State v. Van Hoozer

• Citation: 192 Iowa 818,185 N.W. 588
• Decision Date: 13 December 1921
• Docket Number: No. 33269.,33269.
• Parties: STATE v. VAN HOOZER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

192 Iowa 818

185 N.W. 588

STATE

v.VAN HOOZER.

No. 33269.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 13, 1921.

Appeal from District Court, Pottawattamie County; J. B. Rockafellow, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for the crime of larceny of a Ford touring car. He was convicted and appeals. Reversed and remanded.John J. Hess, of Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Ben J. Gibson, Atty. Gen., and B. J. Flick, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

FAVILLE, J.

[1] Appellant first assigns error in overruling his objections to a certain juror. Upon the voir dire it appeared that this juror was a member of an association known as the “Anti-Horse Thief Association.” It was disclosed that this was an organization formed for the purpose of bringing to justice persons who may be guilty of stealing horses or automobiles, and that the juror had contributed to a fund which is used by said association to give rewards to persons who secure the conviction of those who steal automobiles within a certain territory. It did not appear, however, that the association was in any way concerned in the prosecution of the appellant. The juror testified that his membership in this organization would in no way bias his judgment in the instant case, and that he could try the case fairly and impartially. The case comes fairly within the rule laid down by us in State v. Wilson, 8 Iowa, 407, under somewhat similar circumstances. It was not error to overrule appellant's objections to the qualifications of the juror.

[2] II. The court permitted the witness Peck to testify over appellant's objection that it was a conclusion and incompetent; that it was his business to check the cars in the garage from which the state claimed the car in question was stolen, and that he had to put a tag on each car and take it off when the car went out. This evidence was merely incidental to the testimony of this witness regarding the alleged theft of the car, and was explanatory of his presence in the garage. There was no error here.

[3] III. A witness who was one of the proprietors of the garage from which the state claimed the car was stolen was asked to state whether or not the car had been recovered, if he knew, and answered that it had not been. The car was taken from the garage of this witness, and was in his possession at the time of the taking. The court did not err in overruling the objections urged to this testimony that it was incompetent and a conclusion.

[4] IV. The appellant produced three witnesses upon the trial, who testified that appellant's general moral character was good. One of these witnesses was named Collins. On his cross-examination by the county attorney the following transpired:

“Q. Did you ever talk with Mr. Ikeman about him? A. I don't know Mr. Ikeman. Q. Mr. Ikeman is the man who lost a car at the Ford garage about three months ago. A. I don't know him. Q. Had you ever heard that the defendant was concerned in the selling of stolen automobile tires while working for the Hughes-Irons Motor Company? A. I never did. Q. Have you ever heard that the defendant at the time of his arrest in connection with the sale of stolen tires had a stolen tire which he admitted was a stolen tire in his possession in the storeroom of the Hughes-Irons Motor Company? A. No.”

Palmer, another of appellant's character witnesses, was asked on cross-examination:

“Did you ever hear of this defendant going with a man named Christensen to C. M. Pennell, a man who lost some tires, and trying to settle up the case that was pending against Christensen concerning some stolen tires?”

Smith, another of said witnesses, was interrogated by the county attorney as follows:

“Did you ever hear that in November, 1917, defendant went with a man named Christensen to a man named Pennell, from whom a number of automobile tires had been stolen, and endeavored to settle with Mr. Pennell for the stolen tires?”

Timely objections were interposed to these questions, which objections were overruled. Thereafter, in rebuttal, the state called the party, Pennell, referred to in the above questions, and also one B. O. Spillman, both of whom testified that appellant's reputation for general moral character was not good. Appellant's counsel did not cross-examine these witnesses. In argument to the jury, the county attorney said:

“Gentlemen of the jury, as against this [referring to defendant's witnesses as to character], I did something which they say is very unfair. I did a thing that I know I had a right to do, and as prosecuting attorney of this county I would have been derelict...