State v. Treadway
Decision Date | 10 November 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 60140,60140 |
Citation | 558 S.W.2d 646 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ronald TREADWAY, Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Terry Burnet, Charles H. Mostov, St. Louis, for appellant.
J. Mike Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Appellant, Ronald Treadway, was convicted in one count of robbery in the first degree (§ 560.120, RSMo 1969) and in one count of armed criminal action (§ 559.225, RSMo Supp.1976), in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. Punishment on the first count was assessed at fifteen years. Punishment on the second count was assessed at three years to commence at the expiration of the sentence imposed on the first count. Following rendition of judgment and imposition of sentence an appeal was perfected to this Court.
Evidence at trial showed that on September 25, 1976, Rotha Grimes, her daughter and granddaughter, and Sandra Bequette and her two children drove to Rinderer's Drug Store at 3501 Carter. Mrs. Grimes, the driver of the car, parked at the curb beside the drug store. Mrs. Grimes' daughter, Jerri Hanks, left the car and entered the drug store, leaving her purse on the floorboard of the front passenger's side where Mrs. Bequette was sitting. Two males then approached the vehicle. One of these men was identified by Mrs. Grimes as the appellant, Ronald Treadway. Appellant opened the car door on the passenger's side of the car while his companion stuck a gun inside the car, pointing it at Mrs. Grimes and Mrs. Bequette. Appellant leaned in and demanded the two women give him their purses. Mrs. Grimes told appellant to get out, then slapped his hand as he reached to remove the purses from the front seat between the two women. Appellant then stated, "Give me your purses or we'll kill you." Mrs. Grimes responded by slapping his hand again and blowing the horn. Appellant then hit Mrs. Bequette's leg with his fist and knocked her foot off of Mrs. Hanks' purse, grabbed the purse, and the two men ran from the car.
Mrs. Grimes called the police immediately after the incident and described appellant's facial characteristics and clothing to the responding officer. She was unable to give a height and weight description other than by comparing appellant's build to that of a passerby, which the officer noted. Mrs. Grimes subsequently identified appellant's photograph from photographs shown to her by the police. She also identified appellant from a lineup conducted at a police station. Mrs. Bequette was unable to give a description to the police or to identify anyone as her assailant.
Based on this evidence, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charges of robbery in the first degree and armed criminal action. Appellant was sentenced to terms of fifteen years on the robbery count and three years on the armed criminal action count, said terms to run consecutively. The trial court indicated it felt it did not have discretion to sentence appellant to concurrent terms because of the provisions of § 559.225, RSMo Supp.1976, the armed criminal action statute.
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to strike for cause juror Robert Duke because Mr. Duke indicated at one point in voir dire examination that he felt the fact that the State had charged the appellant with a crime should be considered and he believed the State had the basis of a case. During Mr. Duke's examination the following took place:
In determining the qualifications of a prospective juror, the trial court has very wide discretion, and the court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against the evidence and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 384 S.W.2d 554 (Mo.1964); State v. McGrew, 534 S.W.2d 549 (Mo.App.1976). All doubt should be resolved in favor of the finding of the trial court because he is in a far better position to determine a challenge for cause than an appellate court. State v. McGrew, supra.
In determining whether or not a venireman can act impartially, it is necessary to view all the facts presented and not selectively include or exclude certain facts. In the instant situation, venireman Duke appeared to indicate in answer to questions by defense counsel that he would consider the fact that appellant had been charged with a crime as some evidence of guilt. However, upon further questioning by the court, Mr. Duke's views were clarified and he indicated that he would not consider the fact that appellant was charged with a crime as evidence of guilt. Further, Mr. Duke indicated that he understood and agreed with the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Mr. Duke for cause. State v. Drake, 518 S.W.2d 335 (Mo.App.1975).
Appellant relies on the cases of State v. Holliman, 529 S.W.2d 932 (Mo.App.1975); State v. Carter, 544 S.W.2d 334 (Mo.App.1976); and State v. Thompson, 541 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.App.1976) to substantiate his contention that it was error for the trial court not to strike Mr. Duke for cause. In each of these cases, a venireman indicated some prejudice which would disqualify him from service. In Thompson and Carter the trial court summarily denied the motions to strike for cause without asking any clarifying questions. In Holliman, the trial court indicated he felt he was bound by the venireman's own assessment of his ability to provide the defendant with a fair trial and failed to exercise discretion. These situations differ from the instant case because the trial court affirmatively exercised his discretion in asking clarifying questions of Mr. Duke to determine his suitability as a juror. An abuse of this discretion is not shown by the record.
Appellant next asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by sustaining the prosecutor's objection to a portion of defense counsel's closing argument. During closing argument defense counsel stated:
The prosecuting attorney then...
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...838053 [https://perma.cc/GB8K-F2J6]. (86.) State v. Treadway, 558 S.W.2d 646, 653 (Mo. 1977) (en banc) ("The words 'in addition to', standing alone, do not clearly mandate that a sentence under the armed criminal action statute be imposed consecutive to a sentence for the felony conviction ......