State v. Valencia
| Decision Date | 27 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. A-1-CA-35554,A-1-CA-35554 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM JAMES VALENCIA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Maha Khoury, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C.
Robert E. Tangora
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{1} Defendant appeals his convictions for burglary, conspiracy, and possession of burglary tools. Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion for directed verdict, challenges the accuracy of one of the jury instructions, and advances a claim of cumulative error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} Defendant's convictions stem from an incident in December 2014, when police were dispatched to a house on Velarde Street in Santa Fe, New Mexico in response to a report of a burglary in progress. In view of the applicable standards, we summarize the relevant procedural history and evidence as follows.
{3} Gene and Margaret Montoya (collectively, the Montoyas) testified that they called 911 after seeing a strange vehicle parked in the driveway of the neighboring house, the doors of the house open, and two men taking objects from inside the house and loading them into the vehicle. The Montoyas testified that no one had lived in that house for years, but they kept an eye on it, and in the past the owner had let them know when others were allowed on the property. The Montoyas provided a description of the vehicle and the license plate number to the police, and at trial, they identified photographs of the house and the vehicle, described various items that they saw being carried away, and identified Defendant as one of the men who was removing items from the house.
{4} Several officers promptly responded to the scene, including Officer Bustamante. Officer Bustamante testified that she located the vehicle described in the dispatch. She initiated a traffic stop and spoke with Defendant, who was driving, and also identified the passenger, Bradley Deets. Officer Bustamante further testified that she saw numerous objects in the back of the vehicle.
{5} Officer Lucero testified that he spoke with the Montoyas, took their statements, and then took Margaret to the location of the traffic stop, where she identified Defendant as one of the men she had seen at the house.
{6} Officer Anaya testified that he heard the dispatch, saw the vehicle pass in the other direction, turned around, and stopped behind Officer Bustamante. Officer Anaya then spoke with Defendant, who explained that he was giving Deets a ride when they saw the house in question. Believing the house was abandoned and that anything located there was free to take, Defendant stated that he had parked the vehicle and that he and Deets gathered metal objects that they found both outdoors and inside the residence and loaded them into the vehicle to sell for scrap. Officer Anaya testified that Deets similarly stated that he and Defendant had taken items from the house, that he had helped Defendant load the items into the vehicle, and that Defendant had indicated that he was planning to sell the metal. Finally, Officer Anaya testified that pliers and a knife were found on Defendant's person, and a crowbar and another set of pliers were found under a floor mat in the vehicle. Officer Anaya indicated that hethought Defendant had used these tools to gain entry into the house, which was consistent with pry marks observed on the door frame.
{7} After the State rested, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The district court concluded that there was sufficient direct or indirect evidence to establish all of the essential elements and denied the motion.
{8} The defense then presented its own evidence. First, Defendant called his girlfriend, Lucille Gallegos, who testified that the vehicle Defendant was driving was hers, that she had given the police consent to search the vehicle, and that a number of items found in the car belonged to her.
{9} Defendant testified next. During the course of his testimony, Defendant admitted that he had taken items from outside the house, believing them to be trash and intending to sell them as scrap. Defendant further admitted that he did not have permission to enter the house, and he said that only Deets had entered and taken items from inside.
{10} Finally, Deets testified. He denied that he and Defendant had discussed burglarizing the house. He also asserted that neither of them had entered the house, and that he had not seen Defendant take any items from the property.
{11} After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury, which ultimately returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. This appeal followed.
{12} Defendant's first issue on appeal challenges the district court's denial of his motion for directed verdict at the close of the State's case.
{13} Because Defendant proceeded to present his own evidence after the district court denied his motion, the issue is not properly before us as stated. See State v. Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 30, 130 N.M. 705, 30 P.3d 394 . Nevertheless, we proceed to construe the issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, in relation to which we consider not only the evidence presented by the State in its case-in-chief, but also the evidence subsequently presented by the defense. See State v. Aranda, 1980-NMCA-130, ¶ 4, 94 N.M. 784, 617 P.2d 173 ().
{14} "The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v.Mestas, 2016-NMCA-047, ¶ 8, 370 P.3d 805 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[W]e view the evidence as a whole and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict while at the same time asking whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{15} To support a conviction for burglary, the State was required to prove that in New Mexico on or about December 20, 2014, Defendant entered a structure without authorization with the intent to commit a theft inside. See NMSA 1978, § 30-16-3 (1971) (); UJI 14-1630 NMRA ().
{16} Applying the standard of review described above, evidence was presented that satisfied each of the requisite elements of burglary. The testimony of the Montoyas established that Defendant entered a structure in New Mexico on the specified date. Defendant admitted that he lacked authorization to enter. This evidence, which included the testimony of the Montoyas that they observed Defendant taking items from inside the residence and placing them into the vehicle, the testimony of the officers concerning their observations, and Defendant's statements that he intended to sell the items, supplies sufficient evidence of the requisite intent. See generally State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 ; State v. Reynolds, 1982-NMSC-091, ¶ 5, 98 N.M. 527, 650 P.2d 811 (). We note that Defendant's stated belief that the property was abandoned does not require a different result. See generally Lopez v. State, 1980-NMSC-050, ¶ 4, 94 N.M. 341, 610 P.2d 745 (); State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 39, 139 N.M. 719, 137 P.3d 659 ().
{17} To support a conviction for conspiracy, the State was required to establish that in New Mexico on or about December 20, 2014, Defendant and another person by words or acts agreed together to commit burglary, and that Defendant and another person intended to commit burglary. See NMSA 1978, § 30-28-2(A) (1979) (); UJI 14-2810 NMRA ().
{18} Once again, the eyewitness testimony of the Montoyas that Defendant and Deets took items from within the house on...
To continue reading
Request your trial