State v. Vatter

• Decision Date: 19 March 1887
• Parties: STATE v. VATTER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

71 Iowa 557

32 N.W. 506

STATE

v.VATTER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 19, 1887.

Appeal from district court, Cedar county.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of arson, and he appeals.W. A. Foster and C. E. Wheeler, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

ROTHROCK, J.

1. On the fourth day of July, 1885, the dwelling-house of one Alexander Spear, situated on his farm in Cedar county, was totally destroyed by fire. The house was a large and valuable farm dwelling, and nearly new. No one was in the building when the fire was discovered. Spear and his family had closed it up, fastened the windows and window shutters, and locked the doors, and went away to a public picnic about three miles distant. There is no question but that the fire was incendiary. That fact appears to have been conceded on the trial, and it is established by the evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. On the eleventh day of the same month some out-buildings or sheds on the farm were fired, but the fire was extinguished. A few days afterwards a large quantity of hay and oats, which was in stacks on the farm, was consumed by fire. None of these fires were accidental. They were without doubt the work of an incendiary. The trial from which this appeal was taken, was upon an indictment for burning the dwelling-house.

The first claim made by counsel for appellant is that the court erred in overruling a number of challenges for cause to persons who were called as jurors in the case. These challenges were interposed as to five of the jurors, and the ground of the challenges was that the persons challenged were disqualifiedby reason of having formed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. It is provided by subd. 11 of section 4405 of the Code that a person who has “formed or expressed such an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner as would prevent him from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the trial” may be challenged for cause. Each one of the five persons whom it is claimed were disqualified by reason of having formed opinions was examined under oath by the district attorney, and cross-examined by counsel for the defendant, touching their knowledge of the case, and any opinions they may have formed regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused. In response to the district attorney, they all answered, in substance, that they had neither formed nor expressed such opinions as would prevent them from rendering a true verdict; in other words, they answered that they did not have such opinions as disqualified them under the statute. The question was put to them by the district attorney very nearly in the language of the statute. It is true that on cross-examination they stated that they had opinions on the subject; and one or more of them, in answer to the question whether such opinions were unqualified, stated that they were, but all through their examination they appeared to adhere to the belief that they had no opinion which would prevent them from rendering a true verdict according to the evidence....