State v. Van Valkenburg

• Decision Date: 15 December 1970
• Citation: 276 A.2d 888,160 Conn. 171
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Paul VAN VALKENBURG.

Page 888

276 A.2d 888

160 Conn. 171

STATE of Connecticut v. Paul VAN VALKENBURG.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1970.

Arthur A. Hiller, with whom, on the brief, were A. Reynolds Gordon and Joseph Biafore, Jr., Bridgeport, for the appellant (defendant).

Donald A. Browne, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Gormley, Jr., State's Atty., for the appellee (state).

Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, THIM, RYAN and SHAPIRO, JJ.

ALCORN, Chief Justice.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of breaking and entering and has appealed from the judgment rendered on the verdict.

One assignment of error is the alleged action of the trial court in refusing to permit defense counsel to question two prospective jurors during the voir dire concerning their personal feelings and possible prejudice in the event that the defendant failed to testify. There is no factual basis for this claimed error. The unattacked finding discloses that the court permitted defense counsel repeatedly to inquire concerning whether the defendant's failure to testify would affect the juror's decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. The only rulings made by the court were to sustain the state's objections to a question which was nevertheless answered and to questions obviously defective in form but for which neither the ground of admissibility nor the ground of objection was stated in order to make the ruling reviewable. Practice Book § 226; Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 155 Conn. 609, 612, 236 A.2d 466. Therefore, the defendant's claim of error as to the voir dire is without merit.

We are constrained to observe in passing that the prevalent trial technique of putting prospective jurors on trial under the guise of a voir dire before commencing the actual trial of the case is a major cause of clogged dockets and prolonged trials. As we said in State v. Mendill, 141 Conn. 360, 362, 106 A.2d 178, 180, 'all too frequently such inquiries represent a calculated effort on the part of counsel to ascertain before the trial starts what the reaction of the venireman will be to certain issues of fact or law or, at least, to implant in his mind a prejudice or prejudgment on those issues. Such an effort transcends the proper limits of the voir dire and represents an abuse of the statutory right of examination.' The trial court has a wide discretion in conducting the examination of jurors, the exercise of which is not reversible error unless it is clearly abused or a litigant has been prejudiced thereby. Childs v. Blesso, 158 Conn. 389, 394, 260 A.2d 582. 'Questions addressed to prospective jurors involving assumptions or hypotheses concerning the evidence which may be offered at the trial or instructions which may be given by the court should be discouraged.' State v. Mendill, supra. Both court and counsel should be alert to a duty to avoid a perversion of the privilege accorded to litigants by § 51-240 of the General Statutes.

The only other assignments of error pursued in the brief relate to the court's charge to the jury. The defendant made no request to charge and took no exception following the charge as required by § 249 of the Practice Book. It our settled practice that, with the exception noted below, the errors claimed in the charge cannot be considered under such circumstances. State v. Magoon, 156 Conn. 328, 335, 240 A.2d 853; State v. Mallette, 153 Conn. 584, 587, 219 A.2d 447, and cases cited. The requirement that either a request to charge be made or an exception be taken if a portion of a charge is to be assigned as error merely implements the fundamental rule that we do not...