State v. Trujillo
| Decision Date | 27 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 30,563.,30,563. |
| Citation | 2012 NMCA 112,289 P.3d 238 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Andrew TRUJILLO, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Jacqueline Cooper, Chief Public Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
, Judge.
{1} Defendant Andrew Trujillo appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated battery, and kidnapping. Defendant argues that the Legislature did not intend to punish as kidnapping restraint or movement that is merely incidental to another crime. We agree and reverse the kidnapping conviction. We also hold that the convictions for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit aggravated battery violate double jeopardy and, therefore, remand to the district court to vacate the lesser conspiracy. We affirm all other convictions.
{2} Around 2:30 a.m. on November 6, 2008, Defendant and another man broke into the home of Juaquin Lujan (Victim). The two men were armed with metal bars or wooden bats and were wearing motorcycle clothing and helmets. Victim and his wife awoke to the sight of the two men holding flashlights. Defendant began striking Victim with a metal bar.
{3} Despite being outnumbered and unarmed, Victim fought back and was able to gain the upper hand. Victim was on top of Defendant, hitting him, when Defendant restrained Victim and called out to the other assailant for help. The other assailant began striking Victim, allowing Defendant to get free and continue striking Victim. Both men continued to beat Victim for some time before eventually leaving. The entire episode lasted approximately two to four minutes.
{4} Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, conspiracy to commit aggravated battery, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. He was acquitted of child abuse, interference with communications, and criminal damage to property.
{5} Defendant challenges his kidnapping conviction by arguing in the alternative that the kidnapping statute simply does not encompass his conduct, or that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction, or that the conviction violated double jeopardy. In addition, Defendant argues that (1) his convictions for both conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit aggravated battery constitute double jeopardy, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) the court erred by excluding evidence related to the back door of Victim's home, (4) the court erred by forbidding questioning about Victim's alleged use or sale of drugs, (5) the court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor and the Seventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, and (6) cumulative error deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We address these arguments in the order they were presented.
{6} Defendant argues that “[t]he Legislature did not intend to punish restraint incidental to an aggravated battery as kidnapping.” He argues further that the evidence supporting his kidnapping conviction is insufficient because “it failed to establish a restraint beyond that incidental to the aggravated battery.” In the factual context of this case, the arguments constitute two sides of the same coin. That is, we conclude that the restraint described by the testimony—a momentary grab in the middle of a fight—is as a matter of law insufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. Put another way, we hold that the kidnapping statute as a matter of law does not encompass the conduct described, even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction.
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{7} Whether the Legislature intended restraint during an aggravated battery to be charged as kidnapping is a question of statutory interpretation. “Our primary goal when interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the intent of the [L]egislature.” State v. Torres, 2006–NMCA–106, ¶ 8, 140 N.M. 230, 141 P.3d 1284.
“We do this by giving effect to the plain meaning of the words of statute,” State v. Marshall, 2004–NMCA–104, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801, except when doing so “render[s] the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust.” State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Interpretation of a statute is an issue of law, not a question of fact[,]” which we review de novo. Id.
{8} In this case, applying the plain language would be “absurd, unreasonable, or unjust.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Based on our review of the history and purpose of our statute and similar statutes nationwide, as well as case law in this and other jurisdictions, we conclude that the Legislature could not have intended to increase Defendant's punishment three- or six-fold (from three to nine or eighteen years) for conduct that was merely incidental to another crime.
Pisio, McGuire, and Corneau all dealt with the criminal sexual penetration (CSP) statute and double jeopardy rights implicated in that statute. Similarly, the Vernon holding is limited in application to the “held for service” element of the kidnapping statute, which is not a factor here. Because these cases are distinguishable both on their facts and on their analyses, we decline to rely on them. A brief review of these cases reveals why they are not controlling here.
{11} The first set of cases pertains to convictions for kidnapping and CSP. The relevant portions of the CSP statute state:
E. Criminal sexual penetration in the second degree [CSP II] consists of all criminal sexual penetration perpetrated:
(1) by the use of force or coercion on a child thirteen to eighteen years of age;
(2) on an inmate confined in a correctional facility or jail when the perpetrator is in a position of authority over the inmate;
(3) by the use of force or coercion that results in personal injury to the victim;
(4) by the use of force or coercion when the perpetrator is aided or abetted by one or more persons;
(5) in the commission of any other felony; or
(6) when the perpetrator is armed with a deadly weapon.
....
F. Criminal sexual penetration in the third degree [CSP III] consists of all criminal sexual penetration perpetrated through the use of force or coercion not otherwise specified in this section.
NMSA 1978, § 30–9–11(E), (F) (2009)
(emphasis added). Thus, if the elements of kidnapping are met, CSP III (a third degree felony) may be elevated to CSP II (a second degree felony) through Section 30–9–11(E)(5) (the “in the commission of any other felony” element). The inquiry in these cases revolved around whether the force inherent in any CSP could form the basis for a false imprisonment or kidnapping charge, which then, in turn, could be used to support a CSP II charge. The appellate courts have held consistently that the evidence of force used in kidnapping must be independent of the evidence of force used in CSP.
{12} For example, in Corneau,
the Court considered this issue vis-á-vis false imprisonment. The Court considered whether the defendant could be convicted of CSP II based on a predicate felony of false imprisonment when the same force or coercion “necessary to establish CSP III constitutes the restraint necessary to prove false imprisonment” and establishment of false imprisonment was used to elevate the charge to CSP II. 109 N.M. at 85, 781 P.2d at 1163. The facts of that case were as follows: the defendant offered to give the victim a ride home from a club. Id. at 84, 781 P.2d at 1162. Instead, he drove to his home and went inside, while the victim waited in the car. Id. at 84–85, 781 P.2d at 1162–63. After fifteen minutes, the victim went inside to use the bathroom, and the defendant began drinking beer and making sexual advances. Id. at 85, 781 P.2d at 1163. When the victim asked whether he was going to take her home, the defendant replied, “You're not going anywhere” and raped her after dragging her from the living room into the bedroom. Id. at 85, 86, 781 P.2d at 1163, 1164. Afterward, he prevented her from leaving both by locking the door and “verbal restraint.” Id. at 86, 781 P.2d at 1164. The defendant argued that “since the same proof of force is required to establish CSP III as to establish false imprisonment, to permit false imprisonment to elevate the act to CSP II effectively nullifies the crime of CSP III.”...
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State v. Thomas
... ... {43} New Mexico's kidnapping statute is broadly worded and often encompasses conduct that occurs during the commission of another crime. See State v. Trujillo , 2012NMCA112, 2329, 289 P.3d 238 (discussing the history of kidnapping statutes and the types of conduct intended for punishment). We give effect to the plain meaning of a statute only when that will not render the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust. State v. Rowell , ... ...
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... ... NMSA Section 1978, 30-4-1(A)(4) (2003). In enacting our kidnapping statute, "the Legislature did not intend to punish as kidnapping restraints that are merely incidental to another crime." State v. Trujillo , 2012-NMCA-112, 39, 289 P.3d 238. Deciding whether the conduct giving rise to a kidnapping charge is incidental to the conduct leading to another charge requires we consider "whether the restraint or movement increases the culpability of the defendant over and above his culpability for the other ... ...
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... ... See UJI 14-403 NMRA (1997). In August 2012, this Court decided State v. Trujillo , 2012-NMCA-112, 39, 289 P.3d 238, which held that "the Legislature did not intend to punish as kidnapping restraints that are merely incidental to another crime." The kidnapping UJI was amended in 2015 to follow the holding in Trujillo , and while still requiring the state to prove restraint ... ...
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