State v. Vargas, No. 96-168
| Docket Nº | No. 96-168 |
| Citation | 53 St.Rep. 1184, 279 Mont. 357, 928 P.2d 165 |
| Case Date | November 22, 1996 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
Page 165
v.
Raymond VARGAS, Defendant and Appellant.
Decided Nov. 22, 1996.
Page 166
[279 Mont. 358] Derik Pomeroy, Bozeman, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Cregg Coughlin, Asst. Attorney General, Helena, Catherine L. Truman, Deputy Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
LEAPHART, Justice.
Raymond Vargas (Vargas) appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, finding him guilty of issuing a bad check, common scheme, a felony, and imposing a three-year deferred sentence. We reverse and remand for rehearing.
We restate the issue as follows:
Does the guarantee against double jeopardy prohibit the State from basing a felony bad check (common scheme) charge, in part, upon check(s) which were the subject of a prior conviction for misdemeanor bad checks?
On July 19, 1994, the State of Montana (State) charged Vargas with a single count of misdemeanor issuing a bad check in violation of § 45-6-316(1), MCA. Vargas was charged with the single count misdemeanor despite the fact that the complaint alleged that he had, during a three-week period, written ten individual checks totalling $264.23. Vargas pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge and was given a six-month suspended jail sentence.
When the State charged Vargas with the misdemeanor offense, the County Attorney was only aware of ten bad checks that Vargas had issued. Several months later, the county attorney was notified that Vargas had, during the same three-week period, written an additional [279 Mont. 359] 18 checks totalling $511.91. In light of this newly acquired information, the State charged Vargas with the more serious felony offense of issuing bad checks, common scheme, a violation of § 45-6-316(3), MCA. In the second information filed against Vargas, the State alleged that Vargas issued all 28 checks as part of a common scheme. Vargas moved to dismiss this information, arguing that, under the double jeopardy provision of both the state and federal constitutions, his prior misdemeanor conviction, which was based on one of the 28 checks, prevented additional punishment for the same conduct for which he had been convicted. The District Court denied Vargas' motion to dismiss. Vargas eventually changed his plea to guilty but reserved his right to challenge his conviction on double jeopardy grounds.
Does the guarantee against double jeopardy prohibit the State from basing a felony bad check (common scheme) charge, in part, upon check(s) which were the subject of a prior conviction for misdemeanor bad checks?
The standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686.
Section 46-11-503, MCA, bars a second prosecution based on the same transaction in certain situations. Section 46-11-503, MCA provides in relevant part:
Page 167
(1) When two or more offenses are known to the prosecutor, are supported by probable cause, and are consummated prior to the original charge and jurisdiction and venue of the offenses lie in a single court, a prosecution is barred if:
....
(b) the former prosecution resulted in a conviction that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated[.]
Vargas does not contend that the State actually knew of the other 18 checks when it prosecuted him for the misdemeanor violation. Thus, Vargas specifically eschews any reliance on the "when two or more offenses are known" language of § 46-11-503, MCA, and bases his argument entirely on the constitutional prohibitions against placing a person twice in jeopardy.
[279 Mont. 360] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" This clause has been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; State v. Cole (1987), 226 Mont. 377, 744 P.2d 526. Similarly, Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution provides in part: "No person shall be again put in jeopardy for the same offense previously tried in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Guillaume, No. 97-291
...a single prosecution for the same offense. State v. Savaria (1997), 284 Mont. 216, 222, 945 P.2d 24, 28. See also State v. Vargas (1996), 279 Mont. 357, 360, 928 P.2d 165, 167; State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 90, 910 P.2d 247, 250. In the instant case, Guillaume maintains that applica......
-
State v. Kopp, No. DA 10–0311.
...as subsection (22), as it was when Tadewaldt was decided. 6. We referenced the knowledge element of this statute in State v. Vargas, 279 Mont. 357, 358–59, 928 P.2d 165, 166–67 (1996), where the defendant was charged with felony issuing bad checks, common scheme, after he had been convicted......
-
State v. Pendergrass, No. 96-419
...We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine whether its interpretation of the law is correct. State v. Vargas (1996), 279 Mont. 357, ----, 928 P.2d 165, 166, 53 St.Rep. 1184, 1185 (citation [281 Mont. 132] Pendergrass acknowledges that both the District Court and this Court ......
-
State v. Guillaume, No. 97-291
...a single prosecution for the same offense. State v. Savaria (1997), 284 Mont. 216, 222, 945 P.2d 24, 28. See also State v. Vargas (1996), 279 Mont. 357, 360, 928 P.2d 165, 167; State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 90, 910 P.2d 247, 250. In the instant case, Guillaume maintains that applica......
-
State v. Kopp, No. DA 10–0311.
...as subsection (22), as it was when Tadewaldt was decided. 6. We referenced the knowledge element of this statute in State v. Vargas, 279 Mont. 357, 358–59, 928 P.2d 165, 166–67 (1996), where the defendant was charged with felony issuing bad checks, common scheme, after he had been convicted......
-
State v. Pendergrass, No. 96-419
...We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine whether its interpretation of the law is correct. State v. Vargas (1996), 279 Mont. 357, ----, 928 P.2d 165, 166, 53 St.Rep. 1184, 1185 (citation [281 Mont. 132] Pendergrass acknowledges that both the District Court and this Court ......