State v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 26 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1065.,11–1065.
• Citation: 830 N.W.2d 288
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tommy TYLER, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

830 N.W.2d 288

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Tommy TYLER, Jr., Appellant.

No. 11–1065.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 26, 2013.

Gary D. Dickey of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and David M. Porter, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

ZAGER, Justice.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether law enforcement had probable cause to believe that an equipment violation was occurring under Iowa Code section 321.37(3), which prohibits an owner of a motor vehicle from placing a frame around a license plate that obstructs the view of the plate. If probable cause is not present to justify the stop, the State asks us to decide whether reasonable suspicion of the equipment violation is sufficient to support a traffic stop.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Tyler was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2009). Tyler appeals, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted further review. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

On October 13, 2010, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Johnston Police Officer Brad Lowe was sitting stationary in his marked patrol car in the parking lot of the Dragon Car Wash on Merle Hay Road. Officer Lowe observed Tommy Tyler's white Cadillac Escalade turn northbound onto Merle Hay Road from Johnston Drive, past Officer Lowe's position. Officer Lowe testified that as Tyler's vehicle approached his position, “it appeared the vehicle had a tinted license plate cover on the front of the license plate.” As the vehicle pulled past, Officer Lowe testified, “I then pulled out behind the vehicle and also noticed that it had a license plate cover obstructing the view of the plate on the rear as well.” Officer Lowe recognized the vehicle as the same one he had attempted to stop two days earlier, also because of his concern regarding “tinted” license plate covers.

Officer Lowe testified that because he found it difficult to run the license plate on the vehicle, he initiated the traffic stop, which was captured on videotape from his squad car. Prior to making contact with the driver, however, Officer Lowe was able to view all of the numbers and letters printed on the rear license plate, saw the “Iowa” printed at the top of the license plate, observed the county displayed on the bottom of the plate, and had a full view of the registration sticker. Based upon these observations, Officer Lowe was able to quickly and accurately call the plate information into dispatch.

After making initial contact with Tyler and advising him of the reason for the stop, Officer Lowe detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from within the vehicle and noted that Tyler's speech was slow. Based on these observations, Officer Lowe initiated an OWI investigation. This investigation culminated in a breathalyzer test indicating Tyler had a blood alcohol content of .147.

Tyler filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the stop. He argued the stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, both of which prohibit unreasonable search and seizure. Tyler argued that Officer Lowe lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the stop.

Evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, including the in-car videotape, photographs, and witness testimony, demonstrated that both the rear and front license plate covers were clear rather than tinted. The videotape of the stop shows Officer Lowe was able to read the license plate in order to provide the information to his dispatcher as both vehicles were coming to a stop. Officer Lowe indicated that he had not attempted to read and call in the license plate prior to that point. He did, however, testify that the license plate was “blurred” and that he could not read the plate when he had initially turned on his lights.

The district court denied Tyler's motion to suppress. After a bench trial, Tyler was convicted of OWI, second offense. Tyler appealed, arguing the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling. We granted further review.

II. Standard of Review.

Tyler asserts his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure were violated. Because of the constitutional dimensions of these claims, our review is de novo. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). A de novo review constitutes “an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We give “deference to the factual findings of the district court due to its opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but [we are] not bound by such findings.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion and Analysis.

A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure. Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997) (“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials.”). As we have consistently stated, “[W]e jealously protect this court's authority to follow an independent approach [to evaluate claims made] under our state constitution.” Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 771. Where a party raises both state and federal constitutional claims but does not argue that a standard independent of the federal approach should be employed under the state constitution, we ordinarily apply the substantive federal standards but reserve the right to apply the standard in a fashion different from federal precedent. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). Because Tyler has not proposed a standard for interpreting our search and seizure provisions under the Iowa Constitution differently from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general standards as outlined by the United States Supreme Court for addressing a search and seizure challenge under the Iowa Constitution. See id.

The United States Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment in a number of cases. A traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–37, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 332–33 (1984); State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (2000) (“When the police stop a car and temporarily detain an individual, the temporary detention is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n. 2 (Iowa 2001).

Under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that allowing law enforcement unbridled discretion in stopping vehicles “ ‘would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights.’ ” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 672 (1979) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). When there is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a stop, an officer has the “kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion [that] is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.” Id. Moreover, the Court recognized that individuals frequently spend significant time traveling in automobiles and must be entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when traveling. Id. at 662–63, 99 S.Ct at 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d at 673. “Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time [she or] he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.” Id.

B. Bases for Traffic Stops. We have considered the scope of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in a traffic stop context. In State v. Tague, we held that briefly crossing the edge line on a divided roadway did not provide reasonable suspicion of intoxication to support a traffic stop or probable cause that a violation of Iowa Code section 321.297 occurred under article I, section 8. 676 N.W.2d 197, 205–06 (Iowa 2004).

The State argues that the stop in this case may be supported under both probable cause and reasonable suspicion theories. If a traffic violation actually occurred and the officer witnessed it, the State has established probable cause. Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201. A reasonable mistake of fact does not negate justification for a stop based on probable cause. State v. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 680–81 (Iowa 2005).

Reasonable suspicion is a much more nebulous concept, and a standard that may or may not be appropriate to apply to smaller offenses such as traffic violations. Professor LaFave speculates that,

[i]f the [U.S.] Supreme Court were to address the issue [of whether the nature of the offense being investigated is relevant to whether reasonable suspicion can justify a traffic stop], it might well be that the Court would conclude that Terry stops upon less than probable cause cannot be made with respect to all offenses, so that a goodly number of traffic offenses would not be encompassed with the Terry reasonable-suspicion standard.

Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop”...