State v. Vargas
| Decision Date | 18 March 2013 |
| Citation | 63 A.3d 175,213 N.J. 301 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Cesar Albert VARGAS, Defendant–Appellant, and Carmelo Martinez, Defendant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Wayne R. Powell, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Wayne R. Powell, attorney; Mr. Powell and Wallace R. Wade, of counsel; Mr. Wade, on the brief).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
We must decide whether the community-caretaking doctrine authorizes the police to conduct a warrantless entry and search of a home to check on the welfare of a resident in the absence of the resident's consent or an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there is an emergency.
In this case, a landlord called the police because he had not seen or been able to contact a tenant for two weeks. During the two-week period, the tenant's garbage was not placed curbside, his mail accumulated, his car remained unmoved, and his monthly rent went unpaid. The landlord expressed concern for the tenant's well-being, and the police entered the home without a warrant and conducted a “welfare check.” The tenant was not at home, but the search uncovered evidence that led to the tenant's indictment.
The trial court suppressed the evidence because the warrantless entry and search were not prompted by an objectively reasonable emergency. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the community-caretaking doctrine did not require an exigency to conduct a warrantless search; it only required that the police act reasonably.
We now hold that, based on the United States Supreme Court's and this Court's jurisprudence, the community-caretaking doctrine is not a justification for the warrantless entry and search of a home in the absence of some form of an objectively reasonable emergency. Because the warrantless entry and search in this case violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution, we reverse and reinstate the trial court's suppression order.
A state grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant Cesar Albert Vargas with various second-, third-, and fourth-degree crimes involving money laundering, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, unlawful possession of firearms, unlawful weapons devices, and receiving stolen property. 1 The charges arose from the discovery of contraband during a search of Vargas's apartment. Vargas moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the police entered and searched his apartment in violation of the warrant requirement.
At a suppression hearing before the Honorable Benjamin C. Telsey, J.S.C., the State called four witnesses to testify. The essential facts are largely undisputed.
By March 2008, defendant Cesar Albert Vargas had resided for about a year in a second-floor apartment at 1035 East Park Avenue in Vineland. Henry Olaya, the landlord of the four-unit building, testified that Vargas was a “good tenant”—he kept his place clean and “paid his rent on time.”
On March 2, Olaya placed a letter in Vargas's mailbox informing him that in three days he and an appraiser would enter his apartment. On March 5, Olaya and the appraiser entered Vargas's apartment; Vargas was not at home. Olaya observed nothing amiss inside the residence.
Under the terms of Vargas's lease, rent was due by March 1, and any payment received after the fifth day of the month was deemed late. With the rent unpaid as of March 5, Olaya made several attempts to contact Vargas. However, Olaya received no response to knocks on Vargas's door or to voicemails left on Vargas's cell phone. Two tenants in the building told Olaya that they had not seen Vargas for either “several days” or “weeks.” The tenants noticed that a bag of trash had been sitting on Vargas's front porch, and, for “several days” or perhaps a “week,” Vargas's Jaguar convertible had not been moved.
On March 17, Olaya intended to do spring cleaning at the building. There, he observed Vargas's Jaguar parked beside the house, covered in pollen, its rear tires deflated. Moreover, Vargas's mailbox was full, and Olaya's March 2 letter had not been removed. Olaya knocked on Vargas's door and called his cell phone without any response. Olaya's concern about the unpaid rent now ripened into concern about his tenant's welfare. Olaya decided against entering Vargas's apartment despite the terms of the rental agreement, which provided that the “OWNER may enter ... the premises at any time in case of emergency or suspected abandonment.”
Instead, after conferring with the co-owner of the building, Olaya dialed 9–1–1 to alert the police. Before doing so, however, Olaya did not try calling Vargas's emergency contact number or place of employment.2 Significantly, Olaya did not know details about Vargas's personal life or employment. He did not know the basic pattern of Vargas's “comings and goings,” whether or for how long he vacationed, whether he took business trips, or whether he traveled out of town to meet with family.
In all, three Vineland police officers were dispatched to 1035 East Park Avenue for a “welfare check.” When Sergeant Louis Carini and Patrolman John Calio arrived, Olaya told them that he had been unable to contact Vargas for approximately two weeks. Olaya also explained that tenants had not seen Vargas in that time and that Vargas was behind on his rent and utility bills. The officers observed for themselves that Vargas's mailbox was full, his Jaguar was covered in dust, and the car's tires deflated.
No one answered when the officers knocked on Vargas's door. The officers then peered through a window but saw no one in the apartment. They contacted dispatch and confirmed that no “calls for service”—such as a call for an ambulance or the police—had come from or been directed to Vargas's apartment. The officers did not ask the dispatcher to check whether Vargas had been arrested or hospitalized because such an approach was not consistent with protocol. Olaya—according to Officer Calio—did not tell them that he had Vargas's contact information.3
The officers ultimately entered Vargas's apartment because they “had reasons to fear for his safety.” Olaya unlocked the apartment door, and the officers began to search the premises for Vargas. The officers checked all the rooms of the apartment, as well as the closets, and found no one home and no signs of foul play. In the living room they saw a six- to eight-inch jar containing vegetation that appeared to be marijuana. Olaya, who had entered the apartment with the officers, opened kitchen cabinet drawers. Inside one drawer “appeared to be two canning jars full of marijuana.” An officer standing nearby observed the drawer's contents, and the police then directed everyone to leave the apartment.
The police later secured a warrant to search the apartment.4
The trial court concluded that the police violated the Constitution's warrant requirement and suppressed all evidence seized as a result of the unlawful search of Vargas's home. The court specifically rejected the State's argument that the community-caretaking doctrine justified the warrantless search. According to the court, under the community-caretaking doctrine, the police had to meet a two-prong test before a warrantless search of a residence could be undertaken. The police satisfied prong one because the purpose of the entry into Vargas's home was not to uncover evidence of a crime. The police, however, did not satisfy prong two because there was no objectively reasonable basis to believe that Vargas's life or well-being, or the community's safety was in jeopardy. For that reason, the search of Vargas's home did not fall within an exception to the warrant requirement.
The court distinguished the present case from other community-caretaking doctrine cases: State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 975 A.2d 377 (2009); State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 850 A.2d 1226 (2004); State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 739 A.2d 1016 (App.Div.1999), certif. denied,164 N.J. 560, 753 A.2d 1153 (2000); and State v. Navarro, 310 N.J.Super. 104, 708 A.2d 416 (App.Div.), certif. denied,156 N.J. 382, 718 A.2d 1211 (1998). In each of those cases, the court noted, there was “an immediate risk to not only a present individual but an immediate risk to the community at large.” Here, the court did not see “a single indicia of evidence” that either Vargas's or the community's safety was at risk. Rather, the evidence was consistent with someone vacationing, traveling on business, or tending to a sick family member. In other words, “[h]e just wasn't there for a couple of weeks and that's it.” 5
The court denied the State's motion for reconsideration. The court agreed with the State's argument that the elements of the community-caretaking doctrine do not require “an emergent situation.” Nevertheless, it maintained that the presence of an immediate danger and the urgent need for police action are factors in determining objective reasonableness, and those factors were absent in this case. From the court's perspective, it was not reasonable to conclude that between March 5—the date the landlord entered Vargas's apartment for an appraisal—and March 17—the date the landlord called the police—“something terrible” had happened to Vargas.
The court stated in a supplemental letter that it found further support for its decision in Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.2010). That case held that “[t]he community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a home.” Id. at 177. The court reaffirmed its earlier determination that there were no “exigent circumstances” to justify the warrantless search of Vargas's home.
In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the...
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