State v. Turner

• Decision Date: 29 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. CR-06-1033.,CR-06-1033.
• Citation: 976 So.2d 508
• Parties: Ex parte State of Alabama. (In re STATE of Alabama v. Darryl Dewayne TURNER).
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

976 So.2d 508

Ex parte State of Alabama (In re STATE of Alabama v. Darryl Dewayne TURNER).

No. CR-06-1033.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 29, 2007.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Michael A. Nunnelley and Jasper B. Roberts, Jr., asst. attys. gen., for petitioner.

Haley A. Andrews and John M. Johnson, Birmingham; and Sidney Austin, Christopher Blanchard, Peter Flanagan, Sara Gourley, Kelly Huggins, Nicole Kopinski, Kathleen Kumer, and Alexa Warner, Chicago, Illinois, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The State of Alabama filed this petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge James W. Woodroof to set aside his ruling on Darryl Dewayne Turner's motion for discovery related to Turner's petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

In 1999, Turner was convicted of capital murder for intentionally murdering Barbara Wilson during the course of a robbery and a rape, violations of §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2) and 13A-5-40(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975. Turner was sentenced to death.¹ His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737 (Ala.Crim. App.2002). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review and we issued the certificate of judgment on September 30, 2005.

On October 2, 2006, Turner filed a Rule 32 petition attacking his conviction and sentence.² In October 2006, Turner filed two discovery motions requesting the prosecution's file and numerous other records from various state and nonstate agencies. The State filed a response to Turner's discovery motions, and Judge Woodroof held a hearing. At the hearing Judge Woodroof granted Turner discovery as to the following: (1) all documents relating to the employment, training, discipline, promotions, or demotions of Detective Heath Emerson and Officer Lee Kennemer; (2) all records maintained by the Limestone County jail relating to Turner; and (3) all records maintained by the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") relating to Turner, Beverly Turner (Darryl's mother), Dwight Turner (Darryl's father), and Carolyn Coleman (Darryl's grandmother). The State then filed this mandamus petition requesting that we direct the circuit court to set aside its ruling allowing Turner the above discovery, except as to the discovery of Turner's own DHR files, to which the State has no objection.

Turner contends that the State has failed to show that it "does not have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal;" therefore, he argues that the State cannot seek the remedy of mandamus. (Turner's answer at page 7.) He cites Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So.2d 810 (Ala.2003), to support his argument. In Ocwen Federal Bank, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

"Generally, an appeal of a discovery order is an adequate remedy, notwithstanding the fact that that procedure may delay an appellate court's review of a petitioner's grievance or impose on the petitioner additional expense; our judicial system cannot afford immediate mandamus review of every discovery order."

872 So.2d at 813 (footnote omitted).

Turner fails to consider that the present action is a Rule 32 proceeding, which is governed by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 32.4, Ala. R.Crim.P., and not a civil action, which is governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The State has only a limited right to appeal in the criminal context.³ In relation to a Rule 32 proceeding the State has no right to appeal a prejudgment ruling concerning discovery. Accordingly, the State's only remedy is to file a petition for a writ of mandamus. Thus, this case is correctly before this Court by way of this extraordinary petition. See Ex parte Land, 775 So.2d 847 (Ala.2000).

Also, the State filed this petition within the presumptively reasonable time period set out in Rule 21(a), Ala.R.App.P. The circuit court granted Turner's motion for discovery at the motion hearing on March 15, 2007. The State filed this extraordinary petition on March 22, 2007 — seven days later. The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Thomas, 828 So.2d 952 (Ala. 2001), held that the presumptively reasonable time for the State to file a mandamus petition is within seven days of the date of the ruling that is the subject of the petition. This petition is thus timely.

In Ex parte Land, the Alabama Supreme Court set out the standard for discovery in postconviction proceedings. The Court stated:

"We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that `good cause' is the appropriate standard by which to judge postconviction discovery motions. In fact, other courts have adopted a similar `good-cause' or `good-reason' standard for the postconviction discovery process. See [State v.] Marshall, [148 N.J. 89, 690 A.2d 1 (1997)]; State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1994); People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988). As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the good-cause standard guards against potential abuse of the postconviction discovery process. See Fitzgerald, supra, 123 Ill.2d at 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d at 135. We also agree that New Jersey's Marshall case provides a good working framework for reviewing discovery motions and orders in capital cases. In addition, we are bound by our own rule that `an evidentiary hearing must be held on a [petition for postconviction relief] which is meritorious on its face, i.e., one which contains matters and allegations (such as ineffective assistance of counsel) which, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief.' Ex parte Boatwright, 471 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Ala.1985).

"We emphasize that this holding — that postconviction discovery motions are to be judged by a good-cause standard — does not automatically allow discovery under Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., and that it does not expand the discovery procedures within Rule 32.4. Accord Lewis, supra, 656 So.2d at 1250, wherein the Florida Supreme Court stated that the good-cause standard did not affect Florida's rules relating to postconviction procedure, which are similar to ours. By adopting this standard, we are only recognizing that a trial court, upon a petitioner's showing of good cause, may exercise its inherent authority to order discovery in a proceeding for postconviction relief. In addition, we caution that postconviction discovery does not provide a petitioner with a right to `fish' through official files and that it `is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means of vindicating actual claims.' People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991). Instead, in order to obtain discovery, a petitioner must allege facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief. Cf. Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir.1986) (`a hearing [on a habeas corpus petition] is not required unless the petitioner alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to federal habeas relief'), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918, 919, 107 S.Ct. 3195, 96 L.Ed.2d 682 (1987). Furthermore, a petitioner seeking postconviction discovery also must meet the requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., which states:

"`The petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.'

"That having been said, we must determine whether Land presented the trial court with good cause for ordering the requested discovery. To do that, we must evaluate Land's basis for the relief requested in his postconviction petition and determine whether his claims are facially meritorious. Only after making that examination and determination can we determine whether Land has shown good cause."

775 So.2d at 852-53 (footnote omitted).

This Court in Jackson v. State, 910 So.2d 797 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), stated:

"Though Alabama has had little opportunity to define what constitutes `good cause,' in Ex parte Mack, 894 So.2d 764, 768 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), we quoted with approval an Illinois case the Alabama Supreme Court relied on in Land — People v. Johnson, 205 Ill.2d 381, 275 Ill.Dec. 820, 793 N.E.2d 591 (2002):

"`"A trial court has inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. See People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988); People v. Rose, 48 Ill.2d 300, 302, 268 N.E.2d 700 (1971). A court must exercise this authority with caution, however, because a defendant may attempt to divert attention away from constitutional issues which escaped earlier review by requesting discovery.... Accordingly, the trial court should allow discovery only if the defendant has shown `good cause,' considering the issues presented in the petition, the scope of the requested discovery, the length of time between the conviction and the post-conviction proceeding, the burden of discovery on the State and on any witnesses, and the availability of the evidence through other sources. Daley, 123 Ill.2d at 183-84, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131; see People v. Fair, 193 Ill.2d 256, 264-65, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500 (2000). We will reverse a trial court's denial of a post-conviction discovery request only for an abuse of discretion. Fair, 193 Ill.2d at 265, 250 Ill. Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a discovery request which ranges beyond the limited scope of a post-conviction proceeding and amounts to a `fishing expedition.'"'

"894 So.2d at 768-69 (quoting Johnson, 205 Ill.2d at 408, 275 Ill.Dec. at 836-37, 793 N.E.2d at 607-08). See also State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1994).

"The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 690 A.2d 1 (1997), a case...