State v. Vasquez

Decision Date03 July 2017
Docket NumberDocket No. 43260,2017 Opinion No. 38
PartiesSTATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IDA PEREZ VASQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Power County. Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction, vacated and case remanded.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

____________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Ida Perez Vasquez appeals from the judgment of conviction entered following her conditional plea of guilty to one count of intimidating a witness, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-2604(3). Vasquez argues she was deprived of her state and federal constitutional right to a jury trial because although her trial counsel waived her right to a jury trial, Vasquez never personally waived such right, either orally or in writing. We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, D.P. made allegations of sexual abuse against her paternal uncle, but later recanted those allegations. D.P.'s father, paternal uncle, and Vasquez are all siblings. In 2012, D.P. disclosed additional acts of sexual abuse by the same uncle. Because of the new allegations, police officers again investigated the 2009 allegations. During the course of the 2012 investigation, the officers obtained evidence that Vasquez coached D.P. in 2009 regarding what to say during the recantation. As a result, Vasquez was charged with intimidating a witness.

Vasquez initially pleaded not guilty and the case was set for trial. After a failed attempt at mediation, trial was reset. The day before trial, Vasquez's counsel and the prosecutor informed the district court they intended to waive the right to a jury trial and stipulate to a bench trial. On the day of trial, the following exchange occurred:

Court: Yesterday I was advised by the counsel for parties, both the state and the defendant, that they had stipulated to waive a jury and try this case to the court.
Is that right, Mr. Peterson?
Mr. Peterson: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: Mr. Souza?
Mr. Souza: Yes, sir.
Court: All right. So the record will reflect that agreement.

Although Vasquez was present during this exchange, she was never asked by the court whether she personally agreed to waive her right to a jury trial. Following the bench trial, Vasquez was convicted of felony intimidating a witness. The district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years determinate, and placed Vasquez on probation. Vasquez timely appealed. On appeal, Vasquez argues that the failure of the district court to specifically ask Vasquez and obtain her waiver of her right to a jury trial constituted a structural defect in the proceedings, mandating that her conviction be vacated.

II.ANALYSIS

We recognize the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 376 P.3d 707 (2016). However, because the Supreme Court found that the proceedings in the district court constituted a guilty plea rather than a bench trial, it did not address whether the waiver of the right to a jury trial is a right personal to the defendant and consequently, can be waived only by the defendant. Id. at 507, 376 P.3d 710. Because the issue was not squarely presented, the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the issue of what constitutes a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial:

In holding that [Umphenour's] waiver of the right to a jury trial could be fairly inferred, we are only referring to a waiver of that right in connection with a guilty plea. We express no opinion as to whether it would have been adequate had he really waived a jury trial and had a court trial.

Id. at 507, 376 P.3d at 711. Here, however, the issue is squarely presented.

Vasquez did not file a motion for a new trial nor otherwise raise the issue of a violation of her right to a jury trial in the district court. Therefore, in order to obtain relief on appeal, Vasquez must demonstrate fundamental error. To do so:

(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (footnote omitted).

A. Clear Violation of a Constitutional Right

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution both preserve a criminal defendant's right to trial by jury. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, however, Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution also directs how that right to a jury trial may be waived. It states:

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . . A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

The requirements for a valid waiver of a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial was addressed by a special panel of this Court composed of one Supreme Court justice, one senior Supreme Court justice, and one district judge in State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 703 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1985). There, the defendant's attorney, on the record in open court at the arraignment and again on the first day of trial, stipulated in the defendant's presence to waive the defendant's jury trial right and consented to a court trial. Id. at 964 n.1, 703 P.2d at 728 n.1. The district court thereupon conducted a court trial and found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed, contending that his personal waiver in open court was required for a valid waiver of his jury trial right and that his attorney could not effectively waive that right on the defendant's behalf. Id. at 964, 703 P.2d at 728. This Court agreed that a defendant's personal waiver is required, and therefore reversed the conviction. Id. at 966, 703 P.2d at 730.

Although the precise source of that requirement is not clearly articulated in the Swan opinion, we conclude that its holding that a defendant's personal assent to a waiver is necessarywas grounded upon Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution. This is evident from the Swan court's discussion of State v. Davis, 104 Idaho 523, 661 P.2d 308 (1983), where the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that a criminal defendant could waive the jury trial protections of Article I, § 7 in favor of a court trial even though the constitutional provision in effect at the time1 did not expressly allow a defendant to do so in a felony case. In Swan, this Court framed the issue presented as one not decided in Davis--how, in consideration of the newly amended Article I, § 7, the right to a jury trial is effectively waived in a felony case. Swan, 108 Idaho at 965, 703 P.2d at 729. After considering the importance of the fundamental right to a jury trial as expressed by the United States Supreme Court and authority from other jurisdictions (whether based upon statute, court rule, or state constitution) requiring a defendant's personal waiver, this Court held that a waiver may not be accepted "unless the defendant, after being advised by the court of his right to a trial by jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in writing or in open court for the record." Id. at 966, 703 P.2d at 730 (quoting American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Vol. III, ch. 15, Trial by Jury, § 1.2(b) (1980)). The Court opined that: "a requirement that the Court personally address the defendant will not constitute an undue burden on the courts where this very important right is at issue."2 Swan, 108 Idaho at 966, 703 P.2d at 730.

Here, the district court did not discuss with Vasquez her right to trial by jury at which the State would have the burden of proving her guilt, nor did it obtain Vasquez's personal waiver of that right in open court. Vasquez has thus established a clear violation of her right to a jury trial under Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution, satisfying the first two prongs of the Perry test for fundamental error. Because we conclude that a defendant's express personal waiver is requiredby the Idaho Constitution, we do not address whether the same requirement is imposed by the Sixth Amendment.

B. Whether the Error Affected the Defendant's Substantial Rights

The remaining issue is whether Vasquez has satisfied the third prong. According to Perry, that third element requires that: "the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

In this appeal, Vasquez makes no argument that the invalid waiver of her right to a jury trial "affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." That is, she does not assert the record demonstrates that, had the district court asked her personally whether she was waiving her jury trial right, she would have said no or that a jury as the trier of fact would have acquitted. Instead, Vasquez contends that she is relieved of the burden to show prejudice because a constitutionally invalid waiver of the right to a jury trial is a structural defect that necessitates reversal without a demonstration of actual prejudice.

Vasquez's structural defect argument implicates the "in most instances" hedge in the Perry opinion's...

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