State v. Urbina
| Decision Date | 16 June 2015 |
| Citation | 115 A.3d 261,221 N.J. 509 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Edwin URBINA, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Robin Kay Lord, Trenton, argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Robin Kay Lord, attorney; Ms. Lord and Richard W. Berg, of counsel and on the brief).
Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
This case involves an appeal from defendant Edwin Urbina's conviction and sentence for first-degree aggravated manslaughter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(a)(1), following his entry of a guilty plea for the shooting death of Edwin A. Torres. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the “factual basis elicited for [that] guilty plea indicated that [defendant] was asserting a complete defense to the charge.” That factual basis was later challenged on appeal, along with defendant's seventeen-and-one-half year sentence.
In a split decision, a majority of the Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that while defendant testified to facts during the plea colloquy that raised the possibility of self-defense, his testimony, when considered in light of all the surrounding circumstances, did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring the court to vacate the plea. Rather, the majority found that defendant, during his plea colloquy, explicitly agreed to waive self-defense after consultation with counsel and his family. The majority additionally noted that defendant signed an amended plea form waiving such defense. One member of the appellate panel dissented, concluding that defendant's plea was accompanied by a claim of innocence, and further found that the trial judge failed to engage in a sufficient colloquy with defendant to confirm that his self-defense waiver was knowing and voluntary.
Defendant appealed as of right to this Court. See R. 2:2–1(a)(2). We are now asked to consider whether, in pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated manslaughter, defendant's assertion of facts implying that he acted in self-defense rendered the factual basis for that plea inadequate. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
On the morning of November 24, 2007, emergency dispatchers received a report of an injured man in Camden City. Upon arrival at the specified location, Camden police officers found the victim, Edwin A. Torres, deceased on the sidewalk with multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness to the incident identified defendant, Edwin Urbina, as the shooter. The witness had known defendant since childhood. Defendant, sixteen years old at the time of the shooting, was thereafter charged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute murder contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3(a)(1), (2).
Three days later, on November 27, 2007, defendant, accompanied by counsel, surrendered at the Camden Police Department, and was thereafter remanded to a youth correctional facility.
On March 27, 2008, defendant voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–27.
On that same date, in order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder carrying a potential life sentence with a mandatory parole disqualifier of thirty years, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the State. Under the terms of that plea arrangement, defendant agreed to proceed as an adult and to plead guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(a)(1), in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen-and-one-half years' incarceration subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2. As a further part of the agreement, defendant agreed to pay the requisite fines and penalties and to waive his right to appeal. Defense counsel expressly reserved the right to argue for a sentence less than the sentence the State agreed to recommend in accordance with State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 558 A. 2d 1312 (1989).
At the plea hearing, defendant testified under oath that he had sufficient time to speak with his family and counsel before deciding to plead guilty. Thereafter, counsel for defendant represented to the court that he explained to defendant that “by waiving the Grand Jury he would not be indicted for murder” and that defendant would instead proceed “on a less serious charge.” Defendant acknowledged his understanding and voluntary agreement to waive indictment. To establish the factual basis for defendant's plea, the following colloquy took place, which we set out at length because of its importance:
The court thereafter found that defendant provided an adequate factual basis for aggravated manslaughter, and accepted the plea.
On May 16, 2008, defendant appeared for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor briefly set forth the State's version of events, as developed during the course of the investigation into the victim's murder:
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