State v. Urrabazo
| Decision Date | 23 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | 33460.,Nos. 33459,s. 33459 |
| Citation | 244 P.3d 1244,150 Idaho 158 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Francisco Augustin URRABAZO, Defendant–Appellant. |
Molly Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sarah E. Tompkins argued.
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.
Francisco Augustin Urrabazo appeals the sentence imposed by the district court. Because Urrabazo's appeal is untimely, we dismiss.
On August 8, 2005, Francisco Urrabazo pleaded guilty to statutory rape, felony battery on a police officer, and misdemeanor battery. The statutory rape charge was filed in a different case than the battery charges, but the two cases were considered together for the purposes of sentencing. On November 7, 2005, the district court sentenced Urrabazo to a unified sentence of ten years with three years fixed for statutory rape and a concurrent unified sentence of five years with three fixed for the felony battery charge. However, the court retained jurisdiction in both cases for a period of 180 days.
The district court held a hearing on May 1, 2005, to review Urrabazo's progress. At the hearing, the State acknowledged that Urrabazo "had a good six months," but indicated it was still concerned about Urrabazo's use of alcohol, that he failed to recognize the severity of the situation, and "that it was unclear if the level to re-offend [had] gone down." The court continued the hearing until May 5, 2006, because "it was a close question on whether or not the court should place [Urrabazo] on probation or relinquish jurisdiction." The court also recognized that its jurisdiction expired the following day, on May 6, 2006.
At the May 5 hearing, the district court initially determined it would relinquish jurisdiction and impose the original sentence. The court "advised counsel that the defendant was not ready for probation at this time, however, the Court felt that a Rule 35 motion would be appropriate" if defense counsel wished to argue for a reduction in Urrabazo's sentence. Urrabazo's counsel also suggested that the After a recess, Urrabazo's counsel moved, pursuant to Rule 35, for a reduction in Urrabazo's sentence in the form of a second period of retained jurisdiction. In making its determination on the issue, the court acknowledged Urrabazo's progress during the first rider, and noted that his failure to complete a sexual offender treatment program was not for lack of cooperation but, rather, was due to an inability to complete the assignments in the time provided. However, the court remained concerned about placing Urrabazo on probation in the same city where the rape victim resided, and recognized a continued need for anger management and substance abuse treatment. The court therefore concluded Urrabazo was not ready for probation at that time. The court ordered relinquishment of its retained jurisdiction, but then granted Urrabazo's Rule 35 motion by ordering a second 180–day period of retained jurisdiction.
Two months into the second rider, the district court received an updated report regarding Urrabazo's progress. After reviewing the updated report, the court relinquished its jurisdiction pursuant to the second rider in an order filed on July 28, 2006. The order stated: "The Court's paramount concern for public safety, together with a lack of confidence in Defendant Urrabazo's ability to control his conduct for an extended [period] of time, and to accomplish rehabilitation in the less-structured setting of a community-based probation, support a decision to relinquish jurisdiction."
Urrabazo filed an appeal on September 8, 2006, 42 days after the July 28 order, alleging that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction, and that the sentences imposed were excessive. Urrabazo argues that consecutive riders, without an intervening period of probation, is consistent with the provisions and intent of I.C. § 19–2601(4). The State contends this Court should not consider the merits of Urrabazo's claims on appeal, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to order a successive period of retained jurisdiction, that Urrabazo's 42 days for filing an appeal commenced running at the end of the first period of retained jurisdiction, that the district court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for filing an appeal, and that Urrabazo's late appeal should therefore be dismissed.
1. Does I.C. § 19–2601(4) require a period of probation prior to ordering a second period of retained jurisdiction?
2. If the statute does require an intervening period of probation, was the district court without subject matter jurisdiction to order the second rider?
The district court in this case relinquished jurisdiction on the first rider on May 5, 2006. However, the court then ordered a second consecutive period of retained jurisdiction on that same day, without an intervening period of probation. On July 28, 2006, the court relinquished jurisdiction on the second rider. Urrabazo viewed this order as beginning the 42–day period in which to file his appeal. Thus, we must first determine whether I.C. § 19–2601(4), which permits an additional period of retained jurisdiction "after a defendant has been placed on probation," is ambiguous. Because we determine the provision is not ambiguous and clearly requires an intervening period of probation, we must also determine whether the district court acted without subject matter jurisdiction when ordering the second rider. We hold I.C. § 19–2601(4) requires that a defendant be placed on probation and subsequently be found to have violated the probation before a district court may order a second period of retained jurisdiction and that the district court in this case did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the second rider. Therefore, the orders granting and revoking the second rider are void, rendering Urrabazo's appeal untimely.
The State contends the plain language of I.C. § 19–2601(4) requires an intervening period of probation prior to ordering a second period of retained jurisdiction. However, Urrabazo argues that the provision is ambiguous because district courts regularly order consecutive periods of retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation, which indicates the statute is not plain on its face. Additionally, Urrabazo contends that the probation provision merely delineates an example for a court to consider when making its sentencing decision. Urrabazo further asserts that the legislative history of the amendment supports this interpretation because the goal of the statute is to give district courts substantial flexibility in sentencing decisions.
This Court exercises free review over questions of law, which include issues of statutory interpretation. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 327, 208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to "give effect to legislative intent," which starts with the "literal words of the statute." Id. at 328, 208 P.3d at 732. The words of the statute are given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, unless such meaning leads to absurd results. Id. However, "[t]his Court will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008). Where a statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction, it is ambiguous and must be interpreted to achieve the Legislature's intent. Doe, 147 Idaho at 328, 208 P.3d at 732. To do so, the Court goes beyond the words of the statute, and also considers "the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id.
After a person is convicted of a crime, a district court is empowered with several sentencing options. Among these options is imposing a sentence and retaining jurisdiction for a statutory period. I.C. § 19–2601(4). The purpose of this period of retained jurisdiction is to provide an evaluation "of the offender's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation." State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (2004). However, pursuant to I.C. § 19–2601(4), a court may only retain jurisdiction for up to 180 days,1 except in special circumstances when a court may take up to 30 additional days to make its ultimate sentencing decision.2 According to the statute, courts may also impose more than one period of retained jurisdiction "after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case." I.C. § 19–2601(4). At the time of this appeal, I.C. § 19–2601(4) provided, in part, as follows:
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... ... 35 to ... reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 ... P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 ... P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a ... period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, ... 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to ... revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a ... showing that the trial court abused its discretion ... Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In ... reviewing the propriety of a ... ...