in State v. Traub.

In our first opinion in this case, we were primarily concerned with whether, despite any technical irregularities or illegality in (1) Traub's arrest on a breach of the peace charge (150 Conn. p. 173, 187 A.2d p. 232), (2) his subsequent detention in jail under that charge (150 Conn. p. 173, 187 A.2d p. 232), and (3) certain 'borrowing' practices followed by the police and more fully described in the original opinion (150 Conn. p. 177, 187 A.2d p. 234), his confessions, either verbal or in the form of reenactments of the crimes charged, were in truth voluntary, as the trial court had found them to have been proven to be. We held that they were truly voluntary and that consequently they were properly admitted into evidence. State v. Traub, supra, 150 Conn. 187, 187 A.2d 238, 239.

The mandate of the United States Supreme Court directing the reexamination of our affirmance of Traub's conviction in the light of the Wong Sun and Ker cases, requires, at the outset, a determination of the holdings of each of those two cases, at least insofar as either is applicable to the Traub case. In the Ker case, the Supreme Court (374 U.S. p. 30, 83 S.Ct. p. 1628, 10 L.Ed.2d 726) further explained the holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, which was to the effect that the fourth amendmant to the federal constitution forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the federal government. It was held in Ker (374 U.S. p. 33, 83 S.Ct. pp. 1629-1630, 10 L.Ed.2d 726) that the reasonableness of a search or seizure is to be judged in the state courts by the same fundamental criteria as were laid down in the opinions of the Supreme Court applying to the federal government the fourth amendment and that rules governing arrests, searches and seizures as developed and applied in the states must comply with this standard. Even though evidence is obtained in a manner which does not violate the applicable rules of a state, it will be inadmissible if those rules, or the applications of them by the state court, violate the proscriptions of the fourth amendment. Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. 34, 83 S.Ct. 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d 726.

When the Traub case was previously before us, we did not definitely determine the legality, under Connecticut law, of Traub's arrest, or of his detention under it, or of his trips outside the jail with the police under the so-called 'borrowing' practice. We do not now find it necessary definitely to pass on the legality of these matters, although we adhere to our original view that probably they were technically illegal, and we so assume for the purpose of determining this appeal. Cf. Public Acts 1963, No. 126.

We now turn to the case of Wong Sun v. United States, supra. While interpretations of the holding of the majority opinion in that case probably have not been in entire harmoney, we know of no court which has yet regarded the case as authority for the proposition that any confession made in the course of, or following, an illegal detention, whether or not preceded by, or incident to, an illegal arrest, is per se inadmissible as matter of law.

We think that where, as in Traub, there are confessions or reenactments made during the course of a detention, which, as we assume here, is illegal, they are, prima facie, inadmissible under the Wong Sun rule. As pointed out in the Traub case (150 Conn. p. 175, 187 A.2d p. 233): 'Unless the state has, in a given case involving a particular accused, proved that under all the circumstances a particular confession by him was voluntary, that confession is inadmissible * * *'. In other words, the state is required to prove voluntariness as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a confession in any case, but the effect of an illegal detention, under the Wong Sun rule, as we understand it, is to add to that burden.

Where, as we are assuming for the purposes of this opinion, an arrest and detention are illegal, a confession made during such detention cannot be admitted in unless and until the state proves that the confession was truly voluntary, and in making such proof, any element of coerciveness due to the arrest or detention itself will be a necessary ingredient. But even though, from the evidence produced, a confession made during an illegal detention is properly found to have been truly voluntary, nevertheless, if the illegal detention was an operation factor in causing or bringing about the confession, then the confession will be considered as the fruit of the illegal detention and will be inadmissible. It is this causation factor which Wong Sun added to the previously settled voluntariness requirement in the sense that proof of its absence is now a prerequisite to the admissibility of an otherwise voluntary confession, if the confession was made during an illegal detention. In the event the detention is legal, this causation factor is immaterial if the primary requirement of voluntariness is proven. Even though a detention is illegal, if the confession is truly voluntary and the causation factor of the illegal detention is so weak, or has been so attenuated, as not to have been an operative factor in causing or bringing about the confession, then the connection between any illegality of detention and the...