State v. Trotter

• Decision Date: 27 March 1926
• Citation: 281 S.W. 925,153 Tenn. 30
• Parties: STATE EX REL. SCANDLYN v. TROTTER, JUDGE, ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

281 S.W. 925

153 Tenn. 30

STATE EX REL. SCANDLYN v. TROTTER, JUDGE, ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 27, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Knox County; A. C. Grimm, Judge.

Mandamus by the State, on the relation of Sam H. Scandlyn, against George Trotter, Judge, and others. From an order denying the writ and dismissing the petition, relator appeals. Judgment affirmed.

CHAMBLISS J.

This is an appeal from an order denying a writ of mandamus and dismissing the petition therefor. By chapter 625 of the Private Acts of 1925, passed April 6th and approved April 14th, provision was made for free text-books in grammar schools of counties having a population of not less than 112,000 and not more than 113,000 (Knox county). It was made mandatory upon the county courts to make appropriations for said purpose in such sums as should be fixed by the county boards of education, and the boards of education were directed to make and report the first estimates to the April, 1925, terms of the courts; the appropriations to be made at the July terms following. It appears that the April, 1925, quarterly court for Knox had met and adjourned before the act in question became a law. No estimate was made or reported by the board of education as called for by the act. Subsequently and before the July meeting of the quarterly court, the superintendent of schools for the county made an estimate and reported same to the finance committee of the court; but the committee failed or refused to report same to the court. No appropriation was made by the court at its July session, and on the 9th day of July this petition was filed praying for mandamus to require the county judge, county court, and board of education to comply with the act and make the appropriation for application in the year 1925.

Responsive pleadings were filed and proof was taken and the case heard by the honorable circuit judge, who found that the act did not become operative in time to allow for the procedure prescribed by the act in the year 1925. To this we are constrained to agree. The act plainly calls, first, for the action of the board of education, and, second, for a report of its estimate to the April term of the court, when it would be received and lie over for this appropriation at a succeeding term, giving time for consideration and the inclusion of the sum required in the annual budget of county expenses. The trial judge also held the act unconstitutional on several grounds.

As shown by the petition, the relief sought had relation to the school term opening in September, 1925. It is quite obvious that the time has now passed when the granting of this petition by this court could effectively give the relief sought, and on this ground, under well-recognized rules of practice, the appeal must be dismissed. See State ex rel v. Bush, 208 S.W. 607, 141 Tenn. 233, quoting 2 R. C. L 169, 3 C.J. 360, and other authorities.

However as before stated, the constitutionality of the act was challenged on several grounds, and this attack was sustained by the trial judge, and in this situation it is proper that this court should pass upon the constitutionality of the act in this case. We are of opinion that the classification is palpably arbitrary and partial, in that its application is confined to counties having a population of not less than 112,000 and not more than 113,000 by the census of 1920, or any subsequent census. No reason is suggested, and none can be conceived of, why the citizens of counties of the designated population should be given the benefits and onerated with the burdens incident to this legislation not enjoyed by or imposed upon citizens of other counties of the state. The education of the children of the state is a duty and a privilege applicable to all its citizens alike, without discrimination and without respect to county lines; and the obligation to furnish, and the privilege of enjoying, free text-books cannot constitutionally be so restricted. If it should be conceded that a proper classification might be made between the populous counties and those less so, the classification here attempted to be made cannot be so justified. Under the act in question, a county having a population of 114,000, or a county having a population of 111,000, is excluded. For such a distinction, as before stated, no justification can be offered. We are therefore constrained to hold, however desirable a lawful provision for free text-books might be, that the act under consideration is in violation of section 8, art. 1, and section 8, art. 11, of our Constitution. This construction and ruling is in harmony with a long line of decisions by this court, among which are Sutton v. State, 36 S.W. 697, 96 Tenn. 696, 33 L. R. A. 589; Weaver v. Davidson County, 59 S.W. 1105, 104 Tenn. 315; Redistricting Cases, 80 S.W. 750, 111 Tenn. 274; Flemming v. Memphis, 148 S.W. 1057, 126 Tenn. 331, 335, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1306; and State v. Turnpike Co., 181 S.W. 682, 133 Tenn. 446.

Among other authorities cited with approval by Mr. Justice Williams in his opinion in the Turnpike Co., Case, supra, is Murray v. Board of Com., 84 N.W. 103, 81 Minn. 359, 51 L. R A. 828, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379, which is particularly in point here. The act reviewed in that case provided for treatment at county expense of inebriates, and the court held...