State v. Vaszorich

• Decision Date: 22 June 1953
• Docket Number: A--150,Nos. A--149,s. A--149
• Citation: 13 N.J. 99,98 A.2d 299
• Parties: STATE v. VASZORICH et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 99

13 N.J. 99

98 A.2d 299

STATE v. VASZORICH et al.

Nos. A--149, A--150.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued June 1, 1953.

Decided June 22, 1953.

Edward F. Juska, Long Branch, for appellant Vaszorich.

William J. O'Hagan, Asbury Park, for appellant Brown (Stout & O'Hagan, Asbury Park, attorneys).

George A. Gray, Asst. Pros., Monmouth County, Red Bank, for respondent (J. Victor Carton, Monmouth County Pros., Asbury Park, attorney; George A. Gray, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., J.

Appellants Vaszorich and Brown, and one Berry who does not appeal, were convicted in the Monmouth County Court upon an indictment for the murder on September 8, 1951 of Jeremiah Delhagen. Vaszorich was sentenced to death, and Brown and Berry, upon the jury's recommendation, to life imprisonment. Vaszorich was 19 years of age and both Brown and Berry were 17 when the crime was committed.

The decedent, aged 60, lived alone in a four-room bungalow at Wayside. In the late evening of September 8, 1951 he was asleep in a chair in his living room when the three youths, in accordance with a plan made some days earlier to burglarize the house and rob Delhagen, entered a bedroom adjoining the living room through a window opening upon the front porch. Before going into the house Vaszorich obtained Mr Delhagen's steelworker's claw wrench, some 17 inches long, from the cellar. Vaszorich went almost immediately to the living room where he brutally beat the sleeping man about the head numerous times with the heavy wrench. When decedent, awake and begging not to be hit, struggled to rise, Brown and Berry came to Vaszorich's aid and helped subdue him until Vaszorich succeeded in binding him with some strings of Christmas tree lights which Berry found in one of the bedrooms. Pillows and some furniture were also piled on him. Meanwhile Berry and Brown had stripped the decedent of his trousers, and Vaszorich took from his pocket a wallet containing approximately $300. The search of the house for other valuables was continued and a wrist watch and gun were taken. The decedent continued to struggle to get up, whereupon Vaszorich dragged him into the kitchen and beat him again about the head with the wrench and piled furniture, blankets and pillows and other things upon him, after which he joined Brown and Berry at the front of the house, threw the wrench in the front yard and the three left. They drove away in an automobile they had parked nearby. The car was owned by one John Dean or Dino with whom Brown lived and who allowed Brown the use of it. En route to Shark River Hills Vaszorich gave Brown and Berry each one-third of the stolen money and threw the wallet, the gun and the wrist watch out of the car window at different places on the way. Vaszorich's shirt became considerably bloodied during the assault upon Mr. Delhagen, and when they reached Shark River Hills he attempted to burn his shirt, but unsuccessfully; after the three confessed the shirt was recovered by the authorities. Brown and Berry also had blood stains on their clothing. The three went to a diner in Belmar where they washed up in a washroom and then sat down to a meal of pie, coffee and sandwiches.

In the meantime Mr. Delhagen managed in some way to get to the home of a neighbor who summoned the police. He was immediately taken to Fitkin Memorial Hospital but did not respond to treatment and died in the early morning of September 10. Later that same morning an autopsy was performed. This disclosed that the blows with the wrench caused a skull fracture and intercranial hemorrhages. There were 14 lacerations on his head and four others distributed on the left shoulder, arm and wrist and hand.

Appellants argue a number of points, some applicable to both and others to only one of them. The points will be considered under appropriate topic headings.

The Confessions

Vaszorich alleges error in the admission of his confession into evidence. He contends that the proofs show that it was not voluntarily given in matter of law, that from the time of his arrest early on October 1 until the confession was signed on October 4 'he was questioned for hours on end every day by waves of inquisitors; was taken in and out of cells; was moved around to various police headquarters throughout the county and to the jail at Freehold; was taken out by detectives to look for various items allegedly used in connection with the crime; was taken to a State psychiatrist; was given very little food at irregular hours and in general, every psychological trick and pressure was applied by police authorites of various municipalities, by detectives attached to the Prosecutor's office and by the Assistant Prosecutor himself.' The argument concludes, 'It cannot be said on the bare record itself that a statement given by a nineteen year old boy after hours and days of questioning, illegal detention, irregular meals, shifting from one police station to another and faced at all times by groups of questioning authorities, can possibly be voluntary.'

This proposition that Vaszorich was the helpless victim of a relentless and reprehensible 'suction' process is without support even in his own testimony. The governing principles upon this question have been discussed in several of our recent opinions and no purpose would be served in stating them again. See State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949); State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249, 19 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1950), certiorari denied 340 U.S. 839, 71 S.Ct. 25, 95 L.Ed. 615 (1950); State v. Pierce, 4 N.J 252, 72 A.2d 305 (1950); State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 92 A.2d 786 (1952); State v. Grillo, 11 N.J. 173, 93 A.2d 328 (1952), certiorari denied 73 S.Ct. 1123 (1953). The essence of the inquiry is whether in obtaining the confession there was observance of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,' for 'the aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.' Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166, 180 (1941). And 'Whether a statement or confession is, in fact, voluntary, depends on the facts of the individual case and the determination of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal where the evidence is adequate to sustain it.' State v. Cooper, supra, 10 N.J., at page 550, 92 A.2d at page 795. Here Vaszorich admitted that after his arrest on October 1 at his mother's home in Ocean Grove he was first taken to the local police station and there turned over to the Deal police who took him to the Deal police station where he stayed until the next morning; that during the morning of October 1 he was questioned about matters other than the Delhagen case but not at all in the afternoon or early evening about anything except that he was interviewed by some reporters; that he was first questioned about the Delhagen murder starting at about a quarter before eleven that night and continuing, according to him, until 1:30 in the morning of October 2, after which he was not disturbed until 7:30 that morning when county authorities took him into custody and he was arraigned before a magistrate upon the charge of murder; that following that appearance he was taken to the jail at Freehold, the county seat, and from there to some place, with Berry, on an investigation not connected with the Delhagen case, and for a time during the afternoon was with the Director of the State Hospital at Marlboro, a psychiatrist, returning to the jail about 7:30 that evening, after which he was not disturbed through the night; that throughout the day, October 2, little was said to him by the authorities about the Delhagen murder; that on October 3 he was not interrogated about the case except as officers mentioned it to him incidentally while 'walking through the woods'; that on October 4 he was brought to the prosecutor's office at about 2:30 P.M. to be questioned about the Delhagen murder and that in the course of the afternoon he gave his statement, signed it and initialled the several pages. Plainly, we need not refer to the other abundant proofs supporting the finding of the trial judge in order to demonstrate that Vaszorich's contention is wholly without substance. Cf. State v. Gillo, supra. 'Psychological coercion' in any sense recognized in the law was not proved. See Stein v. People of State of New York, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953).

Brown's contention is that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury, as Brown requested, that 'whether the statement of Brown was voluntarily made or not is a question to be decided by you,' and in charging instead: 'Where there is a dispute as to the voluntary character of a statement or confession made by a defendant, the trial court must pass upon the quality of the confession. This Court after receipt of the testimony for and against the voluntary character of the statements made by these three defendants has admitted them into evidence. The confessions are now part and parcel of all the evidence in this case, and it is left for the jury to decide whether the defendants spoke the truth when they confessed. In other words, the jurors within their province can weigh them, accept them or reject them, as you choose.'

We do not see that the trial judge entirely withdrew the question of the voluntariness of Brown's confession from the jury, particularly when considered with the fact that the judge charged Brown's request number 10 which was: 'If you find that the statement taken from the defendant George Eugene Christian Brown was not voluntarily made by him, I charge you that the requirement of the law is not to exclude from consideration evidence which is presumptively false, but to prevent unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.' But, even accepting Brown's view of the effect of...