State v. Turello
| Decision Date | 17 March 1981 |
| Citation | 183 Conn. 330,439 A.2d 364 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Esther TURELLO et al. |
Edmund W. O'Brien, New London, for appellant (defendant and third party plaintiff).
Paige J. Everin, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellee (plaintiff).
David S. Williams, Norwich, with whom, on the brief, was Allyn L. Brown, Jr., Norwich, for appellee (third party defendant).
Before BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY, WRIGHT and BRENNAN, JJ.
This appeal concerns liability to pay for medical care at a state chronic disease hospital. The plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, brought an action against the defendant, Esther Turello, alleging that she owed an unpaid balance of $9901.15 for her hospitalization at Uncas-on-Thames Hospital, a state hospital. The defendant then brought a third party action against the third party defendant, the Aetna Life Insurance Company, alleging its liability to pay the balance due to the state of Connecticut. Judgment for the state was rendered by stipulation. The third party action was tried on a stipulation of facts with exhibits attached thereto. The third party action resulted in a judgment for Aetna, from which Esther Turello now appeals.
The case was decided on the following stipulated facts: Esther Turello was hospitalized at Uncas-on-Thames, a state chronic disease hospital, from January 8, 1969, to January 24, 1970. During that time, she was the wife and dependent of Anthony P. Turello. He, in turn, was then an insured individual under certain medical insurance policies issued on his behalf by the Aetna Life Insurance Company. The amount of $9901.15 was conceded to have been due and owing to the state as hospital expenses incurred by Esther Turello for board and room in connection with her confinement.
The trial court concluded that the insurance policies issued by Aetna provided coverage for dependents like Esther only insofar as insured individuals like Anthony became legally liable to make payments on their behalf. The court assumed without argument, since the issue had not been vigorously pressed before it, that the applicable Connecticut statutes imposed no further legal liability on Anthony than that for which Aetna had already paid. 1 On the basis of its interpretation of the insurance contracts, rather than on a studied analysis of the statutes, the court, having determined that Anthony was not liable, rendered judgment for the third party defendant, Aetna.
Because our reading of the statutes persuades us that Anthony Turello was liable for his wife's medical costs in a state chronic disease hospital, we find error. We do not reach the question whether the contracts of insurance would have provided direct coverage for Esther as a dependent even had her husband not been personally obligated to pay the state for her care.
We recognize that the statutory claim was not fully explored in the trial court. Nevertheless, because the factual record is adequate for us to adjudicate the claim, and because it raises an issue of general importance, we have decided to exercise our discretion to consider it.
Principally at issue is General Statutes § 19-125, governing support of patients in the state chronic disease hospitals. Uncas-on-Thames is such a hospital. In 1969 and 1970 the statute provided:
This statute must be read in conjunction with the statutory provisions governing support of patients in state humane institutions. General Statutes §§ 17-294 and 17-295. At the time of Esther Turello's hospitalization, § 17-294 defined "state humane institution" as including "state mental hospitals and state training schools for mentally retarded persons." For patients in state humane institutions § 17-295(b) then provided that "the maximum rate to legally liable relatives as such shall not exceed twenty-six dollars and ninety-five cents per week ...." It is undisputed that Anthony Turello is a legally liable relative as that term is defined in § 17-295(c).
The question of statutory construction that we must resolve is whether § 17-295's limitation upon the financial liability of legally liable relatives for treatment of patients at state humane institutions operates equally as a limitation of liability under § 19-125 for treatment at state chronic disease hospitals. The third party plaintiff, Esther Turello, arguing that the limitation is inapplicable, points to the prefatory language of § 19-125 distinguishing §§ 17-294 and 17-295, and to the absence of language in § 19-125 expressly incorporating the maximum rate structure of § 17-295. She notes further that such a cross-reference to the rates charged for care in state humane institutions does appear in at least one other related statute, General Statutes § 17-12c(b). 2 The third party defendant, Aetna, focuses on the second sentence of § 19-125, which provides for support in chronic disease hospitals by "the same persons and estates as are legally liable for support of patients in state humane institutions ... in the same manner and under the same procedures, terms and conditions as are authorized under the laws governing cases of patients in state humane institutions." Aetna argues that this reference to state humane institutions incorporates the limitation on liability that applies to care in state humane institutions.
The rules of statutory construction offer no irrefutable guides that definitively resolve the conflict before us. It is confusing to have the statute concerning chronic disease hospitals contain references that, in one and the same section, both exclude and include the rules governing humane institutions. Nonetheless, we conclude that the argument of the...
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