State v. Trent
| Decision Date | 08 February 1927 |
| Citation | 252 P. 975,122 Or. 444 |
| Parties | STATE v. TRENT. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
In Bank.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Yamhill County; W. M. Ramsey, Judge.
James S. Trent was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of manslaughter.
Frank Eugene Hamlin, a truck driver, 49 years of age, resided in Portland, Or., with his two sons, George Oscar, 27, and Earl 25 years old, both of whom were automobile mechanics. William Hamlin, a nephew of Frank Eugene, 40 years of age, resided at Oregon City. On September 15, 1925, these four men assembled their supplies and equipment at the Hamlin home in Portland loaded the same into a Chevrolet touring car, and, at 7:30 p m., started for Tillamook. George Hamlin drove the car. Earl sat in the front seat on George's right. Their father sat on the right-hand side of the rear seat, with his nephew William, on his left. These respective positions were maintained until the trip was suddenly terminated by the unfortunate tragedy involved herein. When they reached a point on the McMinnville-Sheridan highway about two miles southwest of McMinnville, they stopped their car on the right-hand side of the road, about 125 yards from the residence of the defendant, and somewhere between 25 and 40 feet from a gateway opening into a melon patch belonging to James S. Trent, the defendant herein.
The story of the state is, in effect, as follows:
At the point above indicated, the Hamlins stopped their car to answer a call of nature, and Frank Eugene (the father of two of the boys) suggested that they fix the spot light before starting on. In pursuance thereof they lighted a lantern which was in use for about ten minutes, or while they were repairing the spot light. After repairing the light, they again took their seats in the car in the relative positions hereinbefore described. As the car started, however, they heard a slight explosion, which they suspected was a blowout. They stopped to investigate, and, upon satisfying themselves that the tires were all right, they again started. They had gone but a few feet when there was a loud explosion, and George Oscar Hamlin exclaimed: "I am shot; I am done for," and fell over against his brother Earl. At the same time, their father said: "I am paralyzed." Thereupon, Earl stopped the car, and, at the suggestion of his cousin William, pulled George over, took the driver's seat, turned the car around, and drove back to McMinnville, where they carried the wounded men into a hospital. Within 30 minutes after reaching the hospital, George died from the effects of gunshot wounds.
Dr. Cook, who was called into the case, thus describes the wounds:
"Well, there were four wounds, one through the neck, left side, a glancing wound on the left shoulder, and then a wound on either side of the spine just below the shoulder blade."
Dr. Reitzel testified that the wounds that caused the death of George "were wounds through the chest; bullets that entered the back about the fifth or sixth interspace and passed forward and lodged under the skin over about the fourth interspace."
After the men reached the hospital, the car was examined by Deputy Sheriff Mead and others, who discovered twelve buckshot holes in the back of the car toward the right-hand corner, and one shot in the lower left-hand corner of the windshield. When the sheriff and other officers of the county went to the scene of the shooting, the sheriff went to the defendant's home near by and spoke to the defendant, who was sleeping on the front porch, whereupon, according to the defendant's testimony, the following conversation was had:
The sheriff testified that the defendant and his wife first denied that they had heard any shooting there that night, but that, when, upon his third visit to the house, he informed the defendant that somebody had been shot there that night, and that one man was dead and another would die, the defendant immediately responded:
The sheriff also testified that, after admitting the shooting, the defendant accompanied the officers and showed them the route he had followed from the house to the gate of the melon patch, and pointed out to them the place where he had stood when he fired the two shots.
The defendant claims that, on the night of the shooting, the Hamlins stopped on the highway to steal watermelons. As tending to corroborate his assertion, he points to the fact that, about four weeks after the shooting he found, near the field fence, at a point between the melon patch and McMinnville, a sack containing a few broken melons, a red bandanna handkerchief, and a piece of paper bearing the signature of George Hamlin. William and Earl Hamlin, however, testified that none of them were in the melon patch, that they had no melons in the car, and that their only purpose in stopping was as hereinbefore stated. Defendant told the officers, among other things, that, on the night in question, Mrs. John Arp, a near neighbor, seeing the lights of the automobile on the highway near the melon patch, and thinking that somebody was after melons, telephoned him that he "had better watch his melon patch"; that he thereupon dressed, took his single-barreled shotgun, picked up two shells that he thought were loaded with wheat or rice, and started out towards his melon patch in the hope of surprising the trespassers: that, when he got about 50 or 60 yards from a gate opening into the melon patch, he heard it rattle. We will now let the defendant tell his own story, as given from the witness stand:
We take the following excerpt from the bill of exceptions:
"The defendant further testified that he thought the occupants of this car had been trespassing upon his land and he did not know but that they were Kelly Davidson or some neighbor boys; that he had no intent to shoot at or towards any person, and no intent to do any person any bodily harm whatsoever; that he honestly believed the shells to be loaded with harmless substance, and that he shot solely for the purpose of frightening the trespassers away, and for no other purpose; that, when he fired the second shot he pointed it toward the lower part or back wheels of the automobile and the pavement upon which they stood, and not at the upper part of the car, the back of which car was turned toward him."
The defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Yamhill county, Or., for murder in the second degree. He entered a plea of not guilty, was tried and convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of seven years, and fined $500. From the judgment of conviction, he appeals.
Walter L. Tooze, Jr., of McMinnville (Vinton & Tooze and Eugene Marsh, all of McMinnville, on the brief), for appellant.
Earl A. Nott, Dist. Atty., of McMinnville, and George G. Mowry, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
BROWN, J. (after stating the facts as above).
Does the indictment in this case include a charge of involuntary manslaughter?
Homicide is the slaying of one human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711.
1 Wharton's Criminal Law (11th Ed.) § 417, says:
See, also, Oregon Laws, §§ 1893-1910.
In this state, murder is divided into two degrees. Manslaughter is not a degree of murder, but is usually treated as a degree of homicide. In this jurisdiction, unlike many others, the crime of manslaughter is not divided into degrees. Blackstone defines it as the unlawful killing of another, without malice either express or implied. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 190. Again, the Code of Indiana sets out the following definition:
"Whoever unlawfully kills any human being without malice, express or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat or involuntarily, but in the...
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