State v. Tucker
| Decision Date | 08 August 1994 |
| Parties | , 63 USLW 2182 STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stanley Lee TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Claudia Van Wyk, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause, for appellant (Susan L. Reisner, Acting Public Defender, attorney).
Larry R. Etzweiler, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued the cause, for respondent (Deborah T. Poritz, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
A jury convicted defendant of the 1987 murder of Patricia Warner. It also found him guilty of burglary, a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2a; theft, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a; and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d. The trial court sentenced defendant to a life term with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility on the murder conviction, and to a consecutive term of five years with thirty-months parole ineligibility on the burglary conviction. It imposed a concurrent five-year sentence on the theft conviction and merged the possessory offense with the murder conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction in all respects, 265 N.J.Super. 296, 626 A.2d 1105 (1993). We granted defendant's petition for certification, 134 N.J. 484, 634 A.2d 530 (1993), primarily to consider defendant's contentions that his incriminatory statements were the product of an illegal detention and that his December 2, 1987, confession to the homicide, admitted in evidence as part of the State's case, was taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
We adopt and set forth the carefully detailed factual summary contained in the Appellate Division opinion:
On November 23, 1987, Patricia Warner was strangled, asphyxiated and stabbed. It is undisputed that defendant killed the victim and later discarded her body in a creek. Although defendant challenges the Law Division's decision admitting his confession, other evidence presented at trial clearly and overwhelmingly established his guilt. Among other things, these proofs consisted of the detailed account of an eyewitness, substantial physical evidence and defendant's own trial testimony. * * *
In 1987, Patricia Warner was twenty-five years old and employed as a secretary. She resided in the second floor apartment of a two-family home owned by her parents. The house had been placed on the market for sale because the decedent was planning to relocate. At approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 23, 1987, the decedent's mother and brother attempted to visit the apartment in order to drop off some food. Although the decedent came to the door, the two were not permitted into the apartment. Upon returning with the decedent's father some four hours later to perform carpentry work on the first floor apartment, Mrs. Warner heard someone "knocking" upon the decedent's door. Hearing no response, Mrs. Warner went upstairs and unsuccessfully attempted to gain entry into the apartment. She then left the building and from the sidewalk observed two men walking away with a radio. Mrs. Warner returned to the decedent's apartment where she saw an interior light suddenly dim.
On the next day, Mr. and Mrs. Warner met their real estate broker at the decedent's apartment. Using a key, the three entered the apartment where they found blood on the wall and inside the bathtub. The police were immediately summoned. Upon responding, the police discovered blood on the walls of the foyer and stairway. A "puddle" of blood was found in the bathtub. The police also noticed what appeared to be the broken blade of a steak knife on the floor of the bathroom. In addition, the bedroom had been "ransacked" and a television had been taken from the living room. By the entry to the kitchen, the police found a pail containing a "pinkish liquid."
Three days later, on November 27, 1987, the decedent's automobile was located on a public street several blocks from her apartment. A local resident told the police that she had recently seen the defendant, who she knew as her son's barber, standing next to the car with the door open. She later observed defendant walking toward the railroad tracks accompanied by another male who was having difficulty standing. Further investigation revealed that defendant lived on the same street that the automobile was found.
Defendant was arrested and transported to police headquarters where he was advised of his constitutional rights and questioned. Initially, defendant admitted that he knew the decedent, but denied burglarizing her apartment. He claimed that the decedent's boyfriend, Erk Drury, had borrowed her car and that he briefly accompanied Drury on a ride. Later that evening, defendant told the police that he had accompanied Drury to the decedent's apartment to borrow her car. He claimed that she refused and an argument developed between Drury and the decedent. According to defendant, he left and went to his aunt's house, where Drury, driving the decedent's automobile, subsequently picked him up.
Upon searching defendant's apartment, the police discovered a rusty knife with a wooden handle, two cable boxes, a television and bloodstained clothing. When confronted with this information, defendant claimed that he had purchased one of the cable boxes "on the street", but owned them both, and that he had cut his finger in a fall. When the officer expressed skepticism about the source of blood on his clothes, defendant recounted that the front passenger seat of the decedent's car was "all wet and bloody," thus soiling his clothing. However, defendant could not explain why the bloodstains appeared on the front of his trousers. At this point, the interrogation terminated. Although defendant was advised that he would be charged with burglary and robbery, he agreed to speak to the officers the following day. Defendant remained in jail that night.
At 2:30 p.m. the next day, defendant was again advised of his constitutional rights and questioned. Defendant explained that he and Drury had returned to the decedent's apartment after borrowing her automobile. According to defendant, Drury met with the decedent alone. After a brief period, defendant joined them. On his way up to the second floor apartment, defendant asserted that he noticed blood on the wall and that Drury appeared to be perspiring and "out of breath." Defendant further related that he saw the decedent lying in the bathtub. At this point, defendant claimed that he mistakenly cut his finger with a pocket knife he had been carrying and soaked it in a bucket of water. He recalled helping Drury remove the decedent's body from the apartment and place it in the front passenger seat of her automobile. Drury allegedly drove off with the decedent's body, leaving defendant behind.
Defendant was then permitted to speak to his cousin, who was a police officer. After a brief conference, defendant agreed to lead the police to the decedent's body. Accompanied by the officers, defendant provided directions to a bridge in Hopewell Township. From the automobile, defendant told the police where they could find the decedent's body. Pursuant to defendant's detailed instructions, the police recovered the body in the creek below the bridge. The police discovered a "red cloth" knotted around the decedent's neck. Later that night, defendant gave the police a formal statement in which he essentially repeated what he had told them earlier in the day. The interview was eventually terminated because of the late hour, and defendant agreed to be questioned on the following day.
At noon, on November 29, 1987, defendant was transported from the holding cell, again apprised of his constitutional rights and questioned. Although defendant elaborated on his prior statements, he provided little additional information. The questioning continued throughout the day with numerous interruptions during which he was permitted to eat, smoke and use the bathroom facilities.
Questioning resumed at 9:00 a.m. the next morning. After being advised of his rights, defendant admitted for the first time that he had stolen the television and cable boxes from the decedent's apartment. Later that day, defendant was brought before a municipal court judge for his initial appearance on a complaint charging him with burglary and robbery. Although the proceedings were sound recorded, no transcript was prepared and the tapes were destroyed before this appeal was filed. In the complaint, the word "[r]etained" is circled in the area denoting "defense counsel information." Although this cryptic reference is otherwise unexplained, information presented at a pretrial hearing indicates that defendant had employed David Rhoads, a private attorney, to represent him on unrelated drug charges approximately eight months before the homicide. Although the record is not entirely clear, it is reasonably apparent that defendant apprised the judge at the initial appearance of his prior retention of Mr. Rhoads on the narcotics indictment. In reality, defendant had paid only a fraction of Mr. Rhoads' initial [sic] retainer and was later assigned a public defender. As to the present charges, defendant formally applied for an attorney from the Public Defender's Office on December 4 and 5, 1987. The Public Defender subsequently retained Mr. Rhoads to represent defendant on these charges. The point to be stressed is that the record is barren of anything to suggest defendant sought the assistance of a public defender attorney or otherwise expressly invoked his right to counsel at the initial appearance on November 30, 1987. * * *
On the next day, December 1, 1987, the police returned to defendant's apartment and seized additional items of evidence. Defendant's thirteen year old nephew, Jeffrey Tucker, was present and agreed to accompany the officers to police headquarters for questioning. Jeffrey was...
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