State v. Troyer
| Decision Date | 10 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | A20-0832 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Bond Troyer, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Affirmed
Dakota County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kathryn M. Keena, Acting Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota; and
Cassandra C. Wolfgram, Bridget M. Nason, LeVander, Gillen & Miller, P.A., South St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Jeffrey S. Sheridan, Sheridan & Dulas, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
Appellant seeks to reverse the final judgment of conviction for fourth-degree driving while impaired (DWI) and argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the breath-test results. Appellant contends that, even though he timely requested that respondent preserve the video recording of the breath-test procedure ("booking-room video"), it was destroyed by an automated process, which violated his due-process rights under the Minnesota Constitution. We first conclude that the district court's decision followed existing caselaw under the federal Due Process Clause because appellant does not claim that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory, nor does he claim that respondent acted in bad faith. We also conclude that the Minnesota Constitution's Due Process Clause does not require a different result. Thus, we affirm.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jeffrey Bond Troyer with fourth-degree DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2018) (), along with three other impaired-driving offenses. The following summarizes the facts found by the district court based on the evidence and testimony received at the omnibus hearing.
On February 22, 2018, at about 2:00 a.m., a police officer stopped Troyer for speeding in Inver Grove Heights. The officer observed that Troyer had bloodshot, watery eyes. Troyer told the officer he was returning from a tavern where he had consumed "two tall beers." Troyer failed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. The officer arrested Troyer and brought him to the police station.
At the station, the officer read Troyer the breath-test advisory and gave him time to speak with an attorney. Troyer agreed to submit to the breath test. The arresting officer observed a second officer administer the DataMaster breath test to Troyer and followrequired procedures. Troyer's breath samples showed an alcohol concentration of at least 0.16.
After the state served its complaint, Troyer filed a timely discovery request for, among other things, the "video recordings made regarding this case," including the video of his booking and breath-test procedure. The state could not produce the requested booking-room video because it had been automatically destroyed. Troyer moved to suppress "all evidence that would have been contained" on the booking-room video "had the video been preserved as requested" by Troyer. The state opposed the motion to suppress.
At the omnibus hearing, the arresting officer testified that Troyer's breath test was captured on the video-recording system installed in the station. The officer agreed that while he does not "remember exactly what happened," Troyer's entire breath-testing process would have been preserved on the booking-room video.
After the omnibus hearing, the district court issued written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a memorandum. Together with the facts summarized above, the district court found the police station "has working cameras in its booking spaces," and explained that "[t]hese cameras record at all times and would have recorded [Troyer's] breath test and other interactions" with police. The recordings are retained on the police department's server for 90 days. After 90 days, the recordings are "automatically deleted by the system." The department will "save the footage or override the scheduled destruction, with proper notice."
The district court found that, on "April 12, 2018—within the 90-day retention timeframe—[Troyer's] counsel submitted a discovery request to the Inver Grove Heights City Attorney's Office." The discovery request sought "[c]opies of any audio or video recordings made regarding this case including any recordings made by the officers, dispatchers or jailers." But the "City Attorney's Office did not immediately request the booking footage." Rather, on "December 19, 2018—beyond the 90-day retention timeframe, the City Attorney's Office requested the booking footage" from the police department. Despite the department's efforts to retrieve the booking-room video, it "was already deleted by the server."
In its written memorandum following the omnibus hearing, the district court determined that, in response to Troyer's discovery request, the state produced: "1) audio recordings of [the officer] giving [Troyer] the breath advisory and Miranda warning during booking; 2) the printed breath test advisory form for this case; 3) the DataMaster test results printout; and 4) [the officer's] squad vehicle footage of the incident."
The district court next determined that the booking-room video "was potentially useful evidence," and the state's "failure to request its preservation immediately after receipt of [Troyer's] discovery request was likely inadvertent." The district court emphasized its earlier finding that the booking-room video "was destroyed by the server's automatic process," which followed the record-retention schedule. The district court finally determined that the booking-room video "was not material, and was not destroyed intentionally or in bad faith." Based on these determinations, the district court concludedthat "[Troyer's] due process rights were not violated" and denied his motion to suppress evidence.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain an appellate ruling on the pretrial order denying Troyer's motion to suppress. After a court trial, the district court convicted Troyer of fourth-degree DWI, and stayed the imposition of sentence on the condition that Troyer complete one year of probation.
Troyer appeals. After filing his notice of appeal, Troyer petitioned the supreme court for accelerated review, which the supreme court denied.
Troyer argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence of his breath test, including the test results, because the state violated his due-process rights by destroying the booking-room video. Troyer contends, first, that the Minnesota Constitution's Due Process Clause provides greater protection than the U.S. Constitution. Troyer contends, second, that under the Minnesota Constitution, this court should suppress all related evidence when the state destroys evidence in its possession after a defendant makes a timely request to preserve the evidence, even with no claim that the destroyed evidence is exculpatory or that the state acted in bad faith. The state argues that the district court properly denied Troyer's motion under existing law and that this court should reject Troyer's proposed rule under the Minnesota Constitution.
On appeal of a district court's pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews "the district court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard andthe district court's legal determinations de novo." State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007). Troyer does not contend that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Troyer's sole argument for reversal rests on whether the state's destruction of evidence violated his due-process rights. Whether a due-process violation has occurred poses a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo. State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012). "The interpretation and application of the Minnesota Constitution is a legal question that we review de novo." State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 836 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2013).
Relevant precedent
We begin by summarizing the applicable law on the state's duty to preserve evidence under the federal Due Process Clause. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963). In Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court refined its holding from Brady by adding a bad-faith requirement where the destroyed evidence is not exculpatory. 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 337 (1988). The Court differentiated between "potentially useful evidence" and "material exculpatory evidence." Id. The Court ruled that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Id. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337.
In Illinois v. Fisher, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a timely discovery request by a defendant alters the due-process analysis for the state's destruction of potentially useful evidence. 540 U.S. 544, 545, 124 S. Ct. 1200, 1200 (2004). The Court held that a defendant's discovery request does not negate the bad-faith requirement adopted in Youngblood:
We have never held or suggested that the existence of a pending discovery request eliminates the necessity of showing bad faith on the part of police. Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to limit the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable...
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