State v. Treasurer of City of Plainfield

• Decision Date: 03 June 1897
• Citation: 60 N.J.L. 260,37 A. 615
• Parties: STATE (WATSON, Prosecutor) v. TREASURER OF CITY OF PLAINFIELD.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

37 A. 615

60 N.J.L. 260

STATE (WATSON, Prosecutor)

v. TREASURER OF CITY OF PLAINFIELD.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 3, 1897.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari to city court of Plainfield.

Michael F. Watson was convicted of a violation of an ordinance of the city of Plainfield, and sentenced by the city judge to pay a fine of $100, and to be confined in the county jail for a period of 60 days, and prosecutes certiorari. Conviction set aside.

Argued February term, 1897, before DIXON, LUDLOW, and MAGIE, JJ.

James J. Meehan and James J. Bergen, for prosecutor.

Craig A. Marsh, for defendant.

MAGIE, J. By section 21 of the charter of Plainfield the city judge is given authority, upon oath or affirmation that any person has been guilty of a violation of any of the ordinances of the city, to issue process against such person in the nature of either a summons or a warrant, which process shall state what ordinance the defendant has violated, and in what manner the same has been violated. Upon the return of such process tile city judge may proceed to hear testimony and to determine and give judgment in the matter without the filing of any pleadings. Laws 1872, p. 1142. By section 8 of an act amending that charter, approved April 2, 1873 (Laws 1873, p. 482), the court of the city, judge was made a court of record, the proceedings in which shall be the same as in courts for the trial of small causes, and subject to the same laws as far as applicable, and that judgments rendered in that court might be appealed from in all cases in which appeals were allowed in courts for the trial of small causes, and in the same manner. By a clause in section 2 of another supplement to the charter, approved March 18, 1874 (Laws 1874, p. 302), it was enacted that every conviction had before the city judge should be reviewable only by certiorari allowed, heard, and determined by the presiding judge of the Union county circuit. This court has adjudged that the clause last cited was not within the power of the legislature to enact, and that the provisions of section 8 of the act of 1873, above referred to, were not repealed, but remained in force. It was also held that one who had been convicted by the city judge of a violation of a city ordinance, and desired a review of the judgment, was entitled to an appeal in the same manner that an appeal could be taken from the judgment of a justice's court. Flanagan v. Plainfield, 44 N.J.Law, 118. It is contended that the writ in this case should be dismissed as improvidently issued, on the ground that prosecutor's sole remedy was by appeal to the common pleas of Union county. But this argument rests upon a misconception of the decision in the case last cited. It is true that in the opinion then delivered Mr. Justice Van Syckel stated that the remedy by appeal by virtue of section 8 of the act of 1873 became exclusive. But it is evident that the learned judge was speaking of judgments of the city judge, of such a character as, if rendered in a court for the trial of small causes, were appealable. As to such judgments the remedy by appeal, upon his theory, was plainly exclusive, because by the then existing justice court act no certiorari would lie to bring up a judgment which could be appealed. But by the provisions of that act there were judgments in the court for the trial of small causes which were not capable of being appealed from, such as judgments given by default or by confession or in the absence of defendant. Nixon's Dig. (N. J.) p. 453, §§ 43, 67. Judgments so excluded from relief by appeal were left reviewable by certiorari. The revised justice court act extended the remedy by appeal to all judgments in that court except such as are given by confession. Section 79, as amended, 2 Gen. St. p. 1891. It restricted the review by certiorari so that it applies in only two classes of cases, one class comprising judgments from which no appeal would lie, which are only those given by confession, and the other class comprising judgments which the justice had no jurisdiction to render. Section 96, 2 Gen. St. p. 1882. The first class is reviewable by certiorari only. In the other class the remedies provided by appeal and by certiorari are concurrent. Ritter v. Kunkle, 39 N.J.Law, 259; Drake v. Berry, 42 N.J.Law, 60; Hillman v. Stranger, 49 N.J.Law, 191, 6 Atl. 434; Barclay v. Brabston, 49 N.J.Law, 629, 9 Atl. 769. The decision in Flanagan v. Plainfield, that judgments of the city judge of Plainfield for convictions for the violation of ordinances are reviewable in precisely the...