State v. Valdez

• Decision Date: 06 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 31,164.,31,164.
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Tara VALDEZ, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

293 P.3d 909

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Tara VALDEZ, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 31,164.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Sept. 19, 2012.

Certiorari Denied, Dec. 6, 2012, No. 33,871.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Alex Chisholm, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} The issue in this case is one of first impression: Does the language of NMSA 1978, Section 66–8–102(N) (2010), mandating installation of an ignition interlock on vehicles driven by persons convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI), violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions as applied to DWI offenders whose impairment is caused not by alcohol but by drugs? ¹ We conclude that it does not, and we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Under New Mexico law, it is unlawful for a person to drive a vehicle if that person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See§ 66–8–102(A). Similarly, it is unlawful for a person to drive a vehicle if that person is under the influence of any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle. See§ 66–8–102(B). Section 66–8–102(C) sets out the per se standard for DWI convictions based on alcohol concentration, and Section 66–8–102(D) deals with aggravated DWI. The portion of the statute in question in this case, Section 66–8–102(N), applies to any offender convicted of any type of DWI, and requires that offender to

obtain an ignition interlock license and have an ignition interlock device installed and operating on all motor vehicles driven by the offender, pursuant to rules adopted by the traffic safety bureau. Unless determined by the bureau to be indigent, the offender shall pay all costs associated with having an ignition interlock device installed on the appropriate motor vehicles. The offender shall operate only those vehicles equipped with ignition interlock devices for:

(1) a period of one year, for a first offender;

(2) a period of two years, for a second conviction pursuant to this section;

(3) a period of three years, for a third conviction pursuant to this section; or

(4) the remainder of the offender's life, for a fourth or subsequent conviction pursuant to this section.

An ignition interlock device is an electronic analyzer that measures breath-alcohol concentration and prevents a driver from starting and continuing to operate a vehicle if the driver's blood-alcohol content exceeds a specified limit. See18.20.11.11 NMAC (01/01/03).

{3} Here, the facts are not in dispute. Defendant was charged with a first-time offense after driving while intoxicated in Santa Fe County pursuant to Section 66–8–102(B). Results of a blood test showed the presence in her system of oxycodone, diazepam, and nordiazepam, but no alcohol. She entered into a conditional plea agreement wherein she pled guilty to the first-time DWI but reserved the right to appeal any order requiring her to install an ignition interlock device in her vehicle. In addition, she filed a motion to set aside any requirement that she install an interlock device. The district court accepted the plea agreement and further granted Defendant's motion. Finding that “alcohol did not contribute to ... Defendant's conviction,” the court ruled that the ignition interlock requirement did not apply to her case because the interlock devices detect only alcohol, not drugs. The court concluded that “there is no rational basis” for requiring a person in Defendant's situation to comply with the statute, in violation of equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. The State appeals.

{4} Defendant urges affirmance, claiming that the interlock provision is over-inclusive in its classifications of drivers and under-inclusive in its remedies. The State argues for reversal. It contends that the district court wrongly decided that the ignition interlock law fails the rational basis test and argues that the court improperly concluded that the law is not rationally related to the goal of preventing driving while impaired. We look to the statute and subject it to the rational basis test as adopted by New Mexico courts.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Standard of Review, Scope of Review

{5} New Mexico's Constitution mirrors that of the United States in providing that “[n]o person shall be ... denied equal protection of the laws.” N.M. Const. art. II, § 18; seeU.S. Const. amend. XIV. We have previously articulated the standard of review in such a constitutional challenge and the approach to the three levels of scrutiny involved—strict, intermediate, and rational basis:

In analyzing which level of scrutiny should apply in an equal protection challenge, a court should look at all three levels to determine which is most appropriate based on the facts of the particular case. The determination of which level of scrutiny is applicable under the Constitution is a purely legal question, and is reviewed de novo.

Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005–NMSC–028, ¶ 15, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413.

{6} The extent of our scrutiny depends “on the nature of the interest and the degree to which it is infringed.” State v. Druktenis, 2004–NMCA–032, ¶ 86, 135 N.M. 223, 86 P.3d 1050 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The highest level of review, strict scrutiny, is used if the liberty interest being impinged rises to the level of a fundamental right, most notably in the areas of race or ancestry. Id. ¶ 89. Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for analyzing “legislative classifications infringing important but not fundamental rights, and involving sensitive but not suspect classes.” Id. ¶ 97 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Intermediate scrutiny is limited to classes involving gender and illegitimacy. Id. ¶ 99.

{7} Both parties agree that, absent an important right or sensitive class, neither of the two higher forms of scrutiny is applicable in this case and that rational basis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for assessing the constitutionality of the interlock requirement. Under rational basis scrutiny, the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute “must overcome a presumption of constitutionality” and “is required to show that the statute's classification is not rationally related to the legislative goal.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under this level of scrutiny, the classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. ¶ 102. Thus, we have endorsed the proposition, expressed by the United States Supreme Court, that the Fourteenth Amendment

permits the [s]tates a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the [s]tate's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.

Id. ¶ 103 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)).

{8} The burden on those challenging the constitutionality of legislative enactments is therefore great. The United States Supreme Court has long abided by the “strong presumption of validity” of legislative classifications and has stated that “those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have similarly stated that “the party objecting to the legislative classification has the burden of demonstrating that the classification bears no rational relationship to a conceivable legislative purpose.” Druktenis, 2004–NMCA–032, ¶ 104, 135 N.M. 223, 86 P.3d 1050 (internal quotation marks and citationomitted). The challenging party “must demonstrate that the challenged legislation is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, not just that it is possibly so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, a defendant “must show that the classification serves no valid governmental interest, is unreasonable and arbitrary as to amount to mere caprice.” State v. Edgington, 99 N.M. 715, 719, 663 P.2d 374, 378 (Ct.App.1983).

B. The Purpose of the Statute

{9} “The ultimate purpose of the DWI laws is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public by stopping people from driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol.” State v. Hernandez, 2001–NMCA–057, ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 698, 30 P.3d 387;see State v. Johnson, 2001–NMSC–001, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (“The purpose of our DWI legislation is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of New Mexico.”). And our courts have long acknowledged that the public interest in deterring DWI is compelling. Johnson, 2001–NMSC–001, ¶ 17, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233.

{10} “[A] determination of what is reasonably necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of the general public is a legislative function and should not be interfered with, save in a clear case of abuse.” Druktenis, 2004–NMCA–032, ¶ 106, 135 N.M. 223, 86 P.3d 1050 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he Legislature has broad discretion in determining necessary measures for the protection of the public.” Id. ¶ 107. And a statute will be upheld “if any state of the facts may be reasonably conceived to justify it[.]” Edgington, 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377. In assessing the constitutionality of a statute, we accept that “any redeeming value of the classification is sufficient.” Española Hous. Auth. v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787,...