State v. Valdez
| Decision Date | 24 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 12952,12952 |
| Citation | 30 Utah 2d 54,513 P.2d 422 |
| Parties | d 54 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gavino Joe VALDEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Bettie J. Marsh, William D. Marsh, Ogden, for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Robert B. Hansen, William T. Evans, Randolph S. Collins, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant appeals from his conviction by a jury of the crime of first-degree murder; the jury recommended leniency, and defendant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.
There is no dispute that defendant entered the Post Lounge in Ogden, Utah, at about 12:30 a.m. on August 21, 1971, walked up to the booth where his former wife, Ida Berniece Valdez, was seated with her companions, held his gun with both hands and fired it seven times into her body, and then walked hurriedly away, without speaking a word. Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
The defense introduced evidence to prove that defendant had consumed a quart plus one half of a six pack of beer during the afternoon and early evening preceding the shooting. Defendant further ingested a tablet called 'Purple Haze,' an alleged dosage of LSD, at approximately 7:00 p.m. Defendant's psychiatric expert testified that with defendant's personality characteristics and the effects of LSD on his impulse controls, defendant, although able to understand the nature and consequences of his act, would be unable to control his actions. Defendant further adduced evidence to show the rejection, fear and frustration he experienced, which allegedly turned to rage upon his encounter with his ex-wife and resulted in her death. The defendant testified that he had no memory of shooting the victim; he recalled walking into the establishment, observing a friend of his former wife, and his struggling on the floor.
The prosecution introduced evidence indicating statements made by the defendant following the incident and the observations of witnesses of defendant's demeanor. The psychiatric testimony introduced by the State indicated that defendant was responsible for his actions at the time of the shooting and that he was not unable to control his actions but was unwilling to do so. Evidence was adduced which indicated that defendant had threatened to kill his wife on two occasions in the late spring and early summer of 1971. On the Wednesday prior to the occurrence, defendant injured his former wife's leg by slamming a car door on it. On the night of the homicide, defendant went to the victim's home twice at approximately 10:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, and he appeared angry to the baby sitter, who informed him that his former wife was absent.
Following the shooting, defendant was restrained by other occupants in the lounge; he stated to them that he had done it and that he wouldn't try to get away; and that he'd get the gas chamber for sure. Upon the arrival of the police, he proclaimed that they didn't have to ask, that he'd shot her. On his way to the police station, defendant volunteered that he'd tried to get the children but she wouldn't give them to him. Defendant exclaimed: 'Oh God, I hope she dies.' While riding in the elevator to the jail, a trustee inquired as to defendant's offense, the police officer replied that defendant was suspected of shooting his wife five times. Defendant interjected that if they would check his gun, they'd find seven empty shells.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court's instructions to the jury distinguishing between first- and second-degree murder were improper and prejudicial. In separate instructions, the elements of first- and second-degree murder were set forth. One of the elements listed in the second degree was that the said killing was felonious. In another instruction, 'felonious' was defined as proceeding from an evil heart or purpose, done with a definite intention to commit a crime. Defendant urges that the inclusion of this element in the second-degree murder instruction discouraged the jury from considering the lesser offense. Furthermore, defendant postulates that the exclusion of this element in the first-degree murder charge would lead the average juror to believe that the absence of proof of an intent to commit a crime would place the offense committed in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree.
Implicit within defendant's argument is the assertion that the instruction for second-degree murder appeared to require more reprehensible conduct to fulfill the elements that for the first-degree murder charge. This contention is without merit, particularly when the instructions are construed in their entirety. Instruction No. 12 clearly and specifically outlined the elements of first-degree murder, including the specifications that the killing must be unlawful, wilful, deliberate, with malice aforethought, premeditated, and the result of a specific intention on the part of the defendant to take the life of the victim. In No. 15, the court instructed the jury that if it concluded that the State had not proved that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt then it should determine whether he was guilty of murder in the second degree.
In State v. Murphy, 1 the defendant contended that the instruction for second-degree murder was so worded that the trial court prevented the jury from returning a verdict of anything other than first-degree murder. This court explained that the fact that the jury found all of the elements to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, including the premeditation and deliberation would seem to negate the defendant's suggestion that the jury might have found otherwise. Furthermore, since the veniremen found as they did, they were not duty bound to canvass the second-degree instruction, which was specifically conditioned on the failure of the jury to find all of the elements of first-degree murder. In State v. Gallegos 2 this court reiterated the general rule that under ordinary factual situations wheree a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater offense, the giving of an erroneous instruction on a lesser offense is not deemed prejudicial.
In the instant case, a review of the record reveals not only that defendant failed to take exception to the challenged instructions, but that the instructions, when all of them are considered together, clearly specified the requisite distinctions between first- and second-degree murder. 3
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the statements he made to the police while he was physically restrained and had not yet been apprised of his constitutional rights. When the police arrived at the scene, the defendant was being restrained by spectators. The police handcuffed defendant, searched him, and assisted him from a prome to a standing position. As the officer reached into his pocket to procure his 'Miranda Warning' card and to read the defendant his rights, defendant volunteered:
Defendant contends that at the moment he made the statement he was deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, and since he had not received the warning, his statement is inadmissible.
The authority upon which defendant relies 4 does not proscribe the admission of a voluntary statement of a criminal defendant in custody, which was not made in response to any process of interrogation initated by the police or by someone acting as an agent or instrumentality of the police. 5
Defendant urges that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree as a matter of law. Specifically, defendant argues that reasonable men could not be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the victim was caused by the wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated action...
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State v. Tillman
...law of what a sentence of life imprisonment means in Utah.38 State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298, 1301 (Utah 1976); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973); see also State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982).39 Appellant's Brief at 54.40 See State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d......
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State v. Dunn
...therefrom. See, e.g., Tillman, 750 P.2d at 560, 561 n. 45; State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). Therefore, we conclude that even assuming that Dunn's request for counsel was an exercise of his constitutional rights,......
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State v. Young
...State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973).87 Utah R. Professional Conduct 3.4(e).88 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1047-48, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 ......
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State v. Isom, 20130740–CA.
...in considering in determining their verdict.’ ” State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 50, 309 P.3d 1160 (quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973) ). While “[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury,” Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426, a p......