State v. Van Buren
| Decision Date | 20 April 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. A--85,A--85 |
| Citation | 29 N.J. 548,150 A.2d 649 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John VAN BUREN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Victor R. King, Plainfield, argued the cause for appellant (Victor R. King, Plainfield, and Robert T. Hueston, Elizabeth, attorneys).
Cuddie E. Davidson, Jr., Sp. Asst. Counsel, Westfield argued the cause for respondent (H. Douglas Stine, County Prosecutor, Plainfield, attorney).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Defendant was charged with murder arising out of a holdup of a food market in which his role allegedly consisted of operating the get-away car. Defendant being 17 years of age, the complaint came before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Union County. The court decided to relinquish jurisdiction and referred the matter to the county prosecutor. The grand jury then returned an indictment for murder. Assigned counsel thereafter appealed from the order of transfer and apparently also asked the juvenile court for a rehearing. The juvenile court indicated its desire to hold a further hearing and to that end we granted an application to remand the cause prior to our consideration of it. Upon the further hearing, the juvenile court reaffirmed its action, and the validity of its order is now before us.
N.J.S. 2A:4--14, N.J.S.A., provides that, except as stated in 2A:4--15, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of juvenile delinquency. Juvenile delinquency is there defined to include the commission by a child under 18 years of age of any act which when committed by a person of the age of 18 years or over would constitute a 'felony, high misdemeanor, misdemeanor, or other offense.' The crime of murder is included. State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21, 48 A.L.R.2d 641 (1954). The exception to the court's exclusive jurisdiction appears in N.J.S. 2A:4--15, N.J.S.A., which reads:
'If it shall appear to the satisfaction of the juvenile and domestic relations court that a case of juvenile delinquency as defined in section 2A:4--14 of this title committed by any juvenile of the age of 16 or 17 years, should not be dealt with by the court, either because of the fact that the person is an habitual offender, or has been charged with an offense of heinous nature, under circumstances which may require the imposition of a sentence rather than the disposition permitted by this chapter for the welfare of society, then the court may refer such case to the county prosecutor of the county wherein the court is situate.
'Any juvenile of the age of 16 or 17 years may demand a presentment and trial by jury and, in such case, when this fact is made known to the court, such case, together with all documents pertaining thereto, shall be referred to the county prosecutor.
'Cases so referred to the county prosecutor shall thereafter be dealt with in exactly the same manner as a criminal case.'
The action here complained of was taken under that section.
Defendant urges (1) the statute, or at least an implementing rule of court to which we will later refer, contemplates the same type of preliminary hearing provided for persons charged with crime, I.e., to determine the existence of probable cause to bind an accused over to await final determination; (2) the juvenile court is required to exhaust all avenues of investigation to determine whether defendant is incorrigible, apparently on the thesis that a reference to the prosecutor may not be made unless it is first found that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under the Juvenile Delinquency Act; and (3) the court abused its discretion under the circumstances of this case.
The history of the treatment of juvenile delinquency in this State appears in Monahan, supra, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21, 48 A.L.R.2d 641. There is no doubt that insofar as conduct is treated as delinquency the approach is protective and rehabilitative rather than punitive. But, as Monahan reveals, there has not been universal agreement as to what acts should be so handled. In some jurisdictions murder is excluded, Annotation, 48 A.L.R.2d 663 (1956), and it was judicially held in this State, prior to Monahan, that it was beyond the legislative power to include homicide within juvenile delinquency whatever the age of the offender.
So also, as to offenses generally, disagreement has been evident with respect to the age which should mark the jurisdictional limit of the juvenile court. In our State the jurisdiction of that court was enlarged in 1943 to include juveniles of the ages 16 and 17, but upon an intermediate approach under which an offense could be dealt with either as a crime or as juvenile delinquency. Chapter 97 of the laws of that year placed the power for the initial decision in (1) the grand jury with the approval of the prosecutor or (2) the prosecutor, or (3) the then courts of criminal jurisdiction. No standard was expressed for the decision to refer the complaint to the juvenile court. The sole prerequisite was a report by the chief probation officer. The juvenile court was authorized to return the matter for criminal prosecution (1) 'at any time before final adjudication * * * if, in its judgment upon the facts disclosed at the hearing, the complaint should not be adjudicated in the juvenile and domestic relations court,' or (2) if 'the probationer shall violate any of the conditions of his probation.'
In 1946 the act was amended to embody the provisions set forth in N.J.S. 2A:4--15, N.J.S.A., quoted above, whereby the juvenile court was given the sole authority to determine on behalf of the State whether the juvenile delinquency or the criminal process shall be invoked as to juveniles of the ages 16 and 17.
In considering whether a hearing is required and if so its nature, it is necessary to keep in mind what is and is not determined when the juvenile court decides to refer the matter. It is clear that the court does not pass upon guilt of crime or upon the existence of delinquency. Rather the question is whether the cause shall be prosecuted under the criminal statute or under the Juvenile Delinquency Act. A finding of juvenile delinquency upon the basis of the conduct charged is neither required nor authorized. What must appear 'to the satisfaction' of the juvenile court is that the person is 'an habitual offender' or 'has been Charged with an offense of a heinous nature, under circumstances which May require the imposition of a sentence rather than the disposition permitted by this chapter for the welfare of society' (emphasis added). A decision to refer the complaint to the prosecutor is not a Disposition of the complaint. Thus, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction is not included in N.J.S. 2A:4--37, N.J.S.A. or R.R. 6:9--11 in the specification of the dispositions the juvenile court may make of a child upon a finding of delinquency. And of course it is evident that under the 1943 act which placed the initial jurisdictional decision inthe discretion of the grand jury with the approval of the prosecutor or in the prosecutor alone, neither the grand jury nor the proseuctor adjudicated guilt. The 1946 amendment did not depart from that approach.
Both the 1943 statute and the 1946 amendment relate to a familiar function of the State--the preliminary decision whether to proceed against an offender and, if so, under which statute if more than one may apply. In the ordinary situation that decision is left to the sound discretion of the county prosecutor as the State's representative in such matters. See United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 40 S.Ct. 289, 64 L.Ed. 333 (1919); Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7 Cir.1955); District of Columbia v. Buckley, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 128 F.2d 17 (Ct.App.D.C.1942), certiorari denied 317 U.S. 658, 63 S.Ct. 57, 87 L.Ed. 529 (1942). In the nature of things, legislation cannot anticipate all factual patterns and hence someone must be empowered on behalf of the State to decide when and in what manner its interests are best served. Here the Legislature authorized the juvenile court to make that preliminary decision, doubtless because of its specialization in this area, its familiarity with specific offenders and a greater likelihood of uniformity in the handling of juveniles.
A prosecutor's decision to act and his choice of a public remedy are Ex parte determinations. It could hardly be suggested that he must hold a hearing on notice before he decides to move or how to proceed. And surely the 1943 statute did not contemplate that either the grand jury or the prosecutor should hold such a hearing before deciding to refer a cause to the juvenile court. But although the juvenile court's decision under the 1946 amendment remains akin to the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion, yet it need not follow that there be no opportunity whatever to be heard. The decision to retain or to relinquish jurisdiction is obviously meaningful to an alleged offender as well as to society, and hence, whatever may be thought of the demands of due process in this situation, fairness to both suggests that there be a hearing to aid the court in reaching a decision. At the same time, the hearing must be limited to one appropriate to the preliminary nature of the question and the criteria for decision which the juvenile court is required to observe.
Defendant appears to contend that the ultimate test is whether the juvenile can be rehabilitated under the provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency Act. Some states have legislated that standard. See Ex parte State ex rel. Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17 So.2d 449 (Sup.Ct.1944); Knight v. Superior Court of Tehama County, 102 Cal.App.2d 211, 227 P.2d 62 (D.Ct.App.1951); State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 321 Mo. 1090, 13 S.W.2d 1061 (Sup.Ct.1929); State ex rel. Norfleet v. Swafford, 184 Tenn. 340, 198 S.W.2d 1007 (Sup.Ct.1947). But that is not the...
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...occur), the procedural course must necessarily conform to the protective approach rather than the punitive. See State v. Van Buren, 29 N.J. 548, 553--554, 150 A.2d 649 (1959), in which this court was concerned with the propriety of the transfer for adult prosecution of a charge against one ......
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