State v. Trine

Decision Date12 March 1996
Docket NumberNo. 15277,15277
Citation236 Conn. 216,673 A.2d 1098
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
Parties, 64 USLW 2659 STATE of Connecticut v. Terrence TRINE.

Kevin T. Kane, State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Keith Currier, Certified Legal Intern, for appellant (State).

Dominic S. Piacenza, with whom, on the brief, was Richard T. Miller, Certified Legal Intern, for appellee (defendant).

G. Douglas Nash, Chief of Legal Services, and Gerard A. Smyth, Chief Public Defender, filed a brief for the Office of the Chief Public Defender as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and KATZ, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether, in all circumstances, article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution 1 prohibits the seizure of nonthreatening contraband that a police officer feels during a lawful patdown search for weapons. The state charged the defendant, Terrence Trine, with possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277(a). 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court, Parker, J., denied the defendant's motion to suppress the narcotics that had been seized from him. Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a and Practice Book § 4003(a), 3 the defendant then entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge against him. The trial court, Purtill, J., accepted the plea and rendered judgment thereon. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the seizure of the narcotics violated the defendant's rights under article first, § 7. State v. Trine, 37 Conn.App. 561, 657 A.2d 675 (1995). We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, 4 and we now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court recounts the relevant facts adduced at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. "On March 26, 1993, Officers James Cash and Steven Sinagra of the statewide narcotics task force, a police squad consisting of officers of the Connecticut state and local police, applied for a search warrant authorizing the search of the person and residence of Marybeth Montesi. Partially on the basis of information given to them by two confidential informants, the officers stated that they had reason to believe that Montesi was involved in the sale of cocaine from her home in East Lyme. The warrant was issued the same day and entitled the officers to search Montesi's person and residence for various items common to trafficking in narcotics, including weapons and handguns.

"That afternoon, the team assigned to execute the search warrant met for a preraid briefing. Sergeant Lawrence Pagan, a member of the Connecticut state police with fifteen years experience as a state police officer and three years experience as the sergeant in charge of the eastern division of the statewide narcotics task force, led the team. Pagan was familiar with the contents of the affidavits used in connection with the application for the search warrant and was aware that those affidavits indicated a probability of weapons being found at the scene of the search. He was also aware that the warrant application sought an order of nondisclosure of the warrant and affidavits, alleging that there existed a risk that Montesi or an associate might seek reprisals against the confidential informants that had been the source of the information on which the application was predicated.

"At approximately 3 p.m., the task force arrived at Montesi's home. Because of the home's location, the task force was unable to conduct surveillance of the area without discovery. As a consequence, the officers were unable to ascertain who or how many persons might be present on the premises when the warrant was executed.

"The officers gained entrance to the premises by use of a battering ram and entered with their weapons drawn. Pagan was the second officer to enter the premises, and he observed that three persons were present: two men and one woman. Pagan immediately directed his attention to the man closest to him, later identified as the defendant. Pagan ordered the defendant to lie down on the floor on his stomach with his hands behind his head. The defendant complied with the officer's direction. Pagan holstered his weapon and handcuffed the defendant with his arms behind his back. He then patted down the defendant for the purpose of discovering whether the defendant was carrying a weapon. The search revealed that the defendant was not armed.

"In the course of conducting his patdown of the defendant, Pagan felt a hard object in the area of the right front pocket of the defendant's blue jeans and simultaneously heard a sound made by plastic. Pagan immediately concluded that the object that he felt was rock cocaine on the basis of his knowledge that rock cocaine was hard and often kept in small plastic bags, like the object that he felt in the defendant's pocket. Pagan reached into the defendant's pocket, seized the object and arrested him for a narcotics violation. It was later discovered that the bag recovered from the defendant's pocket contained approximately one ounce of rock cocaine." Id., at 562-64, 657 A.2d 675.

The defendant moved to suppress the cocaine that had been seized from him on the ground that it had been discovered during an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied the defendant's motion in light of its determination that Pagan had violated no constitutional prohibitions either in his initial protective patdown search for weapons or in his subsequent search of the defendant's pocket.

In upholding the validity of the seizure of the cocaine, the trial court first concluded that Pagan had been justified in conducting a patdown search of the defendant for weapons because he had possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant might have been armed and dangerous. The trial court further concluded that Pagan's immediate belief that he had felt rock cocaine while conducting a lawful patdown search, coupled with the earlier determination by a neutral magistrate of probable cause to believe that narcotics would be found on the premises, gave Pagan probable cause to believe that the defendant illegally possessed narcotics. In light of this latter conclusion, the trial court determined that Pagan had a legal basis for seizing the cocaine from the defendant's pocket.

In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant challenged the validity of the seizure. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had concluded that: (1) Pagan could legally conduct an initial patdown search of the defendant because he had possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant might have been armed and dangerous; and (2) despite his determination that the defendant was unarmed, Pagan could legally search the defendant's pocket and seize the cocaine found therein. Although the Appellate Court upheld the validity of the initial patdown search, it concluded, under article first, § 7, that Pagan lacked constitutional authority to search the defendant any further once he had determined that the object he had felt in the defendant's pocket during the lawful patdown search was not a weapon. Id., at 573, 657 A.2d 675. The Appellate Court therefore reversed the judgment convicting the defendant.

The state and the defendant have both challenged the decision of the Appellate Court. The defendant renews his claim that the initial patdown search violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 The state reiterates its claim, which the trial court accepted and the Appellate Court rejected, that the search of the defendant's pocket and the seizure of the cocaine from that pocket did not violate the defendant's state and federal constitutional rights because this search and seizure occurred during the course of a lawful arrest. We agree with the state that, in the circumstances of this case, neither the initial patdown search of the defendant nor the subsequent search of his pocket and seizure of the cocaine violated his constitutional rights.

I

We begin our analysis by considering the defendant's challenge to the validity of the patdown search that preceded and ultimately led to the search of the defendant's pocket and the seizure of the cocaine. In agreement with the trial court, the Appellate Court concluded that the patdown search was valid because Pagan had possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant might have been armed and dangerous. Id. Both courts also concluded that Pagan had not exceeded the legitimate scope of a patdown search for weapons. See id. We are unpersuaded by the defendant's contentions to the contrary.

Under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, 6 and under article first, § 7, 7 and article first, § 9, OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION8, a police officer may briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 654, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). If, during the course of a lawful investigatory detention, the officer reasonably believes that the detained individual might be armed and dangerous, the officer may undertake a patdown search of the individual to discover weapons. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881-82; State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 661, 607 A.2d 355 (1992); State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 118-19, 249 A.2d 245 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927, 89 S.Ct. 1783, 23 L.Ed.2d 244 (1969).

Because a patdown search is intended to secure the safety of the investigating officer,...

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