State v. Valentine

• Decision Date: 15 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15033,15033
• Citation: 692 A.2d 727,240 Conn. 395
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Daryl VALENTINE.

Page 727

692 A.2d 727

240 Conn. 395

STATE of Connecticut v. Daryl VALENTINE.

No. 15033.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 31, 1996.

Decided April 15, 1997.

G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and Michael A. Pepper, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (state).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly excluded extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement that had been offered to impeach the testimony of an eyewitness that the defendant had fatally shot two victims and wounded a third victim. The defendant, Daryl Valentine, appeals ¹ from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), ² criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2) ³ and 53a-59 (a)(1), ⁴ and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35. ⁵

On appeal, the defendant challenges several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and the court's denial of his motion to dismiss. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) excluded extrinsic evidence that had been offered to impeach the testimony of the state's witness, Christopher Roach, that he saw the defendant shoot the victims; (2) violated the defendant's constitutional rights by limiting cross-examination into Roach's alleged motive to lie; (3) excluded the videotaped statement of a witness, Kristina Higgins, that had been offered to impeach her prior statement to the police that the defendant was the shooter; (4) excluded other extrinsic evidence that had been offered to impeach Higgins' prior statement to the police; (5) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, which was based on the police department's failure to preserve the photograph of someone identified by a witness, Byron McFadden, as having features similar to those of the shooter; (6) excluded McFadden's statement to the police; (7) violated the defendant's constitutional rights by interrupting cross-examination of a witness, Regina Coleman; and (8) excluded hearsay evidence regarding Coleman's alleged bias toward the police. Because we agree with the defendant that the trial court committed harmful error in excluding extrinsic evidence that had been offered to impeach Roach regarding his identification of the defendant as the shooter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and order a new trial.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 21, 1991, at approximately 2:40 a.m., Andrew Paisley, Hury Poole, and Roach arrived together at the Athenian Diner, located on Whalley Avenue in New Haven. The diner was busy, and a crowd of people were waiting outside. As Roach approached the front of the diner, he saw people fighting on the steps of the diner. Moments later, the defendant came around from the side of the diner and fired several gunshots that hit and fatally wounded Paisley and Poole. The defendant then ran to a parked car and jumped into its front passenger seat. Roach followed him and approached the driver's side of the parked car. As Roach leaned toward the driver's side window, the defendant pushed the driver back and shot Roach twice in the forearm. Roach fell back, and the car sped away. ⁶

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence that had been offered to impeach Roach's testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. Specifically, the defendant claims that a defense witness, Crystal Greene, should have been allowed to testify that Roach had told her that he did not know the identity of the shooter, but was accusing the defendant because somebody had to "pay the price" for the shootings. The defendant claims that the exclusion of this evidence violated his federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense, and also violated state evidentiary rules. The defendant further argues that because Roach was the state's key identification witness whose credibility was a critical issue in the case, the exclusion of this evidence was harmful error requiring reversal. We conclude that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion constituting harmful error. We need not consider, therefore, whether the ruling violated the defendant's constitutional rights.

The following facts are relevant to this claim. When Roach was interviewed by the police on the morning of the murders, he was uncooperative and said that he had not seen who had shot the victims. Two days after the incident, he again spoke to the police and refused to give a formal statement. One week later, Roach gave the police a formal statement in which he said that he had been drunk on the night of the murders, that he had "blacked out" from drinking, and that he had not seen who had shot his two friends. ⁷

In February, 1993, however, Roach gave another statement to the police in which he admitted that his previous statements had been lies. He stated that although he had been drinking on the night of the murders, he had not blacked out and had in fact been aware of what had occurred. He said that he had seen the defendant shoot Paisley and Poole, then run and jump into the passenger seat of a parked car. According to his statement, as Roach approached the driver's side of the car, the defendant shot him in the forearm from inside the car. Roach explained that he had lied to the police because he was afraid of the defendant. In March, 1993, Roach was shown a photographic array by the police and identified the defendant's photograph as that of the shooter.

At trial, Roach was the only witness to identify the defendant as the shooter. ⁸ During direct examination by the state, he testified consistently with his February, 1993 statement that the defendant had shot and killed Poole and Paisley, and had shot him in the arm. He further testified that he had lied in telling the police in 1991 that he had not seen the shooter. According to his testimony, he had lied because he did not know the whereabouts of the defendant and was afraid.

During cross-examination, the defendant asked Roach if he remembered speaking to Greene at the New Haven train station approximately one month before trial. Roach replied that he did. When the defendant asked Roach what Greene had said to him during that conversation, the state objected on hearsay grounds. Outside the presence of the jury, the defendant made an offer of proof that Roach had told Greene that he did not know who had killed Poole and Paisley because he had not seen the shooter. The defendant also sought to show that Roach had told Greene on another occasion, at a New Haven club, that he had not seen the shooter but that somebody had to pay the price for the shootings. The trial court ruled that the defendant could ask Roach only whether he had had a conversation with Greene "about the defendant's involvement in the case." When cross-examination resumed, the defendant asked Roach this question, and Roach answered in the negative. The defendant had no further questions for Roach.

On redirect examination, however, the state asked Roach about the content of his conversation with Greene at the train station. This time, the defendant objected, but the trial court overruled his objection. Roach answered that he had told Greene that he was in town visiting and that he had not discussed with her whether the defendant had shot the victims.

On recross examination, the defendant asked Roach about the content of his conversations with Greene. Roach denied having told Greene at the train station that he had not seen the shooter. Roach also denied having told Greene at the club that he had not seen the shooter but that someone had to pay the price for the shootings.

During the defense case, Greene was called as a witness. When the defendant asked Greene about the contents of her conversation with Roach at the train station, the state objected on hearsay grounds. During the defendant's offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, Greene testified that Roach had told her at the train station that he did not know who shot the victims because he had not seen the shooter. Greene also testified that Roach had told her at the club that he had not seen what had happened, but that "[s]omebody has to pay the price. Somebody has to go." The trial court sustained the state's objection to Greene's testimony on the basis that it was extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter.

On appeal, the defendant argues that Greene's testimony was admissible as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement offered to impeach Roach's testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. ⁹ The defendant contends that, in the circumstances of this case, the court abused its discretion in excluding Greene's testimony, and that this error was harmful. We agree.

As a general rule, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may not be admitted to impeach the testimony of a witness on a collateral matter. State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 247, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). Thus, on cross-examination, a witness' answer regarding a collateral matter is conclusive and cannot be contradicted later by extrinsic evidence. Id., at 248, 630 A.2d 577; C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 7.24.4, p. 211; 1 C. McCormick, Evidence (4th Ed. 1992) § 49, pp. 182-83. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be admitted, however, to impeach a witness' testimony on a noncollateral matter. State v. Colton, supra, at 247, 630 A.2d 577; State v. Burns, 173 Conn. 317, 327, 377 A.2d 1082 (1977); 1 C. McCormick, supra, § 36, p. 118 and § 49, p. 183. A matter is...