State v. Vasquez-Salas
Decision Date | 17 May 2021 |
Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37856,A-1-CA-37856 |
Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HUGO VASQUEZ-SALAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{1} Defendant Hugo Vasquez-Salas appeals his conviction for possession of burglary tools. On appeal, Defendant claims (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) his right of cross-examination was improperly limited; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; and (5) cumulative error requires reversal. We affirm.1
{2} Defendant claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Our review of a district court's order on a motion to suppress presents "a mixed question of fact and law." State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. "In reviewing a district court's ruling denying a motion to suppress, the appellate courts draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the ruling and defer to the district court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by substantial evidence." State v. Murry, 2014-NMCA-021, ¶ 10, 318 P.3d 180. "[W]e then review de novo the [district] court's application of law to the facts to determine whether the search or seizure were reasonable." Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30. Here, Defendant, who was a passenger in a vehicle lawfully stopped for a traffic offense, is challenging the authority of the officer to expand the seizure by asking him for his identification. Defendant bases his argument on State v. Affsprung, 2004-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 4, 20-21, 135 N.M. 306, 87 P.3d 1088, where this Court held that the defendant's mere presence as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation did not provide individualized suspicion for the officer to ask for the passenger's identification. To satisfy Affsprung, we must consider whether there was reasonable suspicion to subject Defendant to the officer's questions. See id. ¶ 9.
{3} "A police officer can initiate an investigatory traffic stop without infringing the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution,] or Article II, Section 10 [of the New Mexico Constitution] if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken." State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 410 P.3d 186 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We "will find reasonable suspicion if the officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring." State v. Dopslaf, 2015-NMCA-098, ¶ 8, 356 P.3d 559 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{4} In Affsprung, 2004-NMCA-038, ¶ 2, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by a law enforcement officer for a faulty license plate light. The officer, who observed no suspicious behavior from the defendant, asked the defendant for identification. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. The officer then ran a wants and warrants check of the defendant, discovering an outstanding warrant. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. This Court held that the defendant's "mere presence" in the stopped vehicle, where the officer had "no suspicion whatsoever of criminal activity or danger of harm from weapons[,]" could not justify even a "minimal intrusion to tip the balance in favor of public or officer safety over individual Fourth Amendment privacy." Id. ¶ 20.
{5} The facts in this case are distinguishable from Affsprung. Unlike Affsprung, the officer's questioning of Defendant here was based on the officer's suspicion of criminal activity. See id. ¶ 11 ( ). The suspected criminal activity was the possession of burglary tools. "Possession of burglary tools consists of having in the person's possession a device or instrumentality designed or commonly used for the commission of burglary and under circumstances evincing an intent to use the same in the commission of burglary." NMSA 1978, § 30-16-5 (1963).
{6} At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Brice Stacy of the Clovis Police Department testified that he stopped a vehicle for a broken taillight. The stop occurred shortly before 4:00 a.m. The driver and Defendant, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, were in the vehicle. When Officer Stacy approached the vehicle, he noticed an open backpack in the back seat, with various objects and tools sticking out. Officer Stacy testified that he has experience and training in identifying burglary tools and was alerted by the items in the backpack, specifically the "combination of them." He identified the items as bolt cutters, protective eyeglasses, two pairs of gloves, and a facemask, which was described as a bandana. Officer Stacy initially asked for identification from the driver, who was nervous and did not want to give the Officer Stacy any identifiers. The driver eventually stated that he was an unlicensed minor. In an apparent attempt to determine whether Defendant could legally drive the vehicle away, Officer Stacy asked Defendant whether he had a driver's license. Officer Stacy closed out his testimony by stating that by the time he asked Defendant for his identification he already suspected that the items in the backseat were burglary tools. In announcing its ruling, the district court noted the requirement under Affsprung for independent suspicion relating to passengers and denied Defendant's motion after concluding that the totality of the circumstances, including the tools, the time of day, and the driver's nervousness, supported reasonable suspicion to question Defendant. We agree with the district court's ruling.
{7} Defendant claims that the items in the backpack were common household items and could not form the basis for reasonable suspicion, even if considered in combination with each other. In support, Defendant refers us to State v. Estrada, 1991-NMCA-026, ¶¶ 10-11, 111 N.M. 798, 810 P.2d 817, for the proposition that the presence of an innocent item in a vehicle, without more, will not provide reasonable suspicion to expand a traffic detention. However, in that case the suspicion was limited solely to a misplaced tire in the vehicle. See id. ¶ 11 () . As we have noted, the present case involved multiple items that Officer Stacy believed were burglary tools, as well as other factors, including Officer Stacy's testimony that his training and experience provided a basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Cf. id. ¶ 13 ( ). Moreover, the items in the backseat were readily available to both Defendant and the driver. In considering this with the other facts known to Officer Stacy, the limited questioning of Defendant being challenged here, where Officer Stacy simply asked Defendant for his identifiers, was not unreasonable. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 9 ( ); State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 .
{8} Because Officer Stacy's suspicion was reasonable, we conclude that the district court's denial of the motion to suppress did not constitute error.
{9} Defendant claims that the district court erred in preventing him from cross-examining an officer about the driver's criminal history, including possession of a controlled substance. We agree with the district court's ruling that this line of questioning was irrelevant. See Rule 11-401 NMRA. Even assuming, arguendo, that a case for relevancy could be made, Defendant has not established any prejudice, because it is speculative to say that this would have helped Defendant or would not have instead been viewed by the jury in a manner that further implicated Defendant's own guilt. See State v. Fernandez, 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 13, 117 N.M. 673, 875 P.2d 1104 ().
{10} Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective. We will not decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal unless a defendant makes a prima facie showing that counsel was incompetent, and the incompetence resulted in prejudice to the defense. See State v. R...
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