State v. Tregaskis, 87-221

• Citation: 540 A.2d 1022
• Decision Date: 21 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-221,87-221
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Parties: STATE v. William TREGASKIS. C.A.

Page 1022

540 A.2d 1022

STATE v. William TREGASKIS.

No. 87-221 C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 21, 1988.

James E. O'Neill, Atty. Gen., Thomas Dickinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Peter Olsen, Reilly, Oliver & Olsen, Wickford, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case is before us on the defendant's appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a nonjury trial. We affirm. The facts insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

On October 28, 1985, William Tregaskis (defendant) was transported from the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) to the Washington County Superior Court by Captain Leon Brown and Deputy Sheriff Mark Gardner of the Washington County Sheriff's Department. The defendant was one of seven prisoners that Captain Brown and Deputy Sheriff Gardner were responsible for transporting that day. The trip to Washington County proved uneventful. However, while en route from Washington County Superior Court to the ACI, defendant escaped through the rear door of the transporting van. The next morning, defendant, still clothed in prisonwear and handcuffs, voluntarily surrendered to the Pawtucket police.

The defendant was subsequently charged with escape from custody. He waived his right to a jury trial. Thereafter, trial proceeded before a justice of the Superior Court. Following presentation of all the evidence, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to two years, to run consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time of his escape.

Following imposition of sentence, the trial justice heard the state's recommendation that defendant be sentenced additionally under G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-19-21, as amended by P.L. 1982, ch. 226, §§ 1, 2, the habitual-offender statute. In passing upon the recommendation, the trial justice noted that defendant had been advised in open court at the time of his arraignment that the state would be moving to present him as a habitual offender. Following hearing on the issue, the trial justice determined that defendant had three prior convictions. ¹ The trial justice thereafter imposed an additional two-year sentence pursuant to the habitual-offender statute, to run concurrently with the term that defendant was already serving on the escape conviction.

On appeal defendant raises several issues that will be addressed in the order in which they appear in defendant's brief.

I WHETHER THE TRIAL JUSTICE ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE ESCAPE CHARGE

The defendant was convicted of escape as a custodial-unit inmate under G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-25-2, as amended by P.L. 1984, ch. 65, § 1, which provides in part:

"Every prisoner confined in any custodial unit of the adult correctional institutions or in the custody of the warden or other correctional employee while outside the confines of the institutions * * * who * * * shall escape, or attempt to effect an escape, shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for not less than one year nor more than twenty (20) years."

The defendant argues that the statute's reach is limited to those instances wherein a prisoner escapes from the custody of correctional employees while outside the confines of the ACI. A review of § 11-25-2 indicates that to support a conviction for escape, the state must prove that the defendant was either (1) a person confined in a custodial unit of the ACI, or (2) a person in the custody of the warden while outside the confines of the ACI, or (3) a person in the custody of a correctional employee other than the warden while outside the confines of the ACI. The defendant argues that since Captain Brown and Deputy Sheriff Gardner were not "correctional employees" as that term is used in § 11-25-2, a critical element of the statutory offense was not proven, thereby necessitating the granting by the trial justice of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

The record indicates that the state sought to comply with the requirements of § 11-25-2, not by proving that Captain Brown and Deputy Sheriff Gardner were employees of the correctional department, as defendant suggests, but by establishing that defendant, was at all times in the custody of the warden. Contrary to defendant's argument, the very terms of the statute suggest that if the state proves that defendant was in the warden's custody, it is not necessary also to prove that the officers transporting defendant were correctional employees.

This court has previously had the opportunity to construe the terms of similar escape statutes in State v. McInerney, 53 R.I. 203, 165 A. 433 (1933), and more recently in State v. Furlong, 110 R.I. 174, 291 A.2d 267 (1972). Both McInerney and Furlong involved prisoners who escaped while participating in activities outside the correctional institutions walls. The defendant in McInerney walked away from an outside work detail. On appeal the defendant argued that the prison guard had, in essence, abandoned custody at the time that the defendant had effectuated his escape. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that a person sentenced to confinement " 'is in contemplation of law in prison until he serves his term.' " 53 R.I. at 205-06, 165 A. at 434. Relying in great part on McInerney, the court in Furlong determined that an unguarded and unrestrained prisoner involved in a work-release program is in the custody of the warden. See State v. Furlong, 110 R.I. at 177, 291 A.2d at 270. Accordingly a prisoner who fails to return to prison from the place where he or she is employed under the work-release program has unlawfully escaped custody.

Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we believe that the language of § 11-25-2 is sufficiently broad to support the principle that a prisoner who is serving a period of confinement in a correctional institution remains in the custody of the warden during the time that the prisoner is temporarily outside the confines of the institution. In other words, although the prisoner may be physically outside the ACI, he or she is still in the legal custody of the warden until such time as the applicable period of confinement is served. That someone other than the warden is responsible for transporting or guarding the prisoner while outside the confines of the ACI in no way diminishes the fact that the warden is ultimately responsible for and in control of the prisoner.

Moreover, the trial justice, in passing upon defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, noted that there are different transportation arrangements for prisoners in different counties. In Washington and Newport Counties the sheriffs' departments handle transportation of prisoners whereas in Providence County prisoners are transported by marshalls, who are correctional department employees. Thus, to accept defendant's interpretation of § 11-25-2, a prisoner escaping while en route to the Providence County Courthouse could be charged under § 11-25-2 but a prisoner escaping while en route to Newport County could not be charged under the statute. This court will not construe the language of a statute in such a manner as would violate the intent of the Legislature or lead to either absurd or meaningless results. See, e.g., Zincone v. Mancuso, 523 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987); Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349 (R.I. 1986).

The trial justice, in passing upon defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, appropriately distinguished between the legal custody of the warden and the physical custody of the deputy sheriffs for the limited purpose of transporting defendant to and from prison. An escape by a prisoner during such period of transportation, the trial justice determined, constituted a violation of § 11-25-2. Accordingly, the trial justice correctly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

II WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE HABITUAL-OFFENDER PETITION

Following imposition of sentence on the escape conviction, the trial justice heard the state's recommendation that defendant face additional sentencing under § 12-19-21, ² the habitual-offender statute.

Thereafter, the trial justice, pursuant to § 12-19-21, sentenced defendant to an additional two-year term to be served consecutively with the sentence imposed on the escape conviction.

Before this court, defendant's argument is threefold. First, defendant asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the habitual-offender petition because the state had failed to file the petition with the court within fourteen days of defendant's arraignment. The defendant argues that § 12-19-21 requires the state to file such a petition with the court and that merely notifying a defendant of such intention is not enough to comply with the burden imposed by statute.

The record indicates that the state, at the time of arraignment, presented defendant with oral notice that he would be subject to treatment as a habitual criminal. There is no indication that the state filed such petition with the court, only that defendant was notified of such intentions in open court. However, a reading of § 12-19-21 reveals that the Attorney General "may file with the court, a notice." The language suggests that it is within the prosecutor's discretion to proceed under this section. If the state chooses to proceed, due process undoubtedly requires that a defendant be notified of such intent. In the instant case, there is no question that defendant...