State v. Vasquez

• Decision Date: 17 December 2019
• Docket Number: AC 42147
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Ruben VASQUEZ

194 Conn.App. 831

222 A.3d 1018

STATE of Connecticut

v.Ruben VASQUEZ

AC 42147

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 24, 2019

Officially released December 17, 2019

Monte P. Radler, public defender, with whom was Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (acquittee).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, Vicki Melchiorre, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Adam B. Scott, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Bright, Moll and Bishop, Js.

BISHOP, J.

The acquittee,¹ Ruben Vasquez, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (board).² On appeal, the acquittee claims that the court erred in denying his application for discharge because the diagnoses attributed to him—cannabis induced psychotic episode, an acute intoxication now in full remission; cannabis use disorder in remission in a controlled environment; and alcohol use disorder in remission in a controlled environment—are not considered mental illnesses and, thus, do not constitute psychiatric disabilities under General Statutes §§ 17a-580 through 17a-602 (board statutes). We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. "[On July 14, 2009, the acquittee] ... randomly attack[ed] five young individuals, with a four foot six inch [one by four] hard yellow pine pressure treated board. Two of the young individuals attacked were a three and one year old child. While being taken into custody, [the acquittee] physically attacked a police officer."

The acquittee was charged with four counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), four counts of criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-50 (a) (1), and two counts of assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1).³ On June 7, 2011, the acquittee was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13.⁴ On August 8, 2011, the court, Randolph, J. , committed the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board and ordered that he be confined at Dutcher Service on the campus of the Connecticut Valley Hospital for a period not to exceed fifteen years.

On July 25, 2017, in accordance with § 17a-593 (a), the acquittee filed an application with the court seeking discharge from the jurisdiction of the board. The court forwarded the application to the board, which held a hearing on September 15, 2017, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593 (d). On October 26, 2017, the board filed its report with the court recommending that the acquittee not be discharged because "[a]lthough [the acquittee's] psychotic symptoms have not been active since his commitment to the [b]oard, he has repeatedly demonstrated poor judgment, impulsivity, deceitfulness and rule breaking behavior. He has disregarded the rules and protocols in a hospital setting, thereby jeopardizing the [t]emporary [l]eave that would have permitted [the acquittee] to transition to the community. [The acquittee's] treatment team has recommended he consider medication to assist with some of his problematic behaviors, but he has declined the recommendation."

In addition, in its report filed with the court, the board discussed the acquittee's risk factors, stating that "[a] significant risk factor for [the acquittee] remains his history of substance use. As testimony indicated, a substance use relapse would increase [the acquittee's] risk for a re-emergence of his psychotic symptoms. Testimony noted that stress has the potential to exacerbate [the acquittee's] risk of relapse. If discharged from the jurisdiction of the [b]oard, [the acquittee] would return to the community without an established support network. Given that [the acquittee's] psychotic symptoms are intimately tied to his substance use, and [that the acquittee] failed to conform his behavior appropriately in a supervised inpatient setting, the [b]oard finds that [the acquittee's] risk for a substance abuse relapse in a nonsupervised setting without an established community support network is significant. Therefore, the [b]oard finds that [the acquittee] cannot reside safely in the community without [b]oard oversight and should remain under the supervision and jurisdiction of the [b]oard."

On May 29, 2018, after receiving the report, the court, D'Addabbo, J. , held a hearing on the acquittee's application for discharge pursuant to § 17a-593 (f). The court heard testimony from the following individuals: Maya Prabhu, M.D., consultant to the Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services; the acquittee; and Larry Spencer of the Capitol Region Mental Health Center. The court concluded the evidentiary portion of the hearing on May 29, 2018, and heard arguments from the parties' respective counsel on June 18, 2018.

On July 27, 2018, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the acquittee's application for discharge, concluding that, on the basis of the evidence presented at the May 29, 2018 hearing, the acquittee has "psychiatric disabilities" and "if ... released from the [b]oard's supervision entirely ... would ... present a danger to himself or others." This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The acquittee claims that the court erred in denying his application for discharge because the diagnoses attributed to him—cannabis induced psychotic episode, an acute intoxication now in full remission; cannabis use disorder in remission in a controlled environment; and alcohol use disorder in remission in a controlled environment—are not considered mental illnesses and, thus, are not psychiatric disabilities under the board statutes. In making this claim, the acquittee invites this court to overlook our Supreme Court's decision in State v. March , 265 Conn. 697, 830 A.2d 212 (2003), and this court's decision in State v. Kalman , 88 Conn. App. 125, 868 A.2d 766, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 44 (2005), and to conclude that, because his diagnoses are based on substance and alcohol abuse, they cannot be considered mental illnesses or psychiatric disabilities under the board statutes. We are not persuaded.

We first review the statutory procedure relevant to an application for discharge by an acquittee from the jurisdiction of the board. When an individual is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the individual—the acquittee—is committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services for examination of the acquittee's mental condition. General Statutes § 17a-582 (a). Once the examination is complete, a hearing is held, and the court deter-mines whether the examinee should be confined,⁵ conditionally released,⁶ or discharged.⁷ General Statutes § 17-582 (e) (1) and (2). If the court finds that the acquittee should be confined, the acquittee is committed to the jurisdiction of the board for a maximum term of commitment, no longer than that which could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense. General Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (1).

After the court has committed the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board, the board must conduct a hearing within ninety days to review the status of the acquittee. General Statutes § 17a-583 (a). During the hearing, the board must consider whether the acquittee should continue to be confined or whether the acquittee should be conditionally released or discharged. General Statutes § 17a-584. The board is required to conduct these hearings at least once every two years until the acquittee is discharged. General Statutes § 17a-585. The acquittee may apply to the court for discharge no sooner than six months after the board's initial hearing and not more than once every six months thereafter. General Statutes § 17a-593 (a). The court then forwards the application for discharge to the board. Thereafter, the board has ninety days after receiving the application to file a report with the court setting forth findings and conclusions as to whether the acquittee should be discharged. General Statutes § 17a-593 (d).

Upon receiving the report, the court conducts a hearing on either the recommendation from the board or the acquittee's application for discharge. General Statutes § 17a-593 (f). At the hearing, the acquittee has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she should be discharged. General Statutes § 17a-593 (g). Thereafter, the court makes a finding regarding the mental condition of the acquittee, "considering that its primary concern is the protection of society ...." General Statutes § 17a-593 (g). In its finding, the court may determine either that the application for discharge be dismissed or that the acquittee be discharged from the board's custody. See § 17a-593 (g).

Here, the acquittee claims that the court erred in denying his discharge application on the ground that his diagnoses constituted psychiatric disabilities under the board statutes. More specifically, the acquittee asserts that because General Statutes § 17a-458 (b) differentiates between "persons with psychiatric disabilities"⁸ and "persons with substance use disorders,"⁹ the acquittee is not considered to have a "psychiatric disability."

Resolution of the acquittee's claim on appeal requires us to interpret the meaning of the terms "psychiatric disability" and "mental illness" under the board statutes, which presents a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See State v. March , supra, 265 Conn. at 705, 830 A.2d 212. On the basis of our interpretation of the relevant statutory scheme, we then assess...