State v. Tweedy
| Decision Date | 23 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-580,95-580 |
| Citation | 277 Mont. 313,922 P.2d 1134 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William H. TWEEDY, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
William H. Tweedy, Cut Bank, pro se.
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Barbara C. Harris, Asst. Attorney General, Helena, Larry D. Epstein, Glacier County Attorney, Cut Bank, for Respondent.
William H. Tweedy (Tweedy) appeals from an order of the Ninth Judicial District Court, Glacier County, dismissing his appeal from a Justice Court conviction. We reverse and remand with instructions.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Did the District Court have jurisdiction over Tweedy's appeal from the Justice Court?
2. Did the District Court err in granting the State of Montana's motion to dismiss Tweedy's appeal?
3. Was Tweedy's right to a speedy trial violated?
On January 3, 1989, the State of Montana (State) charged Tweedy in Glacier County Justice Court with two counts of misdemeanor assault. On April 11, 1989, a jury found Tweedy not guilty on the first count, and guilty on the second count, of misdemeanor assault. The Justice Court scheduled sentencing for April 18, 1989, and Tweedy filed a notice of appeal to the District Court on April 19, 1989. The Justice Court filed its sentencing order on May 3, 1989.
The District Court scheduled Tweedy's trial for July 21, 1989. Tweedy subsequently requested, and received, a continuance of that trial date. No new trial date was ever scheduled. In April of 1990, Tweedy filed a letter requesting that his name be substituted for that of his previous counsel as attorney of record.
Nothing further occurred in the case until January 13, 1995, when the State moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis that Tweedy had failed to diligently pursue it. Tweedy responded with a motion to dismiss the underlying charge for lack of speedy trial and prosecutorial prejudice. The District Court held a hearing on the motions and, thereafter, granted the State's motion to dismiss Tweedy's appeal. Tweedy appeals.
On appeal, Tweedy argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his appeal from the Justice Court and in implicitly denying his motion to dismiss the charge against him on speedy trial grounds and other bases. In addition to responding to Tweedy's arguments, the State contends that the District Court did not acquire jurisdiction over Tweedy's appeal because his notice of appeal from the Justice Court was premature.
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by the court itself, at any stage of a judicial proceeding. In re Marriage of Miller (1993), 259 Mont. 424, 426, 856 P.2d 1378, 1380. Moreover, a party cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction which is lacking or waive the want of jurisdiction. State v. Hegeman (1991), 248 Mont. 49, 52, 808 P.2d 509, 511. Thus, notwithstanding the State's failure to raise it in the District Court, the issue of whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Tweedy's appeal from the Justice Court is properly before us.
The manner in which an appeal from a justice court to a district court must be taken is controlled by statute in Montana and recently has been clarified by this Court. Pursuant to § 46-17-311(2), MCA, a defendant initiates an appeal to the district court by filing written notice of intention to appeal within 10 days after a justice court judgment is rendered. A judgment on a criminal conviction includes the sentence; therefore, the imposition of sentence and final judgment by the justice court is a prerequisite for an appeal from that court to the district court. State v. Todd (1993), 262 Mont. 108, 111, 863 P.2d 423, 425 (citations omitted). A notice of appeal filed after a conviction, but before the justice court imposes sentence and final judgment, is premature and does not divest the justice court of jurisdiction over the case; conversely, a district court does not obtain subject matter jurisdiction until a justice court has imposed sentence and final judgment. Todd, 863 P.2d at 425 (citation omitted).
Here, Tweedy filed his notice of appeal after the April 11, 1989, jury verdict finding him guilty of misdemeanor assault, but before the Justice Court filed its sentencing order on May 3, 1989. Tweedy asserts, however, that the Justice Court orally pronounced sentence on April 18, 1989, in the presence of himself and his attorney, that the judgment against him was final on that date and that his attorney prepared the notice of appeal later that day. On the basis of these assertions, Tweedy contends that he timely filed his notice of appeal on April 19, 1989, and the District Court acquired jurisdiction.
We previously have held that the statutory 10-day period for filing a notice of appeal runs from the date on which a justice court orally renders judgment in open court, regardless of whether a written judgment is issued. State v. Mortenson (1978), 175 Mont. 403, 404-405, 574 P.2d 581, 582. In Mortenson, the record apparently reflected that the sentence and judgment were, in fact, orally pronounced in open court. Mortenson, 574 P.2d at 581.
The record in the present case, insofar as it is relevant to this issue, consists of a jury verdict finding Tweedy guilty of one count of misdemeanor assault on April 11, 1989; a Justice Court notice requesting Tweedy to appear on April 18, 1989, for sentencing; Tweedy's notice of appeal, dated April 18, 1989, and filed on April 19, 1989; and the Justice Court's sentencing order on Tweedy's misdemeanor assault conviction, filed on May 3, 1989.
Although the sentencing order does not refer to any sentencing proceeding or oral pronouncement of sentence having occurred on April 18, 1989, there also is no indication in the record that Tweedy did not appear, as ordered, for sentencing in the Justice Court on that date. Thus, while the record is not altogether clear in this regard, the order to appear for sentencing on April 18, 1989, taken together with Tweedy's notice of appeal dated the same day and filed on April 19, 1989, creates a strong inference that the Justice Court orally pronounced sentence on April 18, 1989, in accordance with its scheduling order and that the May 3, 1989, sentencing order was merely a written formalization of its earlier oral sentence. As a result, judgment was rendered on April 18, 1989, and Tweedy's notice of appeal to the District Court was timely filed within the statutory 10-day period. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Tweedy's appeal from the Justice Court.
We note that, in 1991, the legislature enacted § 46-18-116, MCA, which provides as follows:
The judgment must set forth the plea, verdict or finding, and the adjudication. If the defendant is convicted, it must set forth the sentence or other disposition. The judgment must be signed and entered on the record.
Although this statute is not located in Chapter 17 of Title 46, which specifically governs criminal procedure in justice and city courts, it is applicable to criminal proceedings in all the courts of Montana "except where provision for a different procedure is specifically provided by law." Section 46-1-103(1), MCA. Neither the legislature nor this Court has provided such a different procedure for justice courts and, therefore, § 46-18-116, MCA, is applicable to criminal proceedings in justice courts. While the § 46-18-116, MCA, requirement for a signed judgment entered on the record does not apply here because Tweedy's Justice Court conviction occurred in 1989, compliance with this requirement by Montana courts should eliminate confusion in the future regarding when the statutory time periods for appeal from judgments in criminal cases begin to run.
The State argued in the District Court that Tweedy's appeal from the Justice Court conviction and judgment should be dismissed based on his failure to pursue it in a timely manner. The State did not file a brief in support of its motion and did not provide the District Court with authority for its position at the hearing on both parties' motions.
The District Court's order granting the State's motion to dismiss Tweedy's appeal notes only that Tweedy made no effort to pursue his appeal from the April 1990, point at which he substituted himself as counsel of record until the State filed its motion to dismiss the appeal in January of 1995. The order provides no further rationale and contains no citation to authority. The court stated at the hearing that, as the party bringing the appeal, Tweedy was obligated to ensure that the appeal was heard in a timely fashion and that the State did not have the burden to pursue the appeal. The District Court order granting the State's motion to dismiss the appeal did not directly address Tweedy's motion to dismiss the underlying charge for lack of speedy trial on appeal.
Section 25-33-304, MCA, authorizes the dismissal of a civil appeal from a justice court to a district court for failure to prosecute or unnecessary delay. No statutory authority for such a dismissal of a criminal appeal exists, however, and this Court has not specifically addressed the issue of whether the defendant or the prosecution has the responsibility to timely pursue the prosecution of a criminal appeal from a justice court to a district court. The State contends that such responsibility lies with the party bringing the appeal.
The right of a criminal defendant to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution. State v. Matthews (1995), 271 Mont. 24, 27, 894 P.2d 285, 287. As a general rule, it is the State's duty to ensure that a...
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